


AFRICA MIGRATION REPORT

CHALLENGING
THE NARRATIVE



Federal Department of Foreign Affairs FDFA
Directorate of Political Affairs DP
Human Security Division



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
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AFRICA MIGRATION REPORT

CHALLENGING THE NARRATIVE



Federal Department of Foreign Affairs FDFA
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Human Security Division





Cover photo

We are Africa, we want to be integrated, thriving, peaceful, piloted by the population, bold globally. Together we are strong, and to stay strong, we have to work together, exchange, share skills, learn from each other, look straight ahead together, believe in the same vision and move together on the same path, on the same rhythm, beat as one heart. This is the future Africa, where movement of people waves the continent on positive vibes, representing freedom of movement, self-reliance and growth.

This future Africa is represented by the African Union color theme of green, representing the hopes and aspiration of a unified and integrated continent. A wavy line moving together on the same rhythm but acknowledging diversity through the different amplitudes, a move that progressively impacts all African countries in a positive way. Because we all are Africa, the future Africa.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|--------------------|--|
| AAPC | All African People's Conference |
| ACERWC | African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child |
| ACP | African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States |
| ACP-EU | Africa Caribbean Pacific-European Union |
| ACRWC | African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child |
| ADFC | African Diaspora Finance Corporation |
| AEC | African Economic Community |
| AfCFTA | African Continental Free Trade Area |
| AfDB | African Development Bank |
| AFFORD | African Foundation for Development |
| AI | artificial intelligence |
| AIR | African Institute of Remittances |
| AUC | African Union Commission |
| AUFMP | African Union Free Movement Protocol |
| AU-HoAI | African Union-Horn of Africa Initiative on Human Trafficking and Smuggling of Migrants |
| BCP | border control post |
| BID | best interests determination |
| BMIS | border management information system |
| CAP | Common African Position |
| CCPAU | Centre for Citizens' Participation in the African Union |
| CEN-SAD | Community of Sahel-Saharan States |
| CEMAC | Central African Economic and Monetary Community |
| COMESA | Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa |
| CRC | Convention on the Rights of the Child |
| CTDC | Counter-Trafficking Data Collaborative |
| DDI | Direct Diaspora Investment |
| DoV | determinants of vulnerability |
| DTM | Displacement Tracking Matrix |
| EAC | East African Community |
| ECCAS | Economic Community of Central African States |
| ECOWAS | Economic Community of Western African States |
| EVD | Ebola virus disease |
| FAO | Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations |
| FDI | foreign direct investment |
| GCC | Gulf Cooperation Council |
| GCR | Global Compact on Refugees |
| GDP | gross domestic product |
| GMDAC | Global Migration Data Analysis Centre |
| HABITAT-III | Third United Nations Conference on Housing and Sustainable Urban Development |
| IBM | integrated border management |
| ICBT | informal cross-border trade |

| | |
|-------------------|---|
| ICESCR | International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights |
| ICRMW | International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families |
| IDP | internally displaced person |
| IDMC | Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre |
| IGAD | Intergovernmental Authority on Development |
| IGAD-RCP | Intergovernmental Authority on Development Regional Consultative Process on Migration |
| IHR | International Health Regulation |
| ILO | International Labour Organization |
| IOM | International Organization for Migration |
| IPCC | Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change |
| JLMP | Joint Labour Migration Programme |
| LMAC | Labour Migration Advisory Committee |
| MDR | multidrug-resistant |
| MIDCAS | Migration Dialogue for Central African States |
| MIDCOM | Migration Dialogue from the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa Member States |
| MIDSA | Migration Dialogue for Southern Africa |
| MIDWA | Migration Dialogue for West Africa |
| MIP | Minimum Integration Programme |
| MMC | Mixed Migration Centre |
| MPFA | Migration Policy Framework for Africa |
| NIDCOM | Nigerians in Diaspora Commission |
| OAU | Organisation of African Unity |
| OCHA | United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs |
| ODA | Official Development Assistance |
| OECD | Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development |
| OSBP | one-stop border post |
| PDD | Platform on Disaster Displacement |
| PKD | International Civil Aviation Organization Public Key Directory |
| RCP | regional consultative process on migration |
| REC | regional economic community |
| SAATM | Single African Air Transport Market |
| SADC | Southern African Development Community |
| SDG | Sustainable Development Goal |
| SIDA | Swedish International Development Agency |
| SME | small- and medium-sized enterprise |
| TB | tuberculosis |
| UHC | universal health coverage |
| UMA | Arab Maghreb Union |
| UMC | unaccompanied migrant children |
| UNCTAD | United Nations Conference on Trade and Development |
| UN DESA | United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs |
| UNECA | United Nations Economic Commission for Africa |
| UNEP | United Nations Environment Programme |
| UN-Habitat | United Nations Human Settlement Programme |
| UNHCR | United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees |
| WHA | World Health Assembly |
| WHO | World Health Organization |

FOREWORD

This first-ever *Africa Migration Report* comes at a momentous period of change on the African continent. Migration as a topic has today taken centre stage in policy discourse in Africa as in much of the rest of the world, evidenced by the adoption of two global compacts – Global Compact on Refugees and Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (Global Compact for Migration) – that seek to deal with human mobility more holistically. The chosen theme of this inaugural edition – Challenging the Narrative – could not be more fitting given the myriad misconceptions, myths and fears around migration that persist. This report tells the story of African migration from the perspective of Africa, and demonstrates the continent’s ardent desire to take control of managing this phenomenon in a manner that maximizes its benefits for the citizens of the continent, while also addressing the negative impacts that continued, uncontrolled migration imply for African countries and migrants.

In recent years, the migration crisis in the Mediterranean has sadly become the poster child for African migration. The desperation that characterizes migration across the Mediterranean has reinforced the perception that African migration is a south-to-north movement, with African migrants taking extreme measures, often at the risk of life and limb, to harvest the promise of Europe.

It goes without saying that African migration goes beyond images of the rickety boats on the Mediterranean or conflict-induced displacements that we see in the media. While these certainly have a place in the narrative, the larger frame of the story is as complex and diverse as the people of the continent itself. It is a story that includes subregional, regional and cross-regional aspirations for enhanced integration, and with it, the recognition that migration in Africa today has the potential to drive continental development and transformation. Contrary to conventional belief, the data clearly demonstrates that far more Africans migrate across land borders than cross seas and oceans.


This first edition therefore seeks to provide additional perspectives that ensure a more complete understanding of this complex phenomenon, thereby correcting misconceptions regarding African migration. The report provides a status update on the breadth of issues that characterize migration on the continent from which both practitioners and policymakers can draw to inform their actions.

As a collaborative endeavour between the African Union Commission (AUC) and IOM, the report is a reflection of both entities’ commitment to more fully harnessing the benefits of migration on the continent and effectively addressing the real drawbacks when migration is not well-managed. Some of the key AUC-IOM initiatives that seek to achieve the goal of enhanced migration governance on the continent include the Joint Labour Migration Programme, the Protocol on Free Movement of Persons and the African Union Horn of Africa Initiative on Human Trafficking and Smuggling of Migrants. Further, through its growing number of offices on the continent, IOM is striving to give effect to progressive migration policies at the national level.

This edition comes on the heels of the adoption of the Global Compact for Migration and is further testament to the commitment of our two Organizations to enhancing the benefits that well-managed migration can have for African countries and their citizens on a continent that is poised for accelerated economic development. How far the aspiration of peaceful Africa – where migration can help all its citizens prosper – as encapsulated in the African Union’s ambitious Agenda 2063 and the United Nations Agenda 2030 and its Sustainable Development Goals, will no doubt depend on the determination with which African countries embrace the African Union’s abundance of policy frameworks and implement them, and the support upon which they are able to draw from the competent United Nations agencies.



Antonio Vitorino
Director General
IOM



Moussa Faki Mahamat
Chairperson
AUC

In this design, Africa is represented with some columns of sheets of paper. Each sheet represents the African people. The varied colors represent the African people's diversity. The three big white curved lines are like a violent wind enabling the sheets to follow the wind whichever way it blows. These lines represent the way that migrants flow in and out of the continent. The curved sheets on the map of Africa represents the potential in freedom of mobility across borders, the potential free movement has in contributing to safe and protected migratory journeys, and its benefits for continental integration. The shadowed Africa and the meridian-like lines means that African migrants all over bring their identity with them, consciously contributing to the development of the continent.

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1

WHAT IS WRONG WITH
THE NARRATIVE ON
AFRICAN MIGRATION?

CHAPTER 1

WHAT IS WRONG WITH THE NARRATIVE ON AFRICAN MIGRATION?

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If you talk to a man in a language he understands, that goes to his head. If you talk to him in his language, that goes to his heart.



– Nelson Mandela

ABSTRACT

This chapter lays out the goal of this first-ever *Africa Migration Report*, which is to advance the African migration agenda in the broader development and integration of the continent. Three reasons are identified for the distortions that characterize the current narrative on African migration: (a) most African migrants are not crossing oceans, but rather crossing land borders within Africa; (b) 94 per cent of African migration across oceans takes on a regular form; and (c) most global migrants are not African. Africa accounts for 14 per cent of the global migrant population, compared, for example, to 41 per cent from Asia and 24 per cent from Europe. These fortify the need to retell the story that is largely about intra-African migration, contrary to the horrific sensationalized impression of irregular migration from Africa through the Mediterranean. This chapter sets the tone for other chapters that follow by emphasizing the need to move past the Western approach and amplify African voices in the migration dialogue by providing answers to the following questions: What would an African approach to mobility look like? With what presumptions would it begin? How would it build on histories of Pan-Africanism and African hospitality? Most importantly, what kind of policies would it bring forth?

INTRODUCTION

In 2017, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development reported that there were about 41 million international migrants moving within, from or to Africa where 5 million were immigrants from the rest of the world, 17 million were residents outside the continent and 19 million found to be residing within the continent. Reports on African migration have focused on displacement and irregular migration, especially to Europe, and yet recent findings indicate that

80 per cent of Africans thinking about migration have no interest in leaving the continent (IOM, 2017), and they have no intention of moving permanently. Although Africa hosts a quarter of the refugee population, only two thirds are nationals of 5 countries out of 54 on the continent. There is a call for a new narrative on contemporary African migration that focuses largely on intra-African migration, as demonstrated in the endless daily border crossings by traders, many of them market women who are simply trying to eke out a living. Contrary to the impression of mediatized horrors of irregular migration from Africa through the Mediterranean, most African migrants are not crossing oceans, but rather crossing land borders. Understanding the various narratives that exist on migration within, to and from the continent, requires a look at the realities in terms of evidence from different countries, the lens through which migration is looked at and the impact the narrative has had on the response to migration at the national, regional and continental levels.

EXISTING NARRATIVES ON MIXED MIGRATION PATTERNS IN AFRICA

Africans have always and will continue to migrate, and this seems only set to increase as current mobility trends emanating from national border posts demonstrate. They move in search of opportunity and sometimes safety. Their movement brings advantages to their families and communities, and therefore to their nations. What these migrants need to keep them safe and productive is less bureaucracy. Some reports have suggested that 94 per cent of African migration across oceans takes on a regular form.

Looking more closely at voluntary migration, the focus is always on the economic impact and/or role migrants play in their countries of origin and/or host countries. Trade, especially within African States, is motivated by economic opportunities available in each country. Hence, within regions and between countries, there is a lot of cross-border migration on the continent. There are notable cross-border trade patterns observable on the continent. For instance, the border between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, between the towns of Rusizi and Goma by some estimates, experiences up to 30,000 people a day cross the borders between these two towns. An estimated 75 per cent of them are women. Most are itinerant traders from the Democratic Republic of the Congo bringing bananas, *pagne* (fabric) and other goods to the markets in Rusizi. There are also Rwandese traders taking finished goods like clothes, small electronics and packaged commodities from further afield across the border. A small number are tourists in search of a glimpse of the region's highly threatened mountain gorillas. Almost everything will be processed in a matter of minutes before going on their way.

Whereas the Beitbridge border post that forms the political border between South Africa and Zimbabwe remains the busiest road border post in Southern Africa. The border post is open 24 hours a day, facilitating daily movement of more than 30,000 people between South Africa and Zimbabwe for trade and other reasons. The cross-border trade is in response to the economic opportunities between the two countries and plays a significant role in servicing consumer needs in both countries by providing low-priced goods and supplementing those that are not available in the market. It also contributes to the economies of both countries

through business creation and development, as economic activities of both Musina town in South Africa and Beitbridge town in Zimbabwe rely heavily on cross-border activities, including informal cross-border traders and truckers.

The recent commissioning of the Seme–Krake joint border post between Nigeria and Benin in October 2018, on the other hand, is set to revolutionize cross-border trade and mobility between the two countries and the wider Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS) region. Strategically located on the Abidjan–Lagos corridor, which accounts for 70 per cent of all transit trade in the subregion, the border will promote regular channels of migration and increase cooperation and coordination of controls, consequently reducing smuggling and fraud earlier witnessed in the Nigeria’s south-west frontier with Benin.

These border posts illustrate the efforts towards the facilitation of mobility on the continent, notwithstanding the numerous hurdles to human mobility at African border crossing points. The very existence of these border crossings challenges presumptions about human mobility in Africa. It often begins either with the forcibly displaced and their presumed impotence, or with elites frustrated at the impotence of their national passports and assumptions that effective migration policymaking is of necessity and resource intensive. African policymaking in the realm of migration should not mimic European fears about migration as a problem, since migration is woven into the DNA of African communities, economies and societies.

The existing reality of African migration is that Eurocentric approaches to managing migration currently dominate domestic and regional policymaking on human mobility in Africa. The securitization of borders in the Sahel, for example, appears to respond mostly to European security imperatives and not nearly enough on the reality of thousands of years of itinerant trade across the Sahara Desert. However, recent discussions and debates in Europe show a shift in understanding the African migration reality. Bjarnesen (2020) argued that political debates were selective and misleading in terms of the information they had on African migration, which has contributed to the distorted narrative of African migration to Europe. The reality is that African migration in Europe has been constant for over a decade, and the number of arrivals through the Mediterranean has dropped since 2015 and not increased. Whereas within Africa, the demand for passports and biometrics at Namanga and Lungu Lungu in East Africa obscures the reality of a Maasai population that are a nomadic community spread between Kenya and the United Republic of Tanzania, and of a Swahili kingdom that once spanned the East African coastline between Mogadishu and Biera. This is the reality of how Africa moves, not in response to colonial borders but to local and regional histories and imperatives. There is a need to recognize these historical movements that were not governed by any policy and law prior to colonialism and still exist in practice today.

Appiah-Nyamekye Sanny and Rocca (2018) and the *World Migration Report* of IOM (2019) stated that African migrants move largely within their respective regions, while the motivations behind intracontinental migrants vary considerably, including those who utilize associational resources, making it possible for poor folks to also emigrate, and thus challenging ongoing narrative of the link between poverty and migration. Yet the media is sometimes awash with misleading stories and images of stranded African migrants, even when these are mostly asylum seekers from war-ravaged regions of the Middle East. It is important to be aware

that Western and African media differ in terms of tone and focus. While both extrapolate existing data based on reported evidence on migration, there is limited specialized media reporting to research the truth behind the numbers. According to Prof. Landau, the media is lazy and often report data as they are reported without undertaking specialized reporting. Second, there are few journalists who take up specialized reporting within the continent, which is affecting the way media reports on migration in Africa (Harber, 2015). Western media, on the other hand, tends to focus on mostly stories of displacement, especially refugees and irregular migrants bound for Europe, giving the impression that a large population of African migrants are bound for Europe. There is an imbalance of stories on economic contributions of migrants within the continent and beyond.

A NEW PARADIGM ON AFRICAN MIGRATION

Against this background, it is critical to begin to interrogate the distortions that characterize African migration and the basis for migration policymaking and practice on the continent. This first *African Migration Report* presents an opportunity to challenge existing distortions of African migration. There are three main reasons why these distortions exist.

Firstly, and probably most prominently, migration as an academic discipline is not well established in academic institutions of higher learning on the continent. Currently, there are three well-established academic institutions in Africa offering training on migration studies. These include the Centre for Migration Studies housed at the University of Ghana, African Centre for Migration Studies at the University of Witwatersrand in South Africa and the Centre for Migration Studies at the American University in Cairo. Consequently, most people who write about African migration are from the West due to the paucity of African scholarship related to migration, African security and development, among others. The result is that their perspectives on migration sometimes tend to be transposed onto Africa, compelling the continent to view migration and mobility in Africa through a prism of a problem to be fixed rather than the reality of life that it is, and a reality that if well managed, could benefit both sending and receiving countries, including the benefits that accrue to the migrants themselves. The few African researchers on migration are in turn also largely influenced by the thinking of the dominant academic views on the topic, consequently influencing the outlook and direction of African policymakers. Recently, there is evidence of upcoming researchers challenging the existing migration narrative attempting to decolonize migration research. This has roused calls from global scholars demanding for a different narrative and highlighting the needs for voices from African scholars. Vanyoro (2019) argued this “entails addressing ‘colonial’ categories of governance, language... through the dismantling of the very ‘systems of knowing’ that sustain them”. In other words, to adopt a different narrative on migration, we must change our way of thinking and knowing about a phenomenon and be open to different “systems of knowing” on migration. This is critical as historically, information and experiences within African settings were transmitted through a local dialect and through oral traditions. Understanding cultures, norms and values of a community that will help to understand migration behaviours requires one to understand the meanings without it being lost in interpretation.

Aside from the policy thinking and academic work, migration initiatives on the continent are yet to be truly driven by African aspirations, as they are often oriented towards addressing concerns of donor countries. These concerns are rightly associated with African migration that makes it to and across the Mediterranean, which – as it is known today – but a fraction of African migration. Irregular migration is a complex and dynamic issue that overlaps several issues concerning security. The drivers of irregular migration are vast, as people are driven by lack of economic opportunities at their country of origin to conflict. Recent discussions aiming to define irregular migration by the Legatum Institute are focused on unpacking this complex concept that can assist policymakers to address the issue more effectively. Recent statistics on irregular migration, however, put this as low as 15 per cent of overall African migration, and yet it is this migration that dominates policy discussions on African migration rather than the 85 per cent that are actively trading across borders such as Rusizi and Goma on a daily basis, thereby positively impacting the economic fortunes of their countries despite the immense hurdles they face. The over-focus on irregular migration, however, distracts the discussions at the African Union on the potential economic opportunities that can be developed and/or strengthened between and among member States in Africa.

Secondly, there is a chasm between African Union policies and practice on the ground by its member States. The policies that the African Union has put out over the course of the past two decades depict a continental political body that is fairly progressive in its thinking and outlook on migration. The evaluation and the revision of the Migration Policy Framework for Africa (MPFA) in 2017 and 2018 offered the opportunity to the African Union and its member States to recognize the importance of strong policy and institutional framework to efficiently manage migration by highlighting the need to consider migration as a key development component, rather than only as a burning issue to manage. In that regard, the revised MPFA recommends strategies and approaches to enhance migration governance at national and regional levels.

The policy frameworks and positions on migration adopted by the African Union are showing some permeation through policy reforms and practice at the national level. While the signals for the proliferation of African Union migration policy positions and propositions are reflected in the national policies on migration, such as Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria and Zambia, among others, the domestication is not occurring at a desirable pace. Arguably, if the full body of policy frameworks and positions on migration-informed policy and practice at national level as they should, the reality of how African migration is viewed and characterized would begin to change. At present, there are few policy frameworks being implemented at national or regional level, which is limited by the available resources and capacities. The evaluation of the 2006 MPFA illustrated the lack of institutional memory of the framework as a result of key government personnel being transferred without providing a handover of relevant documentation related to migration. Since its revision, the African Union – in partnership with IOM regional and national offices – have been supporting member States to develop their national and regional migration policies, as well as strengthen existing policies to align with the guiding principles outlined in the policy. Further, the African Union developed a 10-year plan of action that could lead to the successful development and implementation of the framework by 2030.

Good policies have the potential to transform the governance of migration on the continent. Aside from the myriad of preceding policies on migration, if there is one thing that the recent adoption of the Agreement Establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) and the Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community Relating to Free Movement of Persons, Right of Residence and Right of Establishment (Free Movement Protocol) by the African Union tells us, it is that there is general growing consensus among African member States that migration is an integral part of integration and development. AfCFTA came into force on 30 May 2019 for countries that had deposited their ratification instruments, and it is scheduled to be effective in 1 July 2020, bringing together 55 member States with a combined GDP of more than USD 3.4 trillion. AfCFTA received more interest among member States than the Free Movement Protocol, which has only 32 signatories and only 4 countries¹ have deposited ratification instruments (African Union, 2018). The concerns are related to the slow pace of signatures and ratification, which is linked to the buy-in and support to member States to implement this protocol. In addition, the restrictive and prohibitive nature of the national laws and policies hinder the impact of the Free Movement Protocol. This is further limited by the limited promotion of free movement to popularize and refute the member States' concerns about the protocol (African Union, 2019).

Third, and this is despite the existence of myriad migration dialogue and inter-State cooperation mechanisms on the continent – eight by recent count – there is not much by way of active, ongoing cooperation and information-sharing between countries on migration. This in turn impedes the collection and collation of any meaningful, comparable data that could inform policymakers of continental trends and by so doing, help ensure continued relevance and applicability of policy decisions at continental and regional levels to national realities. There is some evidence of benchmarking exercises adopted between countries (such as Ghana and Kenya) to gain ideas of best practices in migration governance, with some countries receiving additional support from African migration experts to strengthen their knowledge and policies to align with existing policy frameworks. There is tremendous progress Africa has made since the institution of migration dialogues on the continent starting in 2000. However, there is a need to put more effort in ensuring that the already existing migration dialogue platforms are better coordinated to bring together African migration policymakers for sustained deliberations, aimed at practical cooperation and founded on a culture of information and data-sharing. The Pan-African Forum on Migration, which seeks to bring together all African regional economic communities, regional consultative process on migration (RCPs) and inter-State consultation mechanisms – whose existence dates back only to 2015 – has the potential, if strengthened, to be a continental strategic pinnacle of cooperation on framing and setting of the migration policy agenda (see Table 1).

¹ Sao Tome and Principe, Rwanda, the Niger and Mali.

Table 1. Inter-State dialogue processes on migration in Africa

| RCP | Member States | Main areas of discussion |
|---|---|--|
| African Union–Horn of Africa Initiative on Human Trafficking and Migrant Smuggling | <p>8 member States Core member States: Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan</p> <p>Neighbouring countries: Djibouti, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Policy coherence on migration • Prevention of human trafficking and migrant smuggling • Strengthening of protection and assistance to victims of human trafficking and smuggled persons • Enhancing rule of law, prosecution and border management |
| Intergovernmental Authority on Development Regional Consultative Process on Migration (IGAD-RCP) | <p>7 member States Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Migration and development • Labour migration • Social integration of migrants • Protection of migrants' rights • Smuggling and trafficking in persons • Migration data and research • Migration and health • Migration and trade • Migration and environment • Migration and security • Voluntary return of migrants • Mixed migratory flows and protection of refugees • Movement of pastoralist communities • Brain drain and unethical recruitment |
| Migration Dialogue for Southern Africa (MIDSA) | <p>16 member States Angola, Botswana, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eswatini, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Labour migration • Irregular and mixed migration • Combating trafficking in persons and migrant smuggling • Policy development • Disaster risk management • Capacity-building on border management |
| Migration Dialogue for West Africa (MIDWA) | <p>15 member States Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Labour migration • Combating trafficking and smuggling • Border management • Return and reintegration • Migration data • Mixed migration |
| Migration Dialogue from the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa Member States (MIDCOM) | <p>19 member States Burundi, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Migration and development • Migration and trade • Irregular migration • Combating trafficking and smuggling • Migration and health • Forced migration • Labour migration • Data collection and inquiries • Free movement of persons • Right of establishment and residence |

| RCP | Member States | Main areas of discussion |
|---|---|---|
| Migration Dialogue for Central African States (MIDCAS) | 10 member States Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Central African Republic, Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assisted voluntary return and reintegration • Combating human trafficking • Combating migrant smuggling • Irregular migration and mixed migration flows • Labour migration, ethical recruitment, brain drain • Migrant integration • Migration and development • Migration and environment • Migration and security • Migration and trade • Migration data and research • Migration health • Protection of migrants' rights |
| Khartoum Process | 41 member States: 30 European member States and 11 African member States Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Djibouti, Egypt, Estonia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Kenya, Latvia, Libya, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Somalia, South Sudan, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, Uganda, United Kingdom | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Combating human trafficking • Combating migrant smuggling • Development benefits of migration and addressing root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement • Legal migration and mobility • Protection and asylum • Prevention of and fight against irregular migration, migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings • Return, readmission and reintegration |
| Rabat Process | 57 member States: 26 African countries and 31 European member States Austria, Belgium, Benin, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cabo Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Equatorial Guinea, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liberia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mali, Malta, Morocco, Mauritania, Netherlands, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Togo, Tunisia, United Kingdom | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Development benefits of migration and addressing root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement • Legal migration and mobility • Protection and asylum • Prevention of and fight against irregular migration, migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings • Return, readmission and reintegration |

Source: IOM, n.d.

In order to comprehensively articulate the various dimensions of ongoing narratives on African migration, there is a need to shed the searchlight at various interlinked processes beginning with the role of research: (a) how it is funded, framed and by whom, how research findings are packaged and disseminated; (b) role of the media, both electronic and print, in influencing public opinion and policy dialogue; (c) politics of migration policy formulation and implementation; (d) growth of right-wing influence in migration discourse, public opinion and politics; and (e) production and use of migration statistics. This would help inform Africa's real discourse and response to the identified misgivings and ensure proper framing of migration and its management as an inherent, integral component of the development process. It should be recognized that Africa is a continent of diverse dimensions, highly varied in its social, cultural, economic, political and environmental architecture. The migration configuration is correspondingly dynamic and extremely complex contrary to the monolithic view of the continent by many researchers, public, media and politicians alike.

Conferences at which issues linked to African migration are deliberated tend to be largely dominated by Western researchers, some of whom will naturally perpetuate a one-sided, mostly negative narrative of African migration and its repercussions. Regrettably, only a few young African researchers are able to make it to such arena, lacking resources with which to do so, and even less able to access peer-reviewed, wide circulating publication outlets to present compelling evidence that contradicts and challenges the status quo in Africa migration domain. There is therefore mostly a one-sided view of African migration without a compelling counter narrative being put forward that might help ensure a more balanced view of the realities of migration within and from Africa.

CONCLUSION

The goal of this first-ever *Africa Migration Report* is to advance the African migration agenda, underpinned by the strategic and pivotal role migration plays in the broader development of the continent, as articulated in the African Union migration policy frameworks and guiding principles. There may be a need to move past the Western approach and amplify African voices in the migration dialogue by answering the questions: What would an African approach to mobility look like? With what presumptions would it begin? How would it build on histories of Pan-Africanism and African hospitality? And most importantly, what kind of policies would it bring forth?

To do so, scholars engaged in African migration research and discourses would need to challenge the current perceptions, many of which are inaccurate. This includes addressing the continued misconceptions concerning the growing numbers of African migrants bound for Europe by providing evidence on the nature and proportions of intra-African migration, as compared to migration from Africa to Europe. This requires transparency, information- and data-sharing between African States on migration, and an openness to engage with the full range of stakeholders that play a significant role in migration knowledge production. Scholars in this field need to be aware of the different interpretations of African migration that vary from region to region and country to country. By generating knowledge on African migration from the voices of African scholars, there could be greater ownership of the narrative that could help countries formulate effective evidence-

based migration policies and establish strategies of implementing these policies shaped by best practices and lessons learned from other States. To do so, there is a need to explore ways of increasing the contribution of African scholars on this topic and identify existing institutions in Africa that can help to further enhance their skills.

The hope of this first-ever *African Migration Report* is that it catalyses for a candid conversation and shapes the ongoing discourse on what an African approach to migration might look like, and that this conversation in turn begins to intensify the shift in African migration policy and anchor it on transformative actions. Legitimate concerns about irregular migration from Africa to other world regions, principally Europe, can be accommodated and taken account of, but this need not come at the expense of African interests that are linked to the more than 80 per cent of Africans that are continually on the move within the continent.

Ultimately, an African approach to migration will first and foremost protect African people. It will protect the millions of people who have been forcibly displaced by conflict and disaster and create opportunities for Pan-African solidarity rather than constrain them. It will not harden borders before asking the right questions about who will be punished most. It will not pathologize centuries of mobility, solidarity and connection, but rather incubate and modernize them to respond better to the challenges of the modern world. An African approach to migration does not look at the women of Rusizi and Goma and see a problem to be solved. It sees ingenuity, resilience, sound domestic policymaking and an approach that promises a way forward for the continent as a whole.

ANNEX

Key Organisation of African Unity (OAU)/African Union treaties, conventions, protocols and charters relevant to migration

| OAU/African Union treaties, conventions, protocols and charters relevant to migration | Date of adoption | Date of entry into force | Ratifications (Out of 55) |
|--|-------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------|
| Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community (Abuja Treaty) | 3 June 1991 | 12 May 1994 | 50 |
| Constitutive Act of the African Union | 7 November 2000 | 26 May 2001 | 55 |
| African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention) | 23 October 2009 | 6 December 2012 | 28 |
| OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa | 10 September 1969 | 20 January 1974 | 46 |
| Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community Relating to Free Movement of Persons, Right of Residence and Right of Establishment | 29 January 2018 | - | 4 |
| Constitution of the Association of African Trade Promotion Organizations | 18 January 1974 | 28 March 2012 | 15 |
| Inter-African Convention Establishing an African Technical Co-operation Programme | 1 August 1975 | - | 8 |
| Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community Relating to the Pan-African Parliament | 2 March 2001 | 14 December 2003 | 51 |
| African Union Convention on Cross-Border Cooperation (Niamey Convention) | 27 June 2014 | - | 5 |
| Agreement Establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area | 21 March 2018 | - | 28 |
| Statute of the African Institute for Remittances | 29 January 2018 | 29 January 2018 | |
| African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights | 1 June 1981 | 21 October 1986 | 54 |
| Revised Migration Policy Framework for Africa and Plan of Action (2018–2027) | January 2018 | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| Ouagadougou Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings, especially Women and Children (2006) | June 2006 | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| The African Union Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want | January 2015 | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| African Common Position on Migration and Development | June 2006 | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| African Union–Horn of Africa Initiative on Human Trafficking and Smuggling of Migrants | 2014 | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| Malabo Declaration on Creating Employment for Accelerating Youth Development and Empowerment | 2011 | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| Common African Position on the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular on Migration | January 2018 | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| African Common Position on Climate Change and its Strategy to Effectively Address the Dimensions of Climate Change and its Impact on Migration | Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |

| OAU/African Union treaties, conventions, protocols and charters relevant to migration | Date of adoption | Date of entry into force | Ratifications (Out of 55) |
|---|------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------|
| African Union Plan of Action on Employment, Poverty Eradication and Inclusive Development | 2015 | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| African Union Youth and Women Employment Pact for Africa | 2013 | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| Labour Migration Governance for Development and Integration in Africa Initiative | 2015 | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| African Union Border Governance Strategy | Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| Social Policy Framework for Africa | 2008 | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| Minimum Integration Programme | 2009 | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| Action Plan for Boosting Intra-African Trade | January 2012 | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| African Union Model Law for the Implementation of the African Union Convention for the Protection of and Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons in Africa | January 2018 | - | - |


Source: African Union, n.d.

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Ethiopian returnees from the United Republic of Tanzania receiving transport allowance at the IOM Transit Centre in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

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2

AFRICAN MIGRATION: AN OVERVIEW OF KEY TRENDS

CHAPTER 2

AFRICAN MIGRATION: AN OVERVIEW OF KEY TRENDS

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ABSTRACT

Using data from UN DESA, IOM and other sources, this chapter presents key trends in migration in Africa and provides an overview of the gaps and challenges in data collection. The chapter provides a breakdown of the number of international migrants and refugees in Africa and their distribution in different geographic parts of the continent, including age, gender and population dynamics of migrants. In 2019, Africa hosted 7.3 million refugees (including asylum seekers) or 25 per cent of the global refugee population (28.7 million), translating to 1 in every 4 international migrants in Africa being a refugee, compared to 1 in 10 international migrants globally. Data from surveys provide insights into the migration intentions of people living in Africa and shows that only a relatively small percentage of people are actively planning and preparing to migrate. A high percentage of those intending to migrate plan to move to another country in Africa. Most African countries lack the capacity to collect high-quality disaggregated migration data required to make informed policy choices; as such, the chapter underscores the need for capacity-building. This chapter concludes with recommendations on how data could be strengthened including through an Africa-wide migration data capacity-building programme.

INTRODUCTION

This chapter has two key objectives. First, the chapter presents key trends in migration in Africa based on the latest estimates prepared by the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA, 2019a), as well as information from other sources, including IOM.² Second, the chapter provides a brief overview of the main gaps in data on migration in Africa, as well as an outline of the ways in which data on migration could be strengthened.

¹ In loving memory of Rene N'Guettia Kouassi, who passed away just as this project was getting underway.

² See [Annex](#) for a summary of the types of migration data collected by IOM in Africa.

Overall, data on international migration in Africa remains relatively scarce. For example, by 2019, 14 per cent of countries in Africa had not updated the total number of international migrants since the 2000 round of population censuses.³ Nonetheless, it is possible with existing data to highlight some key trends, while new sources of data are emerging (see [Annex](#)).

DATA CHALLENGES IN AFRICA

The estimates of the stock of international migrants, published by UN DESA, are based on national sources, especially the number of foreign-born persons or foreign citizens, as provided by the decennial population census. For countries without recent census data, the estimates are extrapolated or imputed.

Some ongoing initiatives support the production and harmonization of migration data in Africa, such as the following: (a) Revised Strategy for the Harmonization of Statistics in Africa; (b) Pan African Statistics, funded by the European Union; and (c) African Union Commission–Regional Economic Communities–Swedish International Development Agency (AUC-RECs-SIDA) cooperation on migration statistics. These and other initiatives provide support to African member States to produce improved migration statistics.

Key trends⁴

Between 2000 and 2019, the number of international migrants⁵ in Africa increased from 15.1 million to 26.6 million, the sharpest relative increase (76%) among all major regions of the world. As a result, the share of international migrants in Africa relative to the total globally increased from 9 per cent in 2000 to 10 per cent in 2019.

Despite this sharp relative increase, the total number of international migrants recorded in Africa remains relatively modest compared to other world regions and to Africa's total population. In 2019, Asia hosted 31 per cent of the world's 272 million international migrants, followed by Europe (30%), Northern America (22%), Africa (10%), Latin America and the Caribbean (4%) and Oceania (3%). Currently, international migrants comprise 2 per cent of the total population in Africa, compared with 3.5 per cent for the world as a whole. The share of international migrants in the total population is significantly higher in Oceania (21.2%), Northern America (16%) and Europe (11%), but lower in both Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean (1.8% each).

In 2019, Eastern Africa hosted the largest share of all international migrants residing in Africa (30%), followed by Western Africa (28%), Southern Africa (17%), Middle Africa (14%) and Northern Africa (11%) (see Figure 1). However, in relation to the total population, Southern Africa hosted the largest migrant population (6.7%), followed by Africa (2.2%), Western Africa (1.9%), Eastern Africa (1.8%) and Northern Africa (1.2%). Seven countries in Africa hosted more than 1 million international migrants, including South Africa (4.2 million), Côte

³ Op cit.


⁴ Data sources used for this chapter include UN DESA, 2019a and UN DESA, 2019b.

⁵ Estimates of the number of international migrants are based on either the foreign-born population or, in the absence of such information, the population of foreign citizens.

d'Ivoire (2.5 million), Uganda (1.7 million), Nigeria and Ethiopia (1.3 million each), the Sudan (1.2 million) and Kenya (1 million).

While most migration in Africa is occurring within the continent (see Figure 1), estimates of intraregional mobility vary depending on the method of calculation. From a regional perspective, 79 per cent of all international migrants residing in Africa were born in Africa. However, if the global number of African-born migrants born is compared with the number of African-born migrants residing in Africa, the percentage of intraregional migration within the continent drops to 53 per cent.

Figure 1. Distribution of international migrants residing in Africa and destinations of migrants from Africa



Source: UN DESA, 2019a.

Refugees

In 2019, Africa hosted 7.3 million refugees (including asylum seekers) or 25 per cent of the global refugee population (28.7 million). Over half of all refugees in Africa were hosted by countries in Eastern Africa (3.8 million), with significantly smaller numbers of refugees residing in Middle and Northern Africa (1.4 million each), Western Africa (383,000) and Southern Africa (288,000). Between 2000 and 2019, the increase in the refugee population on the African continent (97%) significantly outpaced that of the global refugee population (74%) with Eastern, Middle, Northern and Southern Africa more than doubling in the number of refugees they host.

As a share of all international migrants in 2019, refugees were particularly numerous in Eastern Africa (48%), Northern Africa (46%) and Middle Africa (38%). Overall, 1 in every 4 international migrants in Africa is a refugee, compared to 1 in every 10 international migrants globally.

Sex and age

In Africa, an estimated 47 per cent of all international migrants are female, which is very similar to the global share of female migrants (48%). Within the continent, the share of female migrants is the highest in Eastern Africa (50%), followed by Middle Africa and Western Africa (47% each), Southern Africa (44%) and Northern Africa (43%).

Globally, international migrants are, on average, about 10 years older than the total population: in 2019, the median age of international migrants reached 39 years, compared to 30.9 years for the global population. In Africa, both the median age of international migrants (30.9) and that of the total population (19.7) are about 10 years lower than for the world as a whole.

In 2019, Africa was the youngest continent for international migrants. With a median age of 33.8 years, migrants in Latin America and the Caribbean were the second youngest, followed by Asia (35.6), Europe (42.7), Oceania (42.9) and North America (43.5).

Within Africa, with a median age of 27.0, migrants are the youngest in Eastern Africa, followed by Middle Africa (31.1), Northern Africa (31.2), Western Africa (32.1) and Southern Africa (33.8). The share of international migrants under the age of 30 varied from 56 per cent in Eastern Africa to 39 per cent in Southern Africa.

Migration and population dynamics

Net international migration⁶ is projected to have an increasingly important impact on the future size of populations in a growing number of countries. In Africa, however, the difference between fertility and mortality will continue to drive population growth in the foreseeable future, with net international migration continuing to have a negligible effect. Between 2015 and 2020, net international migration did not significantly alter the size of the total population in Africa, Asia or Latin America and the Caribbean. By contrast, positive net international migration contributed one third or more to population growth in North America and Oceania. In Europe, the size of the population would have declined during the period 2015–2020 in the absence of positive net migration.

In Africa, children under the age of 25 account for 60 per cent of the total population in 2020. As these cohorts of children and youth grow older and as birth rates across Africa are projected to continue to fall, the dependency ratio in Africa will plummet temporarily, presenting the continent with a demographic window of opportunity. Harnessing the demographic dividend in Africa by providing the current generation of children and youth with quality health care and education and ensuring that young persons have access to gainful employment will contribute to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), reduce the demand from young people to migrate, and help to make the option of remaining in one's country viable for more people.

Migration intentions

New data is emerging from surveys that provides insights into the migration intentions of people living in Africa. At first sight, data from recent nationally representative surveys conducted by Gallup and Afrobarometer⁷ give the impression that high numbers of people wish to migrate from Africa (Appiah-Nyamekye Sanny et al., 2019; Laczko et al., 2017). For example, the latest survey from Afrobarometer conducted in 35 African countries in 2018 suggests that on average, one third of respondents “have considered emigrating”, especially the young and educated. However, a detailed analysis of data from these surveys and those conducted by Gallup suggests that only a relatively small percentage of people are actively planning and preparing to migrate (Laczko et al., 2017). Only 1.3 per cent of the world's adults had plans to move permanently to another country in the next 12 months in 2015 (ibid.). Less than 10 per cent of those who expressed a wish to migrate between 2010 and 2015 said they were making plans to move in the next 12 months. However, according to Gallup data analysed by IOM, the number of adults planning to migrate has increased since 2010 especially in West Africa, where the figure rose by 7 per cent between 2010 and 2015 (Borgnäs, 2018). In West Africa, 10.3 million people reported in 2015 that they were making plans to migrate in the next 12 months, but only 2.7 million had made any preparations for such a move (Laczko et al., 2017). It should also be noted that a high percentage of those intending to migrate plan to move to another country in Africa according to Gallup data – 40 per cent of those with migration

⁶ “Net international migration” is the difference between the number of immigrants and the number of emigrants during a period of time, regardless of country of birth or citizenship.

⁷ Since creating the World Poll in 2005, Gallup has conducted studies in more than 160 countries that include 99 per cent of the world's population. With some exceptions, all samples are probability based and nationally representative of the resident population aged 15 and older. Afrobarometer is a non-partisan, Pan-African research institution conducting public attitude surveys on democracy, governance, the economy and society in more than 30 countries in Africa.

plans in 2015. In the case of the Afrobarometer survey in 2018, only 20 per cent of respondents said they would like to migrate to Europe (ibid.).

BUILDING DATA CAPACITIES IN AFRICA

Existing data sources provide a limited picture of migration trends in Africa. For example, only approximately half of the countries in Africa have prepared a national migration profile report at least once (see [Map 1](#)).

The countries in Africa have recognized that there is an urgent need to improve data on migration. For instance, the African Union action plan for the period 2018–2027 recognizes that migration data is “key to mainstreaming migration into policy and planning frameworks and development initiatives, and essential for developing, effective, evidence-based migration policies” (African Union, 2018).

The African Union noted that many countries lack the capacity to collect high-quality data that is disaggregated by sex and age. In December 2018, the African Union released an assessment of the capacity-building needs of African Union member States and RECs to manage migration (ibid.). The evaluation based on information collected from 39 African countries and 3 RECs notes that “in general, Member States lack migration data that is required to make informed policy choices” (ibid., 14).

Most countries collect some data on labour migration (97%), remittances (64%), human trafficking/migrant smuggling (69%) and refugees and asylum seekers (84%). But such data may not be collected on a regular basis or may be collected by different entities or agencies, using varying methodologies. For example, a third of countries reported that data on labour migration is collected infrequently. “Although most AU Member States collect data on labour migration, this occurs at relatively lengthy intervals, or infrequently; which may compromise the effectiveness of the data for decision making” (African Union, 2018). Nearly half of the countries (46%) reported that they do not collect data on the diaspora. Further, such data may be collected by different agencies, and different methods may be used.

Official statistics do not capture the full migration picture in Africa because much migration is irregular. As the African Union points out in the *Report on Labour Migration Statistics in Africa in 2015* (African Union, 2017): “Porous borders between most countries could also lead to underreporting of volume of migrant flows as, many people, particularly those living along borders may not use official border crossing points”. Of the 54 countries surveyed, just under two thirds (63%) provided data on labour migration statistics.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has provided a very brief overview of some key facts and figures about migration trends in Africa. However, African countries recognize that there is a paucity of data on migration in Africa, as well as opportunities to make better use of existing and emerging data sources. There is indeed a case for an Africa-wide migration data capacity-building programme. Such a programme could help to address current data gaps to assess key migration trends and meet the demand for data to monitor the implementation of migration-related commitments, such as the SDGs and the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration.

An Africa migration data capacity-building programme could help to address several challenges through the following:

- Increasing human and financial resources for collecting, producing and disseminating migration data;
- Promoting the sharing of international migration data between countries of origin and destination;
- Improving the utilization and analysis of existing migration data;
- Strengthening the capacity of policymakers to use migration data. Although statistical expertise often may exist within national statistical offices, policymakers may have insufficient expertise within ministries to analyse and report on migration data;
- Improving communication between producers of data (ministries and national statistical offices) and end users (policymakers) of migration statistics to promote more evidence-based policymaking;
- Promoting the harmonization of migration data across countries in Africa. National practices and terminology often differ from the United Nations recommendations on migration statistics: even within a single country, concepts and definitions may not be harmonized across units responsible for data collection and analysis; and
- Building national capacities to exploit the potential of using new technology and big data as a source of information to guide migration policy.

ANNEX

IOM data in Africa

IOM collects data on topics including missing migrants, human trafficking and assisted voluntary return and reintegration. IOM's [Displacement Tracking Matrix \(DTM\)](#) collects data on population movements at key transit points in countries in Western, Central and Northern Africa, such as Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Guinea, Libya, Malawi, Mali, the Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, the Sudan and South Sudan. Through its [regular updates](#) and [reports](#), DTM can be a key source of timely information on migration and mobility patterns in the region. Further, DTM tools are sometimes used to collect data on migrants' profiles and vulnerabilities along migratory routes, including on the Central Mediterranean Route (CMR) and upon arrival in destination countries. For example, since 2015, the DTM tool has included questions on instances of exploitation and abuse – including human trafficking – in some surveys it conducts on major migration routes such as the CMR, and has produced reports based on this. IOM's human trafficking case data can be found on IOM's [Global Human Trafficking Database](#), which is the largest global database with primary data on victims of trafficking. Part of these data are anonymized and publicly available on the [Counter-Trafficking Data Collaborative \(CTDC\)](#). The CTDC is the first global data hub on human trafficking and largest of its kind, with data contributed by counter-trafficking organizations from around the world on more than 90,000 individual cases of human trafficking.⁸ An anonymized version of this data set is publicly available to download.

Migration Profiles (MPs) have become key information tools on migration in many countries. These are analyses of available data on some or all migration-relevant aspects in a country, prepared in consultation with a broad range of stakeholders. More than 100 profiles have been developed around the world. To date, profiles in Northern and Western Africa are available for Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, the Sudan, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, the Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and Togo (see [Map 1](#)). MPs analyse migration patterns and their impact on development and identify strategies to address data gaps. MPs are also tools to improve data capacities; by bringing diverse migration-relevant stakeholders together through a technical working group or equivalent, they can improve coordination on migration issues at the national level (Borgnäs, 2018). The Global Compact for Migration encourages States to “[develop and use country-specific migration profiles in order to develop evidence-based migration policies,” and these will continue to be a key tool. In Northern and Western Africa, countries with MPs can use existing dedicated structures to continue a national dialogue on migration data and promote the integration of migration issues into national development strategies and use of data for policy.⁹

⁸ Last accessed 11 July 2019.

⁹ This chapter currently describes migration trends based on the 2017 revision of the global migrant stock estimates. The 2019 revision of the migrant stock was however released by UN DESA prior to printing of the report. The 2019 revision can be found at UN DESA, 2019a.

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Refugee transportation in Dollo Ado, Somali Regional State, Ethiopia.

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3

THE DATA QUESTION: THE CHALLENGE OF MEASURING IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN AFRICA

CHAPTER 3

THE DATA QUESTION: THE CHALLENGE OF MEASURING IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN AFRICA

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ABSTRACT

The lack of available and reliable data on irregular migration, along with methodological limitations on how these influence narratives of migration in Africa, is examined in this chapter. Data collection on irregular migration stocks, especially migration flows, is inherently difficult due to the nature in which this occurs. They often take place outside the regulatory norms and are likely to go unrecorded or susceptible to double counting. The absence of any internationally accepted definition of “irregular” migration/migrant, sometimes called “illegal”, “clandestine” or “undocumented” migration compounds the problem. The author cautions that the numbers used in the analysis should be considered as an indication of general trends rather than complete figures. An overview of existing data shows that despite popular narratives on irregular migration from Africa to Europe, relatively little is known about irregular migration in the African context, as most African migrants generally move within the continent and that migration from key countries in Africa to the European Union in recent years has been mostly regular. The chapter concludes that any discussions of irregular migration data should always be contextualized and recommends that the use of new technologies may provide insights into irregular movements in Africa and help to overcome some of the inherent difficulties in traditional sources of measuring irregular migration.

INTRODUCTION

Popular narratives of migration in Africa largely centre around irregular¹ movements from North Africa to Europe, often in exaggerated and sensational terms. In reality, available data show that most African migrants generally move within the continent, and that migration from key countries in Africa to the European Union in recent years has been mostly regular: between 2011 and 2017, regular entries in the European Union from key countries in Northern and Western

¹ IOM defines irregular migration as the “movement of persons that takes place outside the laws, regulations, or international agreements governing the entry into or exit from the State of origin, transit or destination” (IOM, 2019a). Even in areas which allow for the free movement of people, movements may be considered “irregular” if people travel outside of official border crossing points or without required documentation. It should be noted that “irregularity” refers to a legal status and consequently should not be applied a descriptor of any individual.

Africa outnumbered irregular entries by sea to Italy (Mosler Vidal et al., 2019). In mid-2019, more than half of migrants born in Africa lived in another African country (52.7%), with the other half residing in Europe (26.3%), Asia (11.4%), North America (8.0%) and other parts of the world (1.6%) (UN DESA, 2019).

This chapter provides a brief overview of the available data on irregular migration in the African context. It first describes the key trends in irregular migration within and from Africa before discussing the main sources and challenges to collecting such data. It concludes with a few recommendations on how best to use data on irregular African migration.

KEY TRENDS IN IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE AFRICAN CONTEXT

This section presents the key trends in irregular migration in Africa based on publicly available data. However, given the many data gaps and limitations discussed below, the numbers used in this analysis should be considered as an indication of general trends rather than complete figures.

Text box 1. Data on migration stocks and flows

Available migration statistics mainly relate to “stocks” or numbers of foreign-born individuals residing in a country at a certain point in time. Estimates of international migrant stocks are regularly compiled by UN DESA Population Division based on national population censuses. The latest available estimates refer to mid-2019 (UN DESA, 2019). However, data on irregular migrant stocks is more challenging to collect due to the often hard-to-capture nature of the status of these migrants. A number of methodologies, including *inter alia* residual and multiplier techniques, have been used to estimate the stock of irregular migrants (Jandl, 2008). Several estimates have been produced for different countries and regions, though few in Africa (Migration Data Portal, n.d.).

Globally, even less information is available on migrant “flows” – the number of migrants moving from and to a country over a period of time – and other aspects of migration. For example, the research and data currently available indicate that irregular African migrants face significant risks, although comprehensive data on the specific challenges they encounter across various migration routes on the continent is scarce. Nearly 7,000 deaths and disappearances have been recorded during irregular migration across Africa since 2014, 4,555 of which occurred in Northern Africa (IOM, n.d.). However, these figures are only minimum estimates, as an unknown number of fatalities go unreported; these may occur in remote regions where detection is unlikely, or because the nature of irregular migration means that deaths are less likely to be reported to the authorities (Sánchez Dionis and Dearden, 2019).

Central and Southern Africa

Data on irregular migration in Central and Southern Africa is extremely scarce, with only a few sources available on certain routes. One example is the highly porous border between Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which has long been a site of intraregional migration (Bedford and Akello, 2018). Despite attempts to close this border, IOM’s Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) recorded more than 200,000 irregular border crossings in October 2019 alone,

61 per cent of which were migrants entering Uganda, compared to 39 per cent crossing into the Democratic Republic of the Congo (IOM, 2019e). It should be noted that data on irregular migration flows is subject to a number of biases discussed in the section below, and initiatives to estimate cross-border mobility such as DTM, risk counting the same individual multiple times.²

Another common migration route is the “southern route” from East Africa to South Africa, Zambia, Malawi and Mozambique (Mixed Migration Centre (MMC), 2019). Since at least the 1970s, many labour migrants worked in the mining sector in Namibia, South Africa, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe, many of whom travelled irregularly from Eastern Africa (Long and Crisp, 2011). These migratory movements have been supplemented by significant refugee outflows from Eastern African countries and intraregional flows linked to civil unrest in Central and Southern Africa: conflicts in countries, such as Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe has meant that large numbers of refugees have been hosted by nearby States in the region (ibid.). Despite the extensive documentation on movements along this route in anecdotal accounts and qualitative research,³ recent statistics on migrant flows are nearly non-existent. In 2018, more than 2,000 Ethiopian migrants were stranded or detained in the United Republic of Tanzania (Agence France-Presse, 2019), indicating that the number of people using this route annually is quite significant.

East Africa

Irregular migration in East Africa is both intra- and extra-regional: of the nearly 445,000 migrants recorded by IOM’s DTM in Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia and Yemen in the first half of 2018, 45 per cent indicated that they planned to remain within the Horn of Africa, 43 per cent would use the “eastern route” to and from Yemen, 8 per cent planned to migrate to Southern African countries, and 5 per cent would move northwards (IOM, 2018). Human smuggling and trafficking⁴ are common in East Africa, with up to 80 per cent of migrants affected (Martin and Bonfanti, 2015).

Intraregional irregular migration for economic reasons is significant; for example, IOM’s DTM (2019b) recorded nearly 30,000 migrants transiting across Somalia’s borders irregularly in October 2019 alone, most of whom came from Somalia (50%), Ethiopia (44%) and Djibouti (5%). Of those who intended to end their journey in Somalia, 35 per cent were seasonal migrants and another 17 per cent migrated for economic reasons (ibid.). Also, intraregionally, many Eritreans have migrated irregularly to Ethiopia in recent years (MMC, 2019); however, in June 2018, the two governments issued an announcement that border crossings would be reopened (*Al Jazeera*, 2018), thereby regularizing movements between the two countries. Though the short-term effects of this seem to be increased migrant flows to Ethiopia (MMC, 2019), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR, 2019a) projects that its caseload of more than 170,000 Eritreans in Somalia will decrease by 25 per cent by the end of 2019.

Irregular movements from East Africa to other regions are also significant. One well-documented flow is the “eastern route” across the Gulf of Aden to Yemen on to Saudi Arabia. Over 150,000 migrants arrived in Yemen via this irregular

² Further information on DTM’s methodology is available at <https://displacement.iom.int>.

³ See for example Horwood, 2014; Long and Crisp, 2011; and IOM, 2009.

⁴ “Migrant smuggling” can be understood as the facilitation of irregular migratory movements, whereas “trafficking” is based on the exploitation of people and does not necessarily require movement across borders (IOM, 2019).


route in 2018, despite ongoing instability in Yemen and a marked increase in the number of East African migrants deported from Saudi Arabia (MMC, 2019). In addition to the “southern route” discussed above, the “northern route” – from the Horn of Africa to North Africa and in some cases to Europe – is used by many Somalis, often ending their journey in the Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya or moving to North African countries via the Sudan. Though data on irregular flows via the Kenya–Somalia border are not currently available, UNHCR (2019b) reports 217,139 “mostly” Somali refugees in Dadaab as of November 2019, a number that has remained relatively stable since 2011.⁵

West Africa

International migration is more prevalent in West Africa than in any other region on the continent (Ndiaye and Robin, 2010). The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) provides for the free movement of people within the region (IOM and UNHCR, 2011). Many migrants in West Africa pass through the regional hubs that have acted as trans-Saharan trading posts for centuries – Agadez, Arlit, Dirkou and Gao – where migrant smuggling makes up a significant part of the economy. The cost of paying a smuggler in these cities for a journey to the North African coast ranges from USD 100 to USD 1,000 (Carling, 2016).

Main migration routes from West Africa to other areas are the sea route from Senegal, Mauritania and Morocco to the Spanish Canary Islands, and the land route from the Niger to North Africa (MIDWA, 2015). The former, or West African route, was previously the main irregular route to Spain. As shown in Figure 1, arrivals to the Spanish Canary Islands rose in the early 2000s, reaching more than 30,000 recorded crossings in 2006, but has since subsided to fewer than 1,000 recorded arrivals per year since 2010.

Figure 1. Irregular migrant arrivals recorded in the Spanish Canary Islands



Source: Ministry of the Interior, Government of Spain, n.d.


⁵ See UNHCR’s Kenya operation statistics page for historical figures at www.unhcr.org/ke/857-statistics.html.

The route through the Niger is used by largely West African migrants en route to North African countries, such as Libya and Algeria, in some cases then moving onward to Europe.⁶ IOM’s DTM in the Niger observed nearly 1.2 million individuals⁷ at flow monitoring points between 2016 and 2019, nearly 40 per cent of whom were “incoming” migrants – those arriving from outside of West Africa and moving into West African countries (IOM, 2019c). Though the recorded number of migrants moving north through the Niger topped 300,000 in 2016, the flow has since fallen to below 100,000 in 2017–2018 and 174,000 in 2019 (ibid.), and it is unclear if this is due to an actual decrease in flows, a shift in routes or a change in the coverage or quality of data collection (see Figure 2).

Text box 2. Reasons for migration in West Africa

According to a 2019 survey conducted by MMC (2019) of 534 migrants across Burkina Faso, Mali and the Niger, the vast majority of people in West Africa migrate for economic reasons, with 93 per cent of respondents citing this as their main motivation for departure. However, this does not necessarily mean that West Africans aim to stay in their destination country permanently: for example, the majority of migrants surveyed by IOM’s DTM in Nigeria – one of the main countries of destination in West Africa and a major origin country for extraregional flows – reported that they planned to migrate only in the short-term, either seasonally (15%) or for less than six months (42%) (IOM, 2019d). However, it should be noted that migrant decision-making is a process that may evolve based on a number of factors, including conditions en route and in the original destination country.

Figure 2. Incoming and outgoing flows recorded at IOM’s DTM flow monitoring points in the Niger



Source: IOM, 2019c.

⁶ Though it should be noted that Libya, in particular, has long been a destination country for sub-Saharan migrants seeking work (de Haas, 2008).

⁷ As noted above, these observations may count the same individual multiple times, and are prone to biases based on the location and duration of monitoring (see Mosler Vidal et al., 2019).

North Africa

North African States have historically been countries of origin, transit and destination. Morocco and Libya have historically been sought out by migrants from sub-Saharan Africa seeking work (de Haas, 2008). However, increased border restrictions and instability, respectively, have led to increased irregular migration to and through these countries.

Libya, in particular, has become both a main departure country for boat crossings to Europe and as host to migrants in irregular situations: IOM's DTM (2020) reported 654,081 migrants in Libya in December 2019. Just under 30 per cent of these come from other North African countries, 65 per cent are from sub-Saharan Africa States, and 7 per cent are from the Middle East or Asia (ibid.). A separate DTM survey of 12,913 migrants in Libya in 2019 concluded that the basic needs of these migrant communities are largely unmet, with 74 per cent reporting lack of access to health services and 18 per cent without access to clean water and/or sanitary and hygiene facilities (ibid.).


Text box 3. Migrant smuggling economy in Libya

Migrant smuggling in Libya is quite common, with revenues estimated between USD 255 to USD 323 million annually (Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, 2015). In many communities, smugglers are considered almost like travel services for migrants; smuggling can be the main source of income for major transit cities such as in Agadez (ibid.). Malakooti (2016) reports that prior to 2014, migrants using smugglers to reach North Africa and to get from North Africa to Europe were charged a flat rate; since then, these prices have become dependent on the nationality of the migrant, the smuggling ring encountered and the level of service provided. The most expensive journeys can reach USD 20,000 (ibid.).

For decades, migrants have crossed the Central Mediterranean route from North African shores to Italy and, to a lesser degree, Malta. Until the introduction of visa requirements for Western European countries in the 1970s, migration via the Mediterranean was largely regular and linked to short-term work in European countries (Fargues, 2017). The number of irregular arrivals to Italy was fairly stable until 2014, when about 170,000 irregular migrant arrivals were recorded in the country.⁸ The flows via this route have dropped dramatically since mid-2017, with fewer than 50,000 attempting the crossing to Italy in 2018, although the available data indicate the risk of dying on this route has become higher since 2017 (IOM, n.d.). The Central Mediterranean route is notable for its high death toll: IOM has recorded more than 17,500 deaths and disappearances since 2014 (ibid.). It is worth noting that although irregular migration via the Central Mediterranean route has made headlines in recent years, the flows are quite small compared to regular migration from West and North Africa: looking at the top 10 countries of origin on this route, under 325,000 irregular arrivals were reported in Italy between 2011 and 2017, whereas 1.15 million first residence permits were granted to nationals of the same countries in the European Union (Migration Data Portal, n.d.).

⁸ At least 3,165 people are believed to have lost their lives in the Central Mediterranean crossing in 2014 (IOM, n.d.).

Figure 3. Attempted migrant crossings in the Central Mediterranean



Source: IOM, n.d.; Ministry of the Interior, Government of Italy, n.d.; IOM, 2020.

Another route that African migrants have historically used to travel to Europe is Western Mediterranean from Morocco to mainland Spain (via sea) or to the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla (via land). While this route has seen several thousand migrants – primarily from North African countries, arriving to Spanish territories since at least the late 1990s – the flows on the Western Mediterranean route increased in 2017–2018, with more than 25,000 arrivals recorded in these years (Ministry of the Interior, Government of Spain, n.d.). The number of migrant deaths on this route has also escalated, increasing from 128 recorded in 2016 to 804 in 2018 (IOM, n.d.).

IRREGULAR MIGRATION DATA SOURCES AND CHALLENGES

Collecting data on irregular migration, particularly migration flows, is inherently difficult, as these movements often take place outside of the regulatory norms of countries and are therefore likely to go unrecorded. These challenges are compounded by the lack of any internationally accepted definition of “irregular” migration/migrant, which may inter alia also be called “illegal”, “clandestine” or “undocumented” migration.⁹ Often, migrants move in and out of situations of (ir)regularity, for example by crossing a border irregularly but then applying for asylum and thereby regularizing their status.¹⁰ The proximity of origin and destination countries, the porosity of borders and the informality of labour markets play a role that means that a significant amount of African migration is informal (Melde et al., 2014): an estimated 80 per cent of South–South migration occurs between neighbouring States (Ratha and Shaw, 2007). African migration is also characterized by “ethnic” migration in which ethnic groups split by international

⁹ See <https://migrationdataportal.org/themes/irregular-migration> for a further discussion of the varying definitions of irregular migration.

¹⁰ See Jandl, 2008 for a discussion of other means by which migration status can change.

borders seek to reunite (Melde et al., 2014). One example of such “international migrants” are the Maasai, who migrate across the border between Kenya and Uganda, where their new neighbours speak the same language and follow the same religious and cultural practices (ibid.). Considering the “mixed movements”,¹¹ often informal nature of migration flows is vital to understanding migration in the African context.¹²

Data on irregular migration stocks are often derived from national administrative sources that measure compliance with migration legislation, or census and survey data (UN DESA, 2017). These data are not generally publicly accessible, and in the African context, they are often incomplete or out of date: census data from more than a third of countries on the continent do not have any information on the country of birth and/or nationality of migrants, and only 40 per cent have data on the age of migrants (Migration Data Portal, n.d.). For 17 per cent of African countries, the most recent census data was from before 2005 (ibid.). Data on smuggling – an issue closely linked to irregular migration – are similarly scarce globally and in the African context.

Data initiatives, such as IOM’s DTM and MMC’s Mixed Migration Monitoring Mechanism Initiative (4mi), provide data on irregular migration flows and human mobility in selected countries and routes in Africa and, in some contexts, the experiences of these migrants. However, these are affected by methodological limitations, such as the bias based on the locations monitored and the individuals interviewed and are therefore not comprehensive or representative.¹³

Text box 4. New data sources to measure irregular migration

Given the difficulties of measuring irregular migration through traditional sources, new technologies may provide insights into irregular movements in Africa. Big data has been used to monitor mobility dynamics on the continent: mobile phone network data has been used to study mobility in 15 West African countries to support efforts in managing the Ebola outbreak (Wesolowski et al., 2014), and several online open-access data sets were used to model refugee displacement in Burundi, the Central African Republic and Mali, with 75 per cent accuracy (Suleimenova et al., 2017). New data sources can help provide insights into mobility patterns in Africa; however, much work is needed to refine methodologies and address ethical, privacy and security issues surrounding new data sources.

The availability of data on the profiles and risks faced by migrants moving irregularly in Africa is even more scarce than figures on stocks and flows. The Counter-Trafficking Data Collaborative (2018) includes more than 55,000 records from documented trafficking cases from 2000 to 2018; however, only 1,314 of these (2%) involve nationals of African nations. Certain modules of the DTM and 4mi surveys include questions on protection risks, but these are not deployed widely enough to be representative. More than 20 per cent of the migrant fatalities recorded by IOM’s Missing Migrants Project since 2014 occurred in Africa; in total, more than 30 per cent of Missing Migrants Project records include the death

¹¹ IOM defines mixed movements as “a movement in which a number of people are travelling together, generally in an irregular manner, using the same routes and means of transport, but for different reasons” (IOM, 2019a).

¹² Comprehensive discussions of data on smuggling can be found in Carling (2016) for West and Central Africa, Majidi and Oucho (2016) for East Africa and Malakooti (2016) for North Africa.

¹³ See Mosler Vidal et al., 2019 for further discussion of the challenges linked to DTM data.

of an African migrant. Considering that fatalities during migration within Africa are likely grossly underreported (Sánchez Dionis and Dearden, 2019), and that the database includes nearly 14,000 deceased persons of unknown origin, these figures are however likely to be highly incomplete.

CONCLUSION

Despite popular narratives on irregular migration from Africa to Europe, relatively little is known about irregular migration in the African context. Based on the data presented above and the many gaps in what is currently available, the following recommendations should be considered as part of any discussion of African migration.

Quality data on irregular migration is urgently needed.

Better data is needed not just on irregular migration flows, but also the profiles and experiences of those on irregular journeys. This requires both an increase in the quantity and quality of collected data and a harmonization of data that are already collected by national authorities. The improvement of these data should be prioritized to provide evidence for informing adequate assistance and protection policies.

Discussions of irregular migration data should always be contextualized.

Irregular migration data are often sensationalized without any contextualization, despite the fact that there has historically been more regular migration within Africa and from Africa to Europe. More robust, contextual analysis is needed to ensure debate over migration-related issues is well informed, but this necessitates building the capacities of national and regional actors to collect and harmonize data. Including the wider context of African migration in any discussion of irregular migration helps to ensure rational, well-informed responses.

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"I personally think that an organized and strategic migration could allow the development of Africa in the future. On the cover, the marker located in the centre of the African continent illustrates the fact that Africa, in a few years, will become the preferred destination of foreign investors and also people from other continents. This will be done, in my opinion, by the fact that African leaders are developing strategies to encourage other people to move and consume in Africa. Once these strategies are put in place, we will have a significant migratory flow. This migratory flow is illustrated by the dashed curves on the cover. These curves represent the migration of other peoples and the African diaspora to the African continent. Good management of the resources resulting from the migration will allow the acceleration of the economic growth of the continent. Thus, the rocket, the boat, the building and the diagram on the cover represent the advances of the continent from the good management of financial, human and other resources from migration."

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4

MIGRATION AND URBANIZATION IN AFRICA

CHAPTER 4

MIGRATION AND URBANIZATION IN AFRICA

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ABSTRACT

Migration to big African cities and the responses of residents, migrants, local administrations and governments to urbanization are examined. Global and regional commitments, such as the African Union's Agenda 2063, Common African Position on Habitat III, Addis Ababa Action Agenda of the Third International Conference on Financing for Development (Addis Ababa Action Agenda) in 2015 and Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 11, have advocated for stronger integration of migration governance in urban policies, and the use of urbanization as a strategic vehicle for inclusive and sustainable development, including making cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable. Migration (rural–urban and external), together with natural population growth, have contributed to a negative narrative around rural migrants, who tend to settle in unplanned and informal settlements, challenging well-planned urbanization and sometimes engendering xenophobic attitudes to international migrants. Despite the popular narrative, African cities are important engines of inclusive and sustainable development for all, as they are increasingly relevant in the global value chain. The growing integration of African cities into globalization offers job opportunities in the private sectors, and together with local initiatives for job creation and skills development, can transform the social landscape of contemporary urban scenes. The chapter concludes that transforming cities into engines of inclusive and social development for all will entail the mainstreaming of migration governance in the urbanization discourse.

INTRODUCTION

The shift in population from rural to urban settlements (urbanization) is an inherent global phenomenon. In Africa, the per cent of population living in urban areas has risen from 15 per cent in the 1960s to 43 per cent in 2018, and is projected to grow to 50 per cent by 2030 (UNECA, 2017). The link between migration and urbanization is a well-known fact, and Africa is no exception, with African cities being places of origin, transit, destination and return.

Generally speaking, migrants tend to move to cities where they expect to find better opportunities resulting from the concentration of economic activities or safer environments than in their current location. Within a country, migrants may move to cities based on the following reasons: (a) diversify household income;

(b) respond to environmental shocks; (c) as a consequence of social and political unrest in rural areas; or (d) as a response to loss of livelihood opportunities due to climate change and increasingly difficult access to tenure security, or to act as a casual or low wage urban workforce (Cobbinah et al., 2015; Lohnert, 2017).

The combination of migration and natural population growth has contributed a negative narrative around rural migrants, who tend to settle in unplanned and informal settlements, challenging well-planned urbanization and sometimes engendering xenophobic attitudes to international migrants (Sassen, 2014; van Noorloos and Kloosterboer, 2018). There might be tangible day-to-day problems that are common to many African cities and its booming young population, but urbanization can still be made sustainable and inclusive. At the moment, compared with urban areas in other developing countries, African cities are costly, fragmented and disconnected. For instance, as the World Bank reports (Lall et al., 2017), in Harare, Zimbabwe, and Maputo, Mozambique, more than 30 per cent of land within 5 km of the central business district remains unbuilt. In Abidjan, as another World Bank report (2016) demonstrates, 50 per cent of residents live at least three to a room. Some policymakers say these cities are cases of urbanization without development and with misallocation of labour, low levels of productivity and poorly coordinated governance infrastructures to host, integrate and empower migrants. Without sufficient formal development, as cases such as Kibera in Nairobi show, informal, yet close-to-job settlements are constantly growing in population (Lall et al., 2017). Still, cities can be, and are, an important engine of personal development for all, including migrants.

Adopting the right policies ensures that migration brings beneficial effects to the urban areas and promote human rights for all. A large number of global commitments have already advocated stronger integration of migration governance in urban policies. In Africa, the Agenda 2063 strategic framework on socioeconomic transformation envisions a continent where urban settlements are centres for inclusive and sustainable development. This shows the need to rethink the relationship between local or municipal and national migration governance mechanisms: while national governments often regulate migration at national levels, local governments bear the greater burden of receiving and assisting migrants without being involved in the national migration policymaking. Therefore, without an inclusive planning at the local level and a good balance of the burden among national, regional and local authorities, African cities will be ineffective in granting migrants' access to public services, opportunities and the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms for all.

MIGRATION AND URBANIZATION: AN OVERVIEW

Migration and urbanization are certainly not new phenomena, even though numbers are higher than in the past (IOM, 2015). As part of an ongoing demographic transformation, there is also an increase in the share of African countries' population residing in urban areas, creating mega, intermediate and small cities. This increase is not homogenous across African countries, but urban population growth occurs primarily in intermediate and small cities (Satterthwaite, 2016).

In Africa, the size of cities notwithstanding, urban population growth is a function of two intertwined factors: natural population growth (surplus of births over deaths) and migration to urban areas. For instance, the urban population of Antananarivo is growing at 5.1 per cent a year. The urban population of Ouagadougou is growing at 7.2 per cent a year. Mbouda (Cameroon) is the fastest growing city at 7.8 per cent a year (Muggah and Kilcullen, 2016). A number of studies have stressed the significance of population growth in Africa to urbanization, especially among the vulnerable segments of society (Potts, 2012). Further, migration from rural areas to cities and from cities to cities is also a critical factor influencing urban population growth and the shape of cities across Africa (Mercandalli and Losch, 2017).

As centres of population and economic activity, large and small cities attract people who move for different reasons, including better economic opportunities, new responses to worsening life conditions and natural hazards. Urban areas are therefore “becoming not just the dominant form of habitat for humankind, but also the engine rooms of human development as a whole” (UN-Habitat, 2014). While making up 54 per cent of the world’s population, cities account for 80 per cent of the global GDP capital (ibid.). In Africa, urban employment grew by an average of 6.8 per cent over the last decade, twice more than the average national rate of 3.3 per cent. Further, urbanization also offers several benefits correlated with a higher Human Development Index score, particularly in Africa. For instance, evidence demonstrates that access to education and access to improved water and sanitation are higher, and less costly to provide, in urban than rural areas (UNECA, 2017).

The diverse migrant population in African consists of men, women, as well as boys and girls, who tend to be drawn to cities by social (that is, education, cultural life, access to urban amenities and access to modernization) and economic opportunities (better integration in the capitalist city economy, formal and informal employment opportunities, livelihood diversification and income growth) or by existing family ties. Distribution of opportunities between urban and rural areas remains uneven across African countries.

Colonization also has a major influence in contemporary urbanization trends. Most colonies were spatially designed for extraction, and the capital city was large and dominant as the space where resources could be aggregated before being extracted. As such, capital cities were large and dominant in the national political economy. Outright physical violence (such as amputation for refusal to work), appropriation of land by settlers, unjust hut and poll taxation regimes, monocultural agricultural production and proximity of giant mines triggered a demand and supply of low-wage workers that forced African subsistence farmers and pastoralists to cities (Freund, 2012).

Today, rural areas in general have higher poverty rates, and in terms of income, the urban–rural divide remains high across the continent, where urban workers tend to have higher wages than their rural counterparts (FAO, 2017). Cities are also essential to the political economy of African countries: all countries below the Sahara – except Botswana, Cameroon, Eswatini, Lesotho and Mozambique – have primacy rates (the percentage of urban population living in the largest city) above 30 per cent and several above 50 per cent like Angola, Burkina Faso, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Somalia (Kriticos, 2017).

Other push factors exist, including human-made push factors like insecurity and conflict, or loss of habitat due to environmental and human-made factors. These include illegal land acquisition, privatizations and sales of public assets that force many African subsistence farmers to move to cities to seek livelihoods. In addition, climate change associated with an increased frequency of droughts and floods may exacerbate the effects of human-made factors by causing food and livelihood insecurity. Slow-onset events, such as increasing temperatures, land and forest degradation, loss of biodiversity and desertification and others, can also push rural populations to urban areas. A mechanical consequence of such push factors in rural areas is that people diversify their livelihoods through the opportunities created by temporary and circular migration, or finding additional non-farming employment in small- and medium-sized cities. Meanwhile, sudden-onset events, such as coastal and riverine floods, earthquakes and cyclones, may also trigger emigration.

It should be noted that responses to push and pull factors are not uniform across income, skills, gender and age groups. Most of the rural–urban migrants do not settle permanently in cities especially in North Africa from where many tend to continue their journey towards Europe and Arab States (UN-Habitat, 2018). The poorest rural groups who migrate to cities in Africa tend to usually lack the adequate skills for employment in the service industries and urban-based manufacturing. As a result, they accept informal and seasonal jobs as a point of entry while the skilled migrants with higher-income levels access jobs in the service sector, as rapidly growing metropolitan areas become more important in the global value chain.

Gender is an important factor in the decision to migrate to urban areas (UNCTAD, 2018). From the late nineteenth century through the 1950s, many policies were designed to keep women in the rural areas, leaving movements between the countryside and towns more male-dominated for long. The 15 per cent of the female population in Kenya as at 2005 and 15 per cent of the female population in Rwanda as at 2002 were striking examples of highly unbalanced sex ratios in the urban areas (Tacoli, 2012). However, in the last decade, migration to cities in Africa has become less selective due to significant improvements in female education, the increasing number of women moving to urban areas in search of better opportunities and also as a response to discrimination and sex abuse and violence in their family relations.

The age of migrants to cities has also decreased significantly in recent years (*ibid.*). Young Africans move to cities where the overwhelming majority of their economic activities are in the informal sector where they often earn pittance in precarious jobs or while living with their employers.

Obviously, it is difficult to generalize linkages between migration and urbanization when there are important differences among people, groups, cities, countries and subregions. In the years to come, cities will continue to be major actors in the migration discourses, and migration to cities would require systematic policy thinking that considers local authorities as central players in sustainable solutions to improve rural and urban areas.

CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR MIGRANTS IN CITIES

Concentrating people and activities in cities can allow countries to promote positive economic growth for all, within and outside urban areas. Recent research shows that these benefits are sometimes counterbalanced by problems, such as overcrowding, traffic congestions, lack of adequate public services, poor economic opportunities, poor access to housing and tenure security and the exploitation of young boys and girls (Tacoli et al., 2015). For residents of African cities where, as a study puts it (Pieterse et al., 2018), water and shelter must be paid for in cash, income poverty is a major concern that once combined with high costs of service provisions, the absence of social safety nets, overcrowding and poor access to housing security, exposes low-income urban households to particular risk. These problems may translate into the violation of fundamental human rights and freedoms, including freedom from discrimination, right to life, liberty and personal security, right to social security, right to education and the right to participate in the cultural life of one's communities. Certainly, if local authorities or municipalities remain unable to manage the provision of adequate services to the large numbers of incoming population, especially when this phenomenon is coupled with the natural growth of urban population due to high fertility rates, concentrating economic activities in certain areas may foster the informal and unplanned growth of cities, as well as the marginalization of migrants without strong social ties or skills to enter the formal job market.

As urbanization is the present and the future of Africa countries, adopting the right and multisectoral policies and an appropriate governance structure is therefore crucial to ensure that cities are resilient systems. A resilient city is one that assesses, plans and acts to prepare for and respond to all hazards – sudden or slow-onset, expected or unanticipated. In this vein, a resilient city can be the source of opportunities for all, while advancing the development of the rural areas. A resilient city is also prepared to absorb and recover from any environmental shock and demographic stress, while maintaining its essential functions, structure and identity. If poorly managed, the combination of natural urban population growth, permanent and temporary migration can pressure local infrastructures and public services, resulting in social insecurity, failed expectations and anger. Thus, today, slum is still a large problem throughout Africa, with countries such as Zimbabwe, which has 17.9 per cent of people living in slums, and the Niger, which has 81.9 per cent of people living in slums (Chenal, 2016). African population who live in slums experiences challenged access to adequate and affordable housing and infrastructures (UN-Habitat, 2014), as well as high unemployment rates despite continuous inflows of people and very low access to job opportunities outside the informal economy (Avner and Lall, 2016).

Economic growth has brought particularly high prices relative to the level of development and the quality of public services provided, as well as high congestion and lack of amenities in many African cities. Moreover, insufficient public transportation, inadequate infrastructure and high commuting costs contribute to the exclusion of migrants from job opportunities (Lall et al., 2017). Spatial segregation exacerbates high out-of-pocket commuting and job search costs. Evidence shows that in Addis Ababa and Kigali, young residents in peripheral neighbourhoods without a non-fungible transit subsidy are more likely to have informal jobs (ibid.). For migrants, therefore, there is a trade-off between the search

for new opportunities and higher prices in urban areas as compared to rural areas due to the costs of commuting, land and rent. Food items, such as fresh or chilled vegetables, eggs, milk and egg-based products, are also relatively more expensive in African cities than in other regions (Nakamura et al., 2019). Against this backdrop, rising prices mark a significant reduction in household well-being, while commuting costs and poor public transportation also affect chances for migrants entering regular job opportunities. Similarly, transport networks determine the density of jobs and population within cities. Moreover, street congestion in several African cities, such as Accra, Dar es Salaam, Kinshasa, Lagos and Nairobi, affects the economic interactions and the distribution of opportunities across migrants. Intermediate cities thereby emerge as more feasible first destinations, as they tend to be both physically and culturally more accessible. They are less costly to reach and as a result, migration networks are also more likely to have been established, further reducing the cost of migration and integration. Furthermore, proximity of intermediate cities helps rural populations to become socially and economically mobile (Ingelaere et al., 2018).

Circular mobility (repetitive movement of a migrant worker between home and host areas) is especially critical. Seasonal workers are very important for multi-local households as they diversify livelihoods (Agesa, 2004). Migration is therefore seen as a risk mitigation strategy in response to conditions of environmental stress (Hunnes, 2012; Smucker and Wisner, 2008). Studies have observed that in many cases, remittances from urban areas are a vital resource for rural households (de Brauw, 2014). For instance, in the Sahel and Sudanese areas, seasonal circular movements mobilize labour during rainy seasons. Households depending on diversified systems may release their workforce during the dry season and access long-distance migration to the cities in the Gulf of Guinea or North or Central Africa (FAO, 2017). Often, seasonal migration links with high levels of informality in economic activities and in housing. In general, these migrants are likely to be more vulnerable once they move to the city (Potts, 2013).

Circular mobility includes also migrants who return home because urban conditions in the city are too bad. For instance, migrants who are less locally connected may be more vulnerable to working in low-paid sectors and sharing their rooms (ibid.). In these cases, insecurity and vulnerability may result in significant outmigration from cities. So far, charity and churches have played a significant role in alleviating the precariousness of circular migrants in African cities (ibid.). In reality, properly managed circular migratory trends can contribute to alleviate severe rural–urban imbalance by creating socioeconomic linkages between urban and rural with a positive impact on community development. In this way, policy and planning would perceive the rural and the urban as ends of the same human continuum rather than as competing entities.

Largely because of shortages of decent housing, rising rental markets and high community costs, migrants have no better choice than settling in shanty towns and slums, where the most vulnerable migrants are disproportionately represented within worst-quality informal settlements (IOM, 2015). Despite differing spatial configurations and land use between one city and another, some broad patterns exist. Around the periphery of many African cities, there are many informal

practices of land management. These systems cause uncertainty over people's rights to own and occupy property and are sources of insecurity. In informal settlements, large-scale evictions are a reality that in combination with problems in regularizing access to housing and tenure security exacerbates the precariousness of migrants, who – unlike other poor urban and rural slum-dwellers – might in some cases be forced to pay bribes to be able to stay within the non-formal system.

Unplanned urban development, growing urban populations and the physical expansion of urban settlements feed discourses about unproductive urban growth, environmental degradation, growing inequality and fuel resentment against migrants causing many of these problems. Nevertheless, urban transition in Africa is ongoing and there are, therefore, several opportunities to lay the foundations for a better and inclusive urban future.

Things are changing at different levels of urban governance. In cities, hometown associations, federations of urban poor, women's associations and religious associations continue to play an important role in responding to the specific challenges of accessing housing and to the first shelter needs of new urban migrants. Meanwhile, in recent years, cities are being recognized as pivotal players in migration governance. African governments and continental bodies, such as the African Development Bank, the African Union and UNECA, have acknowledged the positive impact of urbanization to the continent's development. A recent UNECA report (2017) writes that "Africa's rapid urban growth is both an opportunity and a challenge. While the prevailing narrative has focused largely on the negative externalities of urbanization of Africa, there is now an increasing recognition of its potential to drive growth and transformation. African leaders clearly affirmed the need to harness the potential of urbanization for structural transformation through the Common African Position at the Third United Nations Conference on Housing and Sustainable Urban Development (HABITAT-III) adopted in 2016."

At the international level, there is a general agreement on the idea that well-managed urbanization is key to realize the development potential of the continent. In the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda, United Nations Member States have specifically included SDG 11 (the "urban goal") aiming to "make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable". SDG 11 calls on all countries to "enhance inclusive and sustainable urbanization and capacity for participatory, integrated and sustainable human settlement planning and management in all countries". The Common African Position on Habitat III sees urbanization as a strategic vehicle for inclusive and sustainable growth. The Addis Ababa Action Agenda of 2015 also affirms the crucial link between national sustainable development strategies and inclusive urbanization (UN DESA, 2015). Along the same line, the Agenda 2063 recognizes urbanization as one of the key drivers for renaissance and transformation. In the 2016 report, "In safety and dignity: addressing large movements of refugees and migrants", the United Nations Secretary General states that local governments are very important in the implementation of migration policies. The Mechelen Declaration on Cities and Migration adds a significant contribution to the mainstreaming of migration policies in urban governance and planning. The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, Global Compact on Refugees and the 2017 African Union Revised Migration Policy Framework for Africa and Plan of Action 2018–2020 emphasize how strengthening the local dimension of migration policies is pivotal to leverage the development opportunities that well-managed urbanization

can offer. The New Urban Agenda commits to support migrants, refugees and displaced people in urban setting, in gaining access to adequate standard of living and opportunities for productive and decent work while taking account of national circumstances.

Overall, there is increasing awareness on the role of cities within the migration policy cycle. Between 2013 and 2018, Accra, Addis Ababa, Cape Town, Dakar, Durban, Kigali, Lagos, Luxor, Nairobi and Paynesville have joined the 100 Resilient Cities Initiatives to prioritize and implement resilient strategies. Urban authorities in Narok (Kenya) and Moshi (United Republic of Tanzania) have invested in urban upgrading. Today, African policymakers, local authorities and several national governments recognize the significant social, economic and cultural contributions that migrants can potentially bring into urban life.

CONCLUSION

There is therefore widespread institutional support for the argument that, despite the popular narrative describing African cities as oversized metropolitan areas unable to respond to social and economic expectation of a booming young population, African cities can be important engines of inclusive and sustainable development for all.

First, African cities are increasingly relevant in the global production of goods and services. In the context of globalization processes, the growing integration of African cities may foster the creation of job opportunities in the private sectors, and together with local initiatives for job creation and skills development, can transform the social landscape of contemporary urban scenes. In this regard, in recent years, many organizations have implemented programmes addressing the youth, who are the main victims of unemployment. Efforts to respond to labour market failures include community-based sanitation, urban waste-picking cooperative, as well as start-up grants and business development services for self-employment, innovation challenges to scaling-up of employment programmes for the most vulnerable youth.

Second, improving life conditions of migrants in African cities also requires financing frameworks that enable local administrations and citizens to manage migration while capitalizing on the economic and natural assets of their towns and cities. On the one hand, transforming cities into engines of inclusive and social development for all also entails mainstreaming of migration governance in the urbanization discourse. Certainly, national governments remain central players in the definition of inclusive and effective urban policies and legislation for sustainable urban development, but subnational and local governments, as well as civil society groups, can also be essential in the achievement of sustainable development and prosperity for all. As several international commitments attest, shifting urban management responsibility from central to local government is increasingly important in the context of migration policymaking. Such a shift, moving away from ad hoc solutions, would benefit both urban migrants and host communities.

Third, planning for sustainable urbanization also requires attention to rural–urban linkages, population growth, employment opportunities, governance mechanisms and international migration patterns. Uganda is a case in point. In 2010, the Ministry for Lands, Housing and Urban Development began the process of developing its national urban programme with inputs and support from different stakeholders, such as international, national and local partners. This community-driven approach has been particularly successful in facilitating the integration of migrants in urban areas. As a general rule, successful approaches will be people-centric, including civil society groups and associations working together and trying to find a common ground.

Fourth, it is important to move towards standardization, collection, analysis and dissemination of migrant data at the local level. Systematic and timely inputs can bolster the impact of migration policy in urban areas of all sizes, where stakeholders are fully involved in the analysis and planning of project implementation and infrastructure improvements.

Taken together, new financing instruments enabling cities to sustain the value generated by migration, cooperation between national and urban authorities in the field of migration governance, long-term, integrated and participatory urban and territorial planning, and people-centric activities are crucial moves to a paradigm shift that transforms cities into hubs for inclusive development for all. In a context where reports suggest that xenophobia and negative attitudes towards migrants are widespread across African cities, it is even more strategic to move migration policies to the top priorities of urban governance in order to deploy fully the potential of cities, both as hubs that catalyse people and as nodes in an increasingly connected world.

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Locals and internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Pulka enjoy a brief but much-needed spell of rain at the tail end of the Harmattan season when sandstorms become more frequent. As the rainy season comes in, IDPs here in Pulka come from surrounding villages razed by Boko Haram.

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5

INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT IN AFRICA

CHAPTER 5

INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT IN AFRICA

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INTRODUCTION

Conflicts, violence, disasters and the effects of climate change displace millions of people, but the vast majority of the displaced remain within the borders of their own country, a phenomenon referred to as “internal displacement”. For these individuals, families and communities, mobility is not a choice but a life-saving response, vital to their safety and well-being. Globally, there is an estimated 41.3 million people displaced internally within the borders of their country due to conflict and violence, nearly 41 per cent of whom were in countries across Africa in 2019 (IDMC, 2019a).¹ In the same year, droughts, floods and tropical cyclones across the continent displaced another 2.6 million people (IDMC, 2019a, 2019b).

Internally displaced persons (IDPs) are not refugees: they do not receive the international protection that comes from crossing a national border in times of crisis. As citizens of the country where they continue to reside – albeit having left their place of habitual residence – the protection of IDPs remains squarely with national and local authorities. However, the crises that led to internal displacement often weakens the State’s ability to respond; and at times, the State may be the one responsible for the internal displacement, either directly or by its inability to provide adequate protection leading up to (and during) the displacement. The humanitarian system thus engages, as appropriate, to help the State protect and assist its citizens. Nevertheless, it is often the host communities and the generosity of hosting populations that are at the frontlines of providing affected populations the protection and assistance, shouldering the impacts of the displacement.

¹ This report presents the data monitored and reported on by IDMC in 2018 and examines key displacement situations affecting the continents. See also OCHA, 2019.

Humanitarian action is vital to saving lives and addressing basic needs but does not on its own suffice to address underlying causes and consequences of internal displacement. Given the often multiple and interrelated drivers and impacts of internal displacement, development and peace initiatives must go hand-in-hand with humanitarian assistance and protection. Although there is widespread recognition of the need to expand the prism for addressing internal displacement beyond humanitarian action alone, assistance structures and practitioners have been slow to put this recognition into practice.

In 2015, United Nations Member States pledged to achieve 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), including a firm commitment to leave no one behind, which also comprises displaced persons. As articulated in the African Union's Agenda 2063, resolving displacement and preventing new forced movements is critical for the future prosperity and development of the African continent.

Following a brief outline of the current landscape of internal displacement across Africa, this chapter looks at the relationship between humanitarian response, peace and development to help prevent and mitigate the impacts of displacement and progressively resolve displacement situations.

Text box 1. Definitions

"Internal displacement" refers to the involuntary or forced movement, evacuation or relocation of persons or groups of persons within internationally recognized State borders.

"IDP" refers to persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situation of generalised violence, violation of human rights or natural or human-made disasters and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border.

– Kampala Convention, 2009

LANDSCAPE: INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT IN AFRICA

In recent years, internal displacement related issues have touched, at least to some degree, almost every African country, from a handful of households fleeing a localized disaster to millions displaced by either conflict, violence, disaster or a combination thereof (IDMC, n.d.).

While some IDPs found solutions from previous displacements,² in 2018, over 10.1 million people became newly internally displaced across the continent, primarily in 21 countries.³ For the vast majority of these countries, the new displacements compounded existing internal displacement situations. Globally,

² It is important to note that when obtaining accurate figures on the scale of internal displacement, even when figures are available, this does not necessarily reflect the various dimensions and impacts of displacement or the achievement of durable solutions. See for example, IDMC, 2019a.

³ This does not include the complete number of countries who also undertook prevention, resilience and disaster risk reduction activities, the aim of which is to minimize the risks of displacement from occurring. The figures presented in this paragraph are all drawn from IDMC, 2019b.

over two thirds of African countries were in the top 10 of new conflict-related internal displacements: Ethiopia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia, Nigeria, Central African Republic, Cameroon and South Sudan, respectively; with Nigeria, Somalia and Kenya ranking among the top 10 for new disaster-related displacement. About 80 per cent of the countries (in Africa) responding to new displacements in 2018 required addressing conflict and disaster displacement simultaneously, sometimes as part of multiple drivers of displacement, and also in separate instance in different parts of the country.

This goes to show the importance for countries in Africa of tackling the multicausal drivers of both conflict- and disaster-driven displacement and understanding the interlinkage between the two as part of addressing and resolving displacement situations. For example, armed conflicts and fragility tend to increase the impact of disasters, while the impacts of climate change can fuel internal displacement, as severe weather events, irregular weather patterns and desertification make rural livelihoods more precarious and increase seasonal vulnerability, heightening competition over strained natural resources. While natural hazard-induced displacement is often of shorter duration, its recurring nature contributes to growing vulnerability and requires efforts to address underlying contributing factors.

The causes and impacts of both conflict and natural hazard related displacement correlate to vulnerability, of which poverty, inequality, instability and environmental degradation are leading drivers. Considered against development indicators, more than three quarters (76%) of the African countries dealing with internal displacement rank among the United Nations classification of least developed countries (UN DESA, Economic Analysis and Policy Division, n.d.). Underdevelopment can be a contributing (albeit not sole) driver of instability, while displacement can undermine development progress, impoverish people and can lead to unmet protection needs, loss of social capital, social tensions, including with host communities and many other negative consequences. There is thus an inextricable linkage of development to addressing internal displacement, whether from prevention and risk reduction to mitigating the impacts of protracted displacement and progressing towards durable solutions.

RELEVANT FRAMEWORKS TO THE AFRICAN CONTEXT

The broad range of international instruments and frameworks governing internal displacement also speaks to the complexity of the topic: (a) 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (SDGs); (b) Addis Ababa Action Agenda of the Third International Conference on Financing for Development; (c) Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness; (d) Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 (Sendai Framework); (e) Paris Agreement on Climate Change (Paris Agreement); (f) Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement; (g) IDP Protocol of the Great Lakes Pact; and (h) African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons (Kampala Convention). Although they emerge from different fields and through different pathways, these instruments all contribute to some dimension of preventing, reducing the risk of, responding to and resolving internal displacement.

Of significance, Africa hosts the world's first legally binding regional instrument on internal displacement, the Kampala Convention. This milestone for IDPs in Africa and leadership across the world represents the commitment of African States to comprehensively address internal displacement. Adopted in 2009, the Kampala Convention came into force in December 2012. Forty (40) member States of the African Union are signatories to the convention and, as of February 2020, 29 States have ratified it. While States have already made a notable commitment to the convention, it still needs to be systematically and comprehensively translated into practice by African States to realize its full potential (ICRC, 2018). Among other things, a robust treaty monitoring and reporting body might promote implementation. In 2019, the convention celebrated its tenth anniversary, providing a strong impetus by the African Union, as well as its member States to push for a full continent-wide commitment to the convention.⁴ A website (African Union, n.d.) recently launched in the margins of the African Union's Thirty-third Ordinary Assembly, which tracks member State's signature and ratification of treaties, aims to promote more support for the Kampala Convention and other treaties.

Text box 2. Implementing the Kampala Convention: Harare Plan of Action

A ministerial conference of State Parties to the Kampala Convention adopted the first action plan for its implementation in April 2017. The Harare Plan of Action sets out priority areas, as well as activities that shall be adopted and implemented by the African Union, State Parties, regional economic communities and partners.

The plan of action is structured around the five objectives of the Kampala Convention:

- (a) Establish a framework for solidarity, cooperation and promotion of durable solutions between State Parties
- (b) Establish a policy framework for the prevention, protection of and assistance to IDPs at national level
- (c) Promote and strengthen regional and national measures to prevent and eliminate the root causes of internal displacement and provide for durable solutions
- (d) Promote the obligations and responsibilities of State Parties
- (e) Identify specific obligations, roles and responsibilities of armed groups, non-State actors and other relevant actors including civil society organizations

Other complementary and reinforcing regional initiatives include the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), which references internal displacement within its broader IGAD Regional Migration Policy Framework (2012), thereby promoting, among others, the ratification and implementation of the Kampala Convention. The Nairobi Declaration on Somali Refugees (2017) recognizes the need to look inclusively at the Somalia environment, notably in view of significant numbers of IDPs and the need to seek durable solutions for both returning Somali refugees as well as Somali IDPs, aligned with the Somali National Development Plan.

⁴ Some countries such as Kenya have normative frameworks and policies on IDPs without having ratified the Kampala Convention.

Moreover, the 1998 Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and relevant protocols of the Great Lakes Pact, have also been integrated into some domestic normative frameworks or policies on the protection of IDPs, most notably in Kenya, Mali and Uganda.

RESPONDING TO SITUATIONS OF INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT

Humanitarian protection and assistance

IDPs often have specific protection and assistance needs and challenges that must be addressed in accord with applicable international, regional and national instruments and legal standards. The immediate response to internal displacement centres on life-saving protection, including access to food, shelter, water and hygiene. Particularly in disaster situations, populations may be evacuated prior to, during or in the disaster's aftermath. In all displacement contexts, assessments identify the particular needs of the affected populations, taking account of the special needs of women, children, the elderly and disabled, and identifying the most vulnerable among the populations. Similar to responding to displacement in refugee situations, camps may be established in order to effectively provide a range of support structures and services to the affected populations. However, increasingly, IDPs seek refuge with host communities or in urban areas, often in the hope of improved access to services, employment opportunities and social networks.

Many member States have dedicated entities within government structures to ensure timely humanitarian assistance and coordination with humanitarian actors, such as the Ministry of Solidarity and Humanitarian Action in Mali or the National Consultative Coordination Committee in Kenya, which includes both State and non-State actors. Some States establish camps, providing protection and facilitating targeted aid delivery for IDPs. In North-East Nigeria, for example, the National Emergency Management Agency and State Emergency Management Agency manage camps with technical support from IOM (IOM, 2019).

Text box 3. Urbanization

Urban areas are fast growing across Africa, with climate change catalysing a major push towards Africa's cities. Sub-Saharan Africa is often regarded as the world's fastest urbanizing region (Saghir and Santoro, 2018). At the same time, IDPs are frequently drawn to urban centres, seeking refuge as well as jobs and services, although they often end up joining the urban poor in slums. This exposes them to further risks, such as natural hazards and forced evictions. Mogadishu, for example, is home to some 600,000 IDPs, thus reshaping the urban landscape and fuelling urbanization (IDMC, 2018a). Over time, informal settlements often gradually merge into the urban fabric. If well managed, Africa's urban centres have the potential to utilize IDP capacities, aspirations and numbers to develop economic and social opportunities for all urban residents. In Maiduguri in Nigeria, for example, internal displacement led to the emergence of local markets in isolated areas, opening up new economic opportunities (IDMC, 2018b).

MITIGATING IMPACTS IN PROTRACTED DISPLACEMENT

The intention of humanitarian response is typically meant to be temporary. However, in reality, particularly when displacement occurs as a result of conflict or a complex combination of conflict and natural hazards, IDPs can remain in protracted displacement for years, with no solutions in sight. In this way, alternatives to aid dependency must be considered for the IDPs, as well as ways to mitigate the impacts of the displacement on hosting and neighbouring communities. Early in humanitarian responses, national actors, humanitarian responders and development agencies need to consider transitioning from humanitarian to development assistance and mitigation strategies if the displacement is foreseen to be protracted.

Some key considerations include the following:

- (a) **Self-reliance:** There is a growing discourse around the criticality of investing in action to enable access to local labour markets and services in reducing dependency on humanitarian aid. Efforts to seek out opportunities in developing local economies and markets can capitalize on newly available labour resources and increased demand.
- (b) **Access to services:** Large population influxes often strain existing basic services. Investing in existing government structures and systems to facilitate adequate and equitable access avoids the establishment of (often costly) parallel systems and helps address discrepancies in the availability and quality of services.
- (c) **Housing, land and property:** In out-of-camp settings, population influxes can rapidly distort housing markets and dramatically increase rents as a result of growth in demand. IDPs often lack security of tenure and live in fear of evictions. Opportunities for land or home ownership are usually reliant on documentation and potentially personal networks that IDPs may lack, with discrimination an additional barrier in many cases. Women are often particularly disadvantaged in law and tradition.

Text box 4. Mobility for building self-reliance

IDPs in South Kivu and other areas of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for example, adopt a strategy known as *déplacement pendulaire*: security allowing, they return to tend to agricultural land during the day and return at night to sleep in a place of refuge. A range of coping mechanisms have been adopted by IDPs in Burundi, including prolonged migration and sending family members in search of work, in addition to selling assets, reducing quantity or quality of food, reducing non-food costs such as school and health care and dependence on humanitarian assistance (IOM, 2017).

While many fragile contexts have seen either an over-reliance on cyclical, expensive and short-term humanitarian action, or on development interventions that are “risk blind” to potential shocks and stresses, it is increasingly important to have comprehensive approaches that respond to humanitarian needs and address the drivers of displacement, while creating environments conducive to resolving displacement. Progress in this regard can often be achieved in an incremental manner gradually building resilience and working towards recovery. Maintaining a longer term, development-oriented vision throughout humanitarian responses helps to encourage programming that later reinforces or leads into more robust development down the road.

In addition to focusing on IDPs, there is growing need to also consider the impact of displacement on communities, both host communities and of origin. Large-scale population influxes can stretch local budgets, distort markets, cause environmental degradation and strain already fragile economies, social fabrics and infrastructures. In home communities, for those unable or unwilling to flee, the loss of labour force, reduction in basic services and weakened economies can compound the wider impacts of crisis and increase vulnerabilities.

Programmes that help strengthen the well-being of communities provide a greater foundation for supporting and meeting the needs of IDPs. Likewise, community-based planning that promote active engagement with IDPs can help catalyse gains. For instance, new populations, including IDPs, increase demand for goods and services, which can stimulate local markets. IDPs can also introduce new skills and expand the labour force. Host communities may also benefit from assistance programmes that include vulnerable community members or that have community-wide impacts from migrant remittances including support to families, businesses or wider communities. In countries with high numbers of people living in protracted displacement, focusing on helping them rebuild their lives and contribute to their host communities will allow progress toward many of the global SDGs (IDMC, 2017).

CREATING CONDITIONS CONDUCTIVE TO RESOLVING DISPLACEMENT

In the context of resolving internal displacement, there are three typical “durable solutions”. These are widely recognized to be, and similarly articulated in the Kampala Convention: (a) return and reintegration; (b) local integration; and (c) relocation (Kampala Convention, Article 11).

Reliable data on the number of IDPs in Africa achieving a durable solution does not exist. However, trends in IDP figures in internal displacement contexts across Africa suggest that solutions remain elusive for many. At a minimum, key considerations for achieving solutions as contained in the Kampala Convention include the following:

- (a) Access to relevant documentation;
- (b) Promotion of self-reliance and sustainable livelihoods;
- (c) Prevention of exclusion and marginalization;
- (d) Systems to unify families, mechanisms to resolve property disputes and ensure effective remedies for damage; and
- (e) Ensure enjoyment of civic and political rights and investments in disaster risk reduction and preparedness in risk-prone areas.

Without such long-term investments, continued hardship and marginalization may again fuel instability and displacement. Whether displacement occurs in response to a sudden event such as the eruption of violence, or as a culmination of slow-onset pressures such as desertification, approaches to address drivers must involve pro-poor policies, economic growth, employment generation, preventative diplomacy, conflict prevention and resolution, rule of law, human rights, coordinated peacebuilding efforts, social cohesion and resilience.

Text box 5. Community-driven development in Somalia^a

Government–citizen relationships and social cohesion are being strengthened in displacement-affected districts in Somalia through facilitated participatory visioning, planning and prioritization processes to identify needs and the means to sustain a living for IDPs, returnees and impacted communities. This effort led to the identification of the drivers of instability and tensions and prioritization of community-based projects in the form of community action plans, which are promoted by local authorities to orientate stakeholder support. This government-led intervention promotes locally identified and locally owned solutions to chronic vulnerability and insecurity in areas registering significant numbers of IDPs and returnees.

Note: ^a This initiative led by the Government of Somalia, with technical and capacity support provided by IOM and UN-Habitat, seeks to support communities residing in areas impacted by displacement and returns.

CONCLUSION

Internal displacement remains a significant concern across Africa as a result of conflict, disasters and a complex combination of the two.⁵ As the saying goes, “An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure”. The best solution for addressing internal displacement is to prevent and reduce the risks of it occurring and build resilience to withstand crisis impacts. However, some degree of displacement will always be inevitable. Moving out of harm’s way is life saving, and people must be able to move to safety. Therefore, when it does occur, the goal is to minimize the negative impacts as much as possible and progressively work towards solutions so that the affected populations can resume safe and dignified lives. With innovation and careful planning, communities could also be supported to not only overcome the challenges that displacement brings on them but also to provide opportunities that benefit IDPs, community members and the well-being and resilience of communities as a whole.

Internal displacement is increasingly recognized as a complex humanitarian, development and peacebuilding challenge, requiring strong State leadership, where necessary supported by a range of humanitarian, development and peacebuilding actors, to comprehensively address the drivers and consequences of crises. From the outset, the needs, capacities and aspirations of the displaced and hosting communities, as well as those unable or unwilling to leave their homes, must be systematically considered. While it is imperative to ensure that humanitarian protection and assistance needs are met, inclusive, forward-leaning policies and practices are enablers to progressively resolving displacement situations and creating peaceful and prosperous societies that benefit all. This lens encourages more holistic, comprehensive and strategic approaches that integrate prevention measures as part of wider solutions.

The African Union marked 2019 as the Year of Refugees, Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons, commemorating the tenth anniversary of the adoption of the Kampala Convention. So far, strong commitments have been made on the part of national governments to comprehensively address internal displacement demonstrating firm political will and leadership. While African countries have led the way in adopting national laws and policies on IDPs through the Kampala Convention, efforts to domesticate and comprehensively implement and monitor the provisions of the convention must be reinvigorated.

⁵ Data gaps are also noted, with scant data available on displacement resulting from large development projects.

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Worsening conditions continue to deplete the coping capacities of vulnerable pastoralist farmers in drought-affected areas. When women are forced to leave their houses, they often only carry items that are thought to be essential to the family.

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6

ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION AND HUMAN MOBILITY NEXUS IN AFRICA

CHAPTER 6

ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION AND HUMAN MOBILITY NEXUS IN AFRICA

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ABSTRACT

The link between human mobility and the environment in Africa is discussed, suggesting that an approach to environmental migration should move away from environmental determinism to one that considers the political, social and economic contexts that put affected populations under stress. Vulnerability, low levels of resilience and capacity resulting from population growth, urbanization, environmental degradation and climate change are key drivers of disaster displacement risk in Africa. To mitigate vulnerabilities and displacement risk, it is imperative to address low levels of human development, as failure fosters conflict and instability, thereby increasing the risk of vicious cycles of displacement. Examples are drawn from the Sahel region, East Africa and West Africa for illustration. Similarly, the scale of human mobility triggered by rapid-onset natural hazards is largely determined by the location of homes in areas that are prone to impacts, people's underlying vulnerability to shocks and stresses that can make their homes uninhabitable, disrupt or destroy their livelihoods and leave them with few safe and voluntary solutions to their predicament and inability to recover quickly from displacement. The chapter emphasizes the need for more data to better understand the link between human mobility and climate change in all its complexity.

INTRODUCTION

According to IOM, environmental change and natural disasters have always been major drivers of migration. However, climate change predictions for the twenty-first century indicate that even more people are expected to be on the move as weather-related disasters such as extreme precipitations and temperatures become more frequent and intense (IPCC, 2014), and changes to climate conditions impact on livelihoods.

Environmental migrants are persons or groups of persons who, predominantly for reasons of sudden or progressive change in the environment that adversely affects their lives or living conditions, are obliged to leave their habitual homes, or choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, and who move either within their country or abroad (Ionesco et al., 2017).

Environmental migration is a fact. Most countries experience some form of migration associated with environmental and climate change or forced immobility for those populations that end up trapped. Sudden-onset disasters as well as slow-onset environmental change taking place around the world, whether natural or human-made, profoundly affect migration drivers and migration patterns, even though the relationship between concrete environmental factors and migratory response is seldom direct and linear. Indeed, environmental migration or immobility results from the interplay of intricate economic, political, social and environmental dynamics, where the environmental component is sometimes hard to identify but is nonetheless critical (*ibid.*).

Environmental degradation due to climate change is fundamentally redrawing the map of Africa. Climate affects where and how people are able to live. It drives human displacement and forced migration by threatening lives over the short term and making people's livelihoods untenable over the long term, particularly the poorest and most vulnerable.

However, while vulnerability and low levels of resilience and capacity are key drivers of disaster displacement risk (Ginnetti et al., 2015), in Africa, exposure to hazards would likely increase it in the region in the foreseeable future. This is a result of – among other drivers – population growth and urbanization, and climate change. In order to mitigate displacement risk, it is imperative to intensify efforts to reduce people's vulnerability to hazards by addressing factors related to low levels of human development, which are also core drivers of displacement in other contexts. Failure to do so will heighten vulnerability and foster instability, increasing the risk of vicious cycles of displacement (IDMC, 2017a).

The scale of human mobility triggered by rapid-onset natural hazards is largely determined by the location of homes in areas prone to their impacts, and people's underlying vulnerability to shocks and stresses that can make their homes uninhabitable disrupt or destroy their livelihoods and leave them with few safe and voluntary solutions to their predicament.

There are both economic and political aspects to the vulnerability side of the equation. The poverty that affects around 330 million Africans means communities have few resources to invest in making their homes safe to remain in or recovering quickly from displacement (Beegle et al., 2016).

Environmental degradation due to climate change, in tandem with drivers of people's increasing exposure and vulnerability, is expected to heighten the risk of displacement globally in the coming years and decades as extreme weather events become more frequent and intense (IPCC, 2014). Projected weather patterns over the twenty-first century include an increase in drought and heavy rainfall in Southern and East Africa, more intense precipitation in West Africa and more frequent heatwaves in North Africa (Niang et al., 2014).

Meanwhile, armed conflicts lead to further flows of people fleeing violence either within their countries (internal displacement) or across international borders (refugees). Analysis of civil wars over the past 70 years indicate that at least 40 per cent are linked to the contested control or use of natural resources, such as land, water, minerals or oil (UNEP, 2009).¹

In Africa, it is now obvious, that environmental degradation issues are one factor in human mobility. But what is different now is that the degree of environmental degradation and the wherewithal to move are combining to create a push and pull effect that is on a scale never seen before (Ionesco et al., 2017).

Text box 1. Setting the context

In Africa, climate change intensifies environmental degradation, loss of biodiversity and natural hazards in many regions. Related impacts are already directly and indirectly shifting human movements – both within countries and across borders – and will do so increasingly. Sometimes, ensuing migration can be an adaptation to climate change. At other times, climate impacts increase the probability of migration under distress, creating growing challenges for human development. The most vulnerable can be unable to move, “trapped” in at-risk areas.

Development implications will be substantial for those affected. Understanding the scale of internal climate migration and the patterns of people's movements is critical to countries and local authorities so they can plan and prepare. The focus on “internal” climate migration is driven by the consensus that migration within countries, rather than cross-border migration, is by far the largest phenomenon (Ionesco et al., 2017), yet both require concerted action.

(Rigaud et al., 2018)

¹ Years have been updated by the author.

UNDERSTANDING MOVEMENT OF POPULATIONS CAUSED BY ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION

Disasters triggered significant displacement elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa, forcing almost 2.6 million people to flee their homes due to drought, cyclones and floods in 2018 (IDMC, 2019). Small-scale and frequent disasters go relatively unnoticed as conflict takes centre stage, but what these localized crises illustrate is that displacement is more about an endogenous problem of poverty and lack of development than the consequence of external threats posed by natural hazards. Sub-Saharan Africa's population and urbanization rate are predicted to increase dramatically in the coming decades, putting more people at risk of disasters. If unaddressed, poverty, vulnerability and climate change will increase the risk of population movements.

A combination of climate change and increasing exposure and vulnerability is expected to exacerbate this trend in the coming decades, as extreme weather hazards become more frequent and intense (IDMC, 2017b).

But the picture is complicated. The most vulnerable groups often lack the means or connections to move and may be trapped in place. Others such as pastoralists, in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa regions, rely on seasonal migration as a livelihood strategy. Meanwhile, the planned relocation of populations in the face of a particular risk such as major land degradation can act as a release valve, reducing environmental pressures on fragile ecosystems but also, in effect, "exporting" their environmental footprint elsewhere.

It is also important to remember that displacement/migration itself can have environmental impacts, causing environmental degradation that can prolong the humanitarian emergency or worsening relationships with host communities. Rapid urbanization or poorly managed refugee camps and internally displaced persons (IDPs) settlements can put pressure on scarce water, energy and food resources, lead to uncontrolled waste disposal, and put refugees and migrants in direct competition with local communities.²

² Recovery, reconstruction and addressing the energy and shelter needs of displaced people demands natural resources. For example, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 36 million trees from the Virunga National Park were used to meet the cooking and shelter needs of refugees between 1994 and 1996.

Text box 2. Highlight on East Africa

Dependency on agriculture – especially rain-fed agriculture for both human and livestock consumption – is high in East Africa and thus, highly sensitive and vulnerable to climate variability and change. While existing livelihood systems such as pastoralism are traditionally well adapted to rainfall variability, rising temperatures and the increasing frequency and intensity of extreme weather events are putting stress on water availability and cropping systems.

Climate variability, and particularly drought in dryland areas, has been a common driver of migration in the region. Major droughts and conflict have contributed to the region's history of internal displacement and mixed migration flows. Climate migration is expected to increase in the coming decades, and the East Africa region could see up to 12.1 million climate migrants by 2050.

In 2017, the population of East Africa was 422 million. Population growth under both moderate and unequal development scenarios will be rapid across the region, resulting in 675 million and 786 million people by 2050, respectively. This growth creates challenges for development that will be magnified by the future impacts of climate change. Past rapid population growth has contributed not only to land fragmentation, which has spurred rural to urban migration, but also to rapid urbanization, as well as pressures on natural resources and institutions. Future internal migration will occur in this context of already high internal mobility and burgeoning populations.

In East Africa, between 2020 and 2050, the number of internal climate migrants is projected to increase. Overall, East Africa could see an average of 10.1 million climate migrants by 2050 under the pessimistic reference scenario, with numbers steadily increasing from 2.6 million in 2020. The share of climate migrants in the population is projected to rise from 0.6 per cent to 1.3 per cent in the same period. The more climate-friendly scenario has lower numbers of climate migrants. Under this scenario, climate migrants rise from 1.8 million in 2020 to 6.9 million in 2050 on average.

The region will also see a sharp rise in the number of other internal migrants driven by economic, social, political or environmental reasons. Climate migrants as a share of total internal migrants will increase across the scenarios albeit at slower pace, representing 11 to 15 per cent of total internal migrants by 2050.

(Rigaud et al., 2018)

Text box 3. The case of West Africa and the Sahel regions

With a 2017 population of 382 million, West Africa is home to 5 per cent of the world's population. This is a fivefold increase in population since 1950, when 73 million people lived in the region, which makes West Africa the fastest growing of any of the world's regions. For comparison, the world population has increased less than threefold during the same time period. The young age structure of the West African population – almost half of West Africans are 15 years old and younger – assures continued population growth into the near and medium future. Assuming a medium fertility model, the population of the region is projected to exceed 1 billion by 2059, when almost one in 10 of the world's human population will be West African (Ministerie van Landbouw, Natuur en Voedselkwaliteit, 2019).

It is widely recognized that West Africa is one of the most mobile regions in the world, accounting for over 50 per cent of global migration flows. West Africa is also a region highly vulnerable to climate change that can affect local livelihoods, threaten food security and increase the number of people on the move, making it an important place to consider the links between climate change and human mobility (PDD, 2018).

According to the 2007 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), average temperatures in West Africa are expected to rise as much as 3°C by 2050, potentially causing devastating effects to the security of the region. The resilience of this ecosystem will also be challenged by an estimated 10 per cent reduction in annual rainfall by the same year.

The Sahelo–Sudanese region is the most affected by the multiplication of extreme events (floods), the increase in temperatures or the decline and poor distribution of rainfall. The impacts on agriculture are amplified due to the weakness of infrastructure and risk management systems and the persistence of subsistence farming (FAO, 2015). The anticipated short- and long-term impacts of these changes on agriculture are all the more important as the most affected areas are those with high rural density. Tensions associated with these demographic and environmental factors make it difficult for young rural people to integrate. These tensions contribute to the dynamics of regional migration with consequences that vary according to national situations.

The United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) report on desertification (2014) noted that in the Sahel region, climate change and desertification are increasingly displacing people and forcing them to migrate. Desertification and deforestation have critically put at risk 67 million people living in that region.

TACKLING ENVIRONMENTAL MIGRATION

Migration and displacement issues have been reflected in the landmark agreements adopted in 2015 that set out much of the development framework for the next 15 years. The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), for example, include a commitment to facilitate “orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration” as part of Goal 10 to reduce inequality within and among countries.³ SDG 11 highlights the need to “(m)ake cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable”, while Target 11.5 aims to “significantly reduce the number of deaths and the number of people affected and substantially decrease the direct economic losses relative to global gross domestic product caused by disasters, including water-related disasters, with a focus on protecting the poor and people in vulnerable situations” by 2030. SDG 13 urges “urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts”, while Target 13.1 seeks to “strengthen resilience and adaptive capacity to climate-related hazards and natural disasters in all countries.” Environment and climate-induced migration has also been extensively covered in Africa’s Agenda 2063.

The Sendai Framework on Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030, adopted in 2015, creates a global framework for reducing disaster risk and losses in lives, livelihoods and health, aiming to substantially reduce the number of displaced people globally by 2030 (UNISDR, 2015).

A number of other global initiatives also directly seek to address aspects of environmental displacement itself. The Platform on Disaster Displacement is a State-led process that endeavours to forge consensus on the rights and protection needs of people displaced across borders in the context of disasters and climate change.⁴ On 19 September 2016, the United Nations General Assembly convened a high-level meeting on addressing large movements of refugees and migrants as a way to build international consensus to address the growing challenge of international migration and the increasing flow of refugees. The meeting adopted the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants.

The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration – signed in 2018 in Marrakech, Morocco – offers a set of guiding principles and also articulates concrete measures for action related to border management, documentation, migrant services, capacity-building for States, consular protection, skills recognition, mechanisms of portability and building environments for migrants and diasporas to be actors of development. The text also contains multiple references to environmental migration, articulating a wide and comprehensive understanding of the challenges linked to the environment–migration nexus. Most of the references related to environmental migration are made under objective 2 (Minimizing the adverse drivers and structural factors that compel people to leave their country of origin), which contains a section specifically dedicated to the subject and titled “Natural disasters, the adverse effects of climate change, and environmental degradation” (Objective 2, paragraphs 18.h–18.l). Furthermore, a few important references can be found under Objective 5: Enhance availability and flexibility of pathways for regular migration) (Ionesco and Traore Chazalnoël, n.d.).

³ SDG 10, Target 7: “Facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through the implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies (United Nations, n.d.).

⁴ Formerly known as the Nansen Initiative (PDD, n.d.).

Meanwhile, in Africa, the issue of irregular migration and forced displacement has rocketed up the political agenda, attracting attention from academics, policymakers and the humanitarian community. African governments have made a series of commitments on collecting and sharing data as part of efforts to prevent internal displacement and protect and assist IDPs, incorporating the principles of international law into national legislation and regional frameworks such as the Kampala Convention (African Union, 2009).

Indeed, dealing with climate-related human mobility requires an integrated approach that combines knowledge on climate risks with the social and political realities of African regions. The Economic Community of West African States and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development have recognized the increasing risks linked to climate change.

At the African Union level, the Peace and Security Architecture Roadmap 2016–2020 highlights climate change as one of the cross-cutting issues in peace and security. It acknowledges the vulnerability caused by climate change and has held two open sessions focusing on the linkages between climate change and security. The African Union’s “Silencing the Guns in Africa by the Year 2020” also underscores that linkages between climate change and security exist. The hope is that these frameworks will create a new and improved international response to irregular migration and refugee flows.

CONCLUSION

Environmental degradation (and mismanagement) due to climate change contributes to many of the political, economic and social drivers of displacement. There is a need to better understand and mitigate those complex and interdependent factors. Ultimately, unless long-term environmental vulnerability can be dealt with, huge numbers of people displaced every year could become the “new normal”. Fundamentally, there is a need to find a way of doing more than just responding to recurring crises.

The environmental community has an important role to play in the following: (a) building awareness of the ecological drivers of displacement; (b) strengthening the capacity of communities and countries to withstand shocks and environmental change; and (c) helping to plan the relocation of communities likely to be displaced by unavoidable environmental change.

Ultimately, climate-induced human mobility is not just a political challenge. There is a need to think of it as a development challenge and, critically, an environmental management challenge. The scale of possible future displacement under even moderate climate change scenarios means that environment, humanitarian and displacement-focused actors must work together to build people’s resilience in a changing world.

Reliable data on population movements in Africa is vital to ensure a timely and well-targeted operational and policy response. Evidence of the multiple causes of human mobility and its impact on development priorities, such as food security, education, health and the protection of vulnerable groups, with a solution-oriented focus, can inform more holistic action by governments and aid agencies.

Early warning systems and disaster risk reduction, preparedness and management systems also rely on credible data. Baseline information and consistent monitoring can build up an understanding of the needs and coping strategies of people in gradually deteriorating conditions, such as those brought on by drought, which in turn can inform the development of prevention and preparedness plans. The identification of unusual or intensified migration patterns can serve as an indicator of the need for interventions at least to mitigate a crisis. That is why investment in Earth observation and climate information services, as well as technological advancements are important.

The next few years will be critical for the development of a more effective, compassionate and rights-based approach to human mobility. There is a need to work more proactively to reduce risks and avoid merely reactive responses. In other words, there is a need to do more fire prevention and less firefighting.

One should also bear in mind to incorporate environmental considerations in the formulation of national and regional migration management policies to better address environment-related causes of migratory movements, as well as the impact migratory movements have on the environment. There is also a need to increase collaboration with relevant international agencies to this end, including strengthening research and data gathering and exchange on the relationship between migration and the environment.

Enhancing the adaptation and the resilience of African countries to the adverse effects of climate change is fundamental to preventing forced massive human mobility across, and even beyond, the continent. This can be done through the following: (a) improving local understanding of climate change issues; that is, knowledge of what climate change means to local governments and communities in concrete and tangible terms, such as information on nature and risks they face; (b) adopting human development-oriented measures to improve the livelihoods of those exposed to the effects of climate change and increase their resilience, in order to counter the need for involuntary movements; and (c) implementing ecosystem-based/nature-based solutions for adaptation, combating climate change and environmental degradation.

More capacity-building for governments is also needed to recognize the potential negative impacts of economic development as defined by the GDP, and the need for amending and/or developing new policies that pursue sustainable development models.

Identifying priority objectives (through the implementation of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration) to which local governments can contribute, as a means of demonstrating concerted action and galvanizing commitments by other actors in support of local efforts should also be considered.

The link between human mobility and climate change is still not fully understood in all its complexity, partly due to the lack of data, and this hinders the ability of States to cooperate with international donors as these issues are yet mainstreamed across funding priorities. It is, therefore, necessary to increase funding opportunities by raising awareness among international donors of the importance of climate change and its important links to forced human mobility.

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A border bridge in Dollo Ado, Somali Regional State, Ethiopia.

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7

REORGANIZING BORDERS IN THE AGE OF FREE MOVEMENT IN AFRICA

CHAPTER 7

REORGANIZING BORDERS IN THE AGE OF FREE MOVEMENT IN AFRICA

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ABSTRACT

This chapter looks at the future of border management as Africa takes important steps towards a new era of free movement across the continent, on the premise that Aspiration 2 of the African Union Agenda 2063, which envisions a continent with “seamless borders” where “the free movement of people, capital, goods and services”, does not imply the removal of colonial boundaries. As such, effective and efficient border management will take new dimensions and remain a priority for the foreseeable future. Issues affecting African border management are examined, including the following: (a) visa liberalization in Africa; (b) free movement in the regional economic communities (RECs); (c) border data and the importance of evidence-based policymaking; (d) an integrated border management (IBM) approach; (e) one-stop border posts (OSBPs); (f) travel documentation; (g) free trade; and (h) Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration. The chapter recommends that States should adopt an IBM approach and establish OSBPs that experience significant flows of people and goods, as well as establish border management information systems (BMIS) at all principal ports of entry.

INTRODUCTION

For many Africans, migration has become a way of life, prompting observers to use phrases like “Africa on the move” and “the culture of migration”. However, most Africans do not migrate and those that do tend to move regionally within the continent (Adepoju, 2007). Between 2015 and 2017, the number of African international migrants living within the region increased 19 per cent, from 16 million to approximately 19 million. Within the same period, there was a more moderate 6 per cent increase in the number of Africans moving outside the continent: from around 16 million to 17 million (McAuliffe and Kitimbo, 2018;).

Historically, Africans moved far and wide across the continent without the formal constraints now commonplace among nations: border controls, travel documents, visas in some cases and the necessity of access to various national currencies. While precolonial movement on the continent was likely hindered by animosity or distrust, and even exploitation, from many power and social structures encountered along the way, as well as by topographical and weather challenges,

the precolonial boundaries were more naturally aligned with ethnic and broad family groupings and movement within these common areas was likely largely unencumbered by other than natural forces. For many Africans, particularly for contiguous cross-border communities, today's travel requirements continue to constitute a nuisance and seem out-of-place with their natural social structure. For contiguous communities separated by national boundaries, what was routine movement to visit family and pursue resources is now characterized as cross-border international migration – often irregular in nature.

Three periods in the border-mobility narrative can be distinguished, namely the historical precolonial, colonial and post-colonial periods. These roughly equate to periods of largely unencumbered circulation within the area of one's own social group, through that of controls imposed by generally strict national border requirements coupled with limited capacity to manage the colonial-demarcated borders.

Precolonial and colonial era

Despite many constraints to movement in precolonial times, over the centuries, Africans circulated across the continent on the backs of camels in the deserts of the Sahara, horses or mules in coastal Africa, on foot through the forests or by canoe on the rivers and seas along the shores of the continent. Since the eleventh century, the trans-Saharan trade routes that connected North and West Africa, which peaked between the fourteenth and sixteenth centuries and remained intact until the twentieth century, stood an example of mobility across geographic, sociocultural, religious, climatic and political boundaries.

During colonization, the people of colonial territories became Belgian, British, French, German, Italian or Portuguese subjects, and were generally free to move within the respective empires. The scramble for territories by the colonizing powers, the ruthless competition and search for minerals resulted in partitioning of the continent without regard to existing configuration of language and family ties, cultures and local administrative set-up to the extent that the pencil sketches literally partitioned households on different sides of territories forcing the people to commute daily across “borders”. In many ways similar to the historic Tejanos in Texas, these people can reasonably claim that the border crossed them, rather than they crossed the border.

Political independence was ushered in with great expectations and promise by politicians of abundant jobs and enhanced living conditions. That proved to be an uphill task, and politicians quickly turned to “non-nationals”, scapegoating them for all the economic challenges, especially unemployment.

Borders gradually took on a heightened security dimension to deter undocumented migrants, criminals and proliferation of small arms across countries. Later, and more a matter of current events, terrorism took centre stage among the security challenges that formalized border procedures were meant to ameliorate. Requirements for travel documents, passports and acquisition of entry visas were reinforced, alongside huddles of different currencies for travellers across the countries. The terms “irregular”, “illegal” and “undocumented” migration became entrenched in policy debate and public discourse.

Border conflicts also became a feature of independence era in Africa. Major conflicts traceable to border and transborder mineral resources, redefinition of boundaries or simply ethnicity, erupted, at times spectacularly, as between Somalia and Ethiopia, and Ethiopia and Eritrea. This development informed the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to enjoin countries in respecting the inherited borders to avoid escalating border conflicts that contributed to population displacements both internally (internally displaced persons) and across countries as refugees. This chapter therefore sets out some of the most significant issues in relation to African border management, providing recommendations for future action by States and other actors.

BORDER GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA

Over the last decade, border governance in Africa has become significantly more complex than in preceding decades. The challenges that States face include the management of irregular migration, transnational organized crime and terrorism, the protection of the most vulnerable including victims of trafficking, unaccompanied minors and refugees, as well as responding to health epidemics and large-scale cross-border mobility caused by natural and human-made crises. Climate change is also increasingly putting pressure on livelihoods and security in certain parts of the continent, generating the potential for increased cross-border movement.

While border management in Africa has traditionally focused on ensuring the security and safety of the resident population, and somewhat so that of the migrants themselves, increasingly the focus is on how best to facilitate the movement of people across borders as a means of enhancing formal economic development through expanded services and trade.

With the changing nature of border management on the continent, there is often the expectation that the free movement of persons implies the physical removal of colonially imposed borders; this is not the case. Instead, the vision articulated in Agenda 2063, and also reflected in the referenced African Union and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) migration policy documents, is one of a continent of “seamless borders” where goods, people and services can move more freely. Thus, the importance of borders takes on a new lens with the need for innovation, resources, capacity-building and appropriate technological solutions. In rising to this occasion, the African States face various challenges that are common to all borders, as well some that are specific to the continent, regional blocks or particular countries.

VISA LIBERALIZATION IN AFRICA AS PART OF THE FREE MOVEMENT AGENDA

The removal of visas for African nationals is a continental objective set out in Agenda 2063. The fragmentation of Africa in 54 States can result in people wishing to travel on the continent by land to cross many borders, possibly requiring multiple visas. Travel by air is less complex, but the same issue in one or two countries along an air route can also be a major discouragement to travel and trade.

Countries may enforce visa policies or liberalize them for various interrelated and complex reasons: visa liberalization for increased trade, commerce and tourism, and overall potential economic benefits; or more restrictive visa policies to address concerns around irregular migration, political or economic instabilities and security issues (Pécoud and de Guchteneire, 2007).

While many African countries bilaterally, and some RECs and other trade blocks, had started to address this issue by putting in place visa-free travel for their constituency, a major step forward was the signing of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Agreement on 21 March 2018, and its complementing Protocol on Free Movement of Persons.¹ The protocol begins to put in place a visa-free zone within the AfCFTA area (African Union, 2018). All but one (Eritrea) of the African Union's 35 member States has signed the agreement, and as of December 2019, 29 had ratified. The agreement entered into force on 30 May 2019 (Trade Law Centre, n.d.).

Visa policies and practices are frequently misunderstood and the discourse over the removal of visas is often oversimplified. Removing visa requirements or liberalizing visa regimes does not mean that a State does not require a visa policy or that it has removed border controls. Risk management processes including pre-clearance mechanisms, such as Advanced Passenger Information or Passenger Name Records, can serve to address State's legitimate concerns over the entry and stay of non-bona fide travellers. Moreover, countries may be reluctant to remove visa requirements as they serve a legitimate source of revenue for Immigration Departments that are often poorly resourced. The use of "visa on arrival" has proved popular among numerous countries, keen to remove the cumbersome visa requirements to attract tourism and trade. A number of countries in the continent, including Nigeria, Rwanda and Seychelles, implement visa on arrival for most Africans.

The African Development Bank's (AfDB) 2018 Africa Visa Openness Index Report (2018) catalogues the progress made by the States to liberalize access to their country as much as possible, particularly in terms of the number of countries offering e-visas for Africans, which increased from 9 in 2016 to 13 in 2017 and 16 in 2018. In the top 20 most African-friendly countries, the predominant regions are East Africa (8 countries), West Africa (7 countries) and Southern Africa (4 countries), while there is only one country in North Africa (Mauritania) and no country in Central Africa. Overall, Africans do not need a visa to travel to 25 per cent of other African countries, can get visas on arrival in 24 per cent

¹ Known as the Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community Relating to Free Movement of Persons, Right of Residence and Right of Establishment.

of other African countries, and need visas to travel to 51 per cent of other African countries. Again, the gradual implementation of the AfCFTA and the Free Movement Protocol is gradually changing this landscape for most of the continent.

Table 1. African Union countries offering the most visa facilities to Africans

| | Number of countries | Countries |
|--|---------------------|--|
| Countries offering visa-free or visa-on entry to Africans | 11 | Benin, Cabo Verde, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Mauritania, Mozambique, Rwanda, Seychelles, Togo, Uganda |
| Countries offering visas on arrival to all Africans | 4 | Comoros, Djibouti, Madagascar, Somalia |

Source: AfDB, 2018.

Nigeria's President Muhammadu Buhari announced in December 2019 that Nigeria, Africa's most populous country, will begin issuing visa-on-arrival to all African nationals with effect from January 2020. There has, however, been resistance to this implementation from some factions (Olaniyi, 2020).

FREE MOVEMENT AND REGIONAL ECONOMIC COMMUNITIES

The freedom of movement of people, capital, goods and services are the aspired four basic freedoms that make up the African continental and regional integration agendas. The freedom of movement allows citizens in an REC to move to, live in, work or provide a service or business in another country of that community under the same (or similar) conditions as a citizen of that country.

The African Union's Agenda 2063 identifies free movement of persons as a key ingredient for achieving other development aspirations. The idea of the free movement of people across Africa is the object of a number of statements and agreements by African heads of State. The Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community (Abuja Treaty), adopted by OAU in 1991, envisions the "free movement of people and the rights of residence and establishment". This represents the fifth phase of the Abuja Treaty, which is expected to be realized by 2023. One of the objectives of the African Union Constitutive Act is "to accelerate the political and socio-economic integration of the continent".

Free movement is a phased process of progressive implementation, which is closely aligned with the various stages of regional economic integration from free trade area to a customs union and on to a common market. There are four common phases of the free movement of persons, which are broadly speaking: (a) free movement of persons (liberalization and eventual removal of visas); (b) free movement of labour; (c) right of establishment; and (d) right of residence.

The importance of the subject of free movement within RECs, such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Southern African Development Community (SADC) and Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), has led them to adopt specific protocols on this subject in addition to their constituent treaties. The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the East African Community (EAC) and the Arab Maghreb Union have merely clarified the elements concerning free movement in

their constituent treaties; however, at ECCAS level, the six countries forming the Central African Economic and Monetary Community signed a free movement agreement in 2017. Protocols are being developed at the IGAD and Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) level.

Despite the existence of both continental and RECs free movement protocols, not all free movement regimes in the continent are in force. For example, while the COMESA Visa Protocol² is in force, COMESA's Free Movement Protocol³ has yet to be ratified by the requisite number of countries and therefore for it to be in force. Article 164 of the COMESA Treaty requires the COMESA Visa Protocol to be implemented fully before the Free Movement of Persons enter into force. The SADC Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons is also not in force.

One way that States have advanced on free movement agenda, in particular where free movement protocols are not in force, is by adopting the concept of variable geometry, which acknowledges that all countries cannot move at the same pace, and therefore individual, bilateral and multilateral measures can be undertaken by member States outside the Integration Agenda to make progress towards the attainment of free movement of persons. Several States have already significantly advanced on provisions related to free movement, for example on visa liberalization and labour migration.

At continental level, the Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community Relating to Free Movement of Persons, Right of Residence and Right of Establishment (African Union Free Movement Protocol, AUFMP) has recently been adopted and is intended to remove discrepancies between different free movement arrangements. However, the AUFMP is not currently in force, and also envisions a phased approach to implementation based on the concept of variable geometry.

Obstacles in the ratification and implementation of the protocols are traced to the desire of States to maintain their sovereignty by having control over those who enter their territory, and protection of the labour market within countries. In reality, the porous natural boundaries of African States make it difficult to control entrances and exits throughout an entire territory; however, generally the concept of free movement of persons is often poorly understood, including by government officials, the private sector and by the general public (see Adepoju, 2009).

² Known as the COMESA Protocol on the Gradual Relaxation and Eventual Elimination of Visa Requirements.

³ Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons, Labour, Services, the Right of Establishment and Residence.

BORDER MANAGEMENT AND THE FREE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS IN AFRICA

Many countries in Africa have weak border management infrastructure and personnel capacities, along with extensive and porous borders, with a number of borders still requiring final demarcation. Undocumented and irregular migration undermines the concept of free movement coupled with the capacity of States to manage their own borders.

The (draft) African Union Strategy for Enhancing Border Governance in Africa defines border management as “national and international coordination and cooperation among all the relevant authorities and agencies involved in border security and trade facilitation to establish effective, efficient and coordinated border management, in order to reach the objective of open, but well controlled and secure borders”.

It is a common misconception that moving towards free movement in the African Union context entails the removal of borders and will lead to the uncontrolled irregular movement of persons across borders. The ultimate aspiration of the African Union is the creation of a common market that provides for the free flow of labour, capital and other resources at continental level. However, even at this final stage of the integration process, internal borders are not foreseen to be removed and replaced with a common external border, and the process of border passage remains a managed one, albeit highly facilitated and commonly supported by advanced technology and more cooperative or integrated inter-agency approaches to border management.

Border data and the importance of evidence-based policymaking

The challenge of data on migration flows in the continent is one of the most pressing with regards to border management. Border data is generally intended for security purposes rather than policymaking, though timely and comprehensive border data is a necessary tool for informing border and general migration management policies. Immigration data that is captured at the border includes the time and location of the individual crossing the border (on entry/exit) by nationality, gender and purpose of entry. Border data can also encompass information regarding visas, including those issued at borders. Advanced systems, though now increasingly common, also include biometric indicators of the persons processed to strengthen the identification of those persons beyond the indicators provided in often weak travel documents.

Irregular migration that takes place outside of gazetted points of entry represents one of the principal challenges associated with obtaining accurate and complete border data, more so since borders throughout Africa are expansive and often porous. Manual data capture at borders remains prevalent at some critical border control posts (BCP) throughout the continent. Many BCPs face resource constraints; power and telecommunications infrastructure are common problems, in particular in geographically remote areas. Innovative approaches, such as the use of solar power at BCPs, are being implemented in some key areas, with Somalia a good case in point.

BMIS are important data capture tools that improve efficiency, allowing for real-time data capture, and effectively collecting, processing, storing and analysing information, thereby allowing countries to better track the movement of people and goods across borders. BMIS also promote consistency in the border inspection process and accountability, as well as the official handling of traveller's clearance, thus helping to reduce confusion, inefficiency and potentially corruption in the process. The United Nations, through its migration agency, IOM, is particularly active in this area, and has provided a BMIS of its own design to 17 African countries through donor support⁴ with active plans for deployment in other African countries,⁵ thus lifting a significant economic burden from those States as compared with their contracting for private sector BMIS products. Solar power systems accompany this deployment at some of the recent sites.

An integrated border management approach

One way of effectively managing borders to enable the efficient movement of goods, services and people is through the application of an IBM approach that includes the following: (a) intraservice cooperation; (b) inter-agency cooperation; and (c) international cooperation.

The IBM approach is gaining ground in the continent, advanced in part by the recent coming into force of the African Continental Free Trade Area Agreement (May 2019). For regional integration and free movement to succeed, IBM, which includes risk management, needs to be in place to: (a) support regular cross-border mobility; and (b) address irregular migration, including trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants. Key to this approach is addressing irregular migration, as well as putting in place border control measures including routine border checks and surveillance, cooperation with neighbouring countries, bilateral agreements, exchange of information and harmonizing/standardizing border procedures and travel documents.

One-stop border post

The concept of an OSBP, which has been applied across Africa for more than a decade, combines two stops for national border control in a shared space. OSBPs are not only a key tool of border management but also promote the progressive stages of regional integration of the various RECs. More than 80 OSBPs have been planned and/or implemented in various parts of Africa as a means of reducing the time and costs of delays at border crossings along major corridors.

OSBPs help tackle the human mobility and trade movement challenges that are common to many of Africa's busiest border crossing points. At the same time, OSBPs require much deeper bilateral coordination and engagement, including the standardization and compatibility of legislation, administrative frameworks and operational procedures. OSBPs are most effective for borders that experience large volumes of passengers or cargo and may not be suitable for the majority of African borders, in particular as they are often accompanied by large-scale investments and operational costs. At times, development banks, including the

⁴ IOM's border management information system called (Migration Information and Data Analysis System (MIDAS) is now deployed at some of the border control posts in the following 17 African countries: Burkina Faso, Burundi, Chad, Congo, Djibouti, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guinea, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, the Niger, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, United Republic of Tanzania and Uganda.

⁵ Ethiopia's borders were assessed in 2019 for likely MIDAS deployment in the near future.

African Development Bank, will help fund an OSBP as part of establishment and consolidation of a particular trade corridor.

Travel documentation and border management

Travel documentation is also a part of effective border management. A valid travel document is usually a national ID card (if there is an agreement that this document will suffice), a passport or a passport card. In the African context, specific documents may also be needed for cross-border communities to ease and facilitate their cross-border movement in lieu of the more sophisticated documents mentioned, in particular where national IDs are not in common use, and where the cost of passports is beyond the means of the local cross-border community members. Such special local IDs (often known as border residency cards/passes) are generally designated as valid only within a short distance from the border, such as an area encompassing a common community's market and worship sites.

Travel documents need to be of high quality and with issuance integrity measures in place. A legal basis and procedures need to be in place for member States to recognize each other's travel documents, including common database to be able to compare travel document formats. Moreover, identity management processes need to be in place to ensure that a traveller is genuine and ensure that bona fide travellers are able to move across the borders. Such systems increasingly rely on biometrics to affirm the identity of the traveller.

Free movement requires that countries put into place biometric passports (e-passports) and replace existing non-biometric ones. This is needed at the national and regional (REC) levels for border management and will also be helpful should the aspired African Union passport reach widespread implementation. The use of biometrics in ID and travel document issuance can be instrumental in reducing the potential for identity fraud, which is a high risk in countries with weak civil registration and vital statistics capabilities. Electronically enhanced ID and travel documents are also instrumental in speeding border clearance and thus support the freer flow of persons across the borders and the general ambitions of a seamless border system in Africa, while contributing to regional security and stability. Several countries in Africa already have e-passports in place, with many more in the process of implementation.

For these e-passports to realize full security and facilitation benefits, they need to be connected to the public key infrastructure to ensure the authenticity of data in the chip. Among other things, countries that issue e-passports or read them at the border need to be active participants in the International Civil Aviation Organization Public Key Directory (PKD). Moreover, effective data systems need to be available at the BCPs. The majority of African e-passports have yet to be so registered in the PKD. The state of BMIS on the continent has previously been outlined, and it is through BMIS that the data systems supporting the full use of electronic passports are deployed.

Once in force, AUFMP requires member States to cooperate in the process of identification and issuance of travel documents (AUFMP, Article 9). The introduction of an African Union passport is intended to provide a unified travel document for African nationals to travel within the continent. It is also the case that improved national travel documents, with biometrics, and BMIS at the

borders would contribute to that same goal and may be a prerequisite or initial step necessary prior to embarking on full deployment of the envisioned African Union passport. To date, the African Union passport has only been introduced to high-level diplomats. Most African States need to review and improve their data privacy laws prior to embarking on the widespread collection and sharing of new data through travel documents and related database.

INTERCONNECTED FREE MOVEMENT AND FREE TRADE

The 2063 Agenda of the African Union aspires to boost regional integration by establishing a continental free trade area, which was adopted in 2019 through AfCFTA. Aspiration 2 of the Agenda envisions a continent with “seamless borders” where “the free movement of people, capital, goods and services will result in significant increases in trade and investments amongst African countries rising to unprecedented levels, and strengthen Africa’s place in global trade” (African Union, n.d.). The adoption of AUFMP in March 2018 in Kigali, and the entry into force of AfCFTA in May 2019 are both important steps in this regard.

Trade, migration and cross-border human mobility are inherently interconnected. Without people, goods and services would be unable to cross borders and contribute to formal economic development. Barriers to the cross-border human mobility of traders can increase cost and inefficiency in cross-border trade, particularly in locations where there are high volumes of (small-scale and informal) cross-border traders. Measures should also be envisioned to ensure that cross-border trade can continue as much as possible during cross-border crises. This can be foreseen as a six-pillar approach that includes facilitation, health, protection, capacitation, humanitarian response and security.⁶

BUILDING SEAMLESS BORDERS FOR THE AFRICA OF TOMORROW

Free movement of people has the potential to boost trade, ensure labour mobility, skills transfer, promote employment opportunities, enhance regional integration and development over the continent, and further stimulate the improvement of air transportation and transborder route infrastructure. To achieve this goal, States would have to take bold steps to promote borders that support managed free movement, improve their national travel documents and establish BMIS with linking data systems, fully implement a visa-free or visa-on-arrival policy, and eventually operationalize the common African passport. All these actions are needed to achieve the goals of AfCFTA and similar regional agreements.

Importantly, States should aim towards liberalizing their visa policies for African nationals in line with Agenda 2063 aspirations. In that context, States that have not done so are encouraged to ratify and implement relevant regional and continental free movement protocols, based on policy research on costs and benefits, and as a means of strengthening further regional integration.

⁶ As outlined in the forthcoming IOM publication written by this author titled “Making the case to integrate human mobility into cross-border trade and trade facilitation – Cross-border trade and border management in select countries and borders in the COMESA Region: A case study”.

As borders remain in place throughout the continent, the effective and efficient management of borders will remain a priority for the foreseeable future. States should adopt an IBM approach, and establish OSBPs at border posts that experience significant flows of people and goods and also establish BMIS at all principal ports of entry, with linking data systems and stable electricity to support them – looking towards the solar power examples set in countries including Nigeria and Somalia in recent years.

The entry into force of AfCFTA kindles hope for enhanced intra- and interregional trade and employment opportunities for present and future generations of young people. The lack of these opportunities is a major trigger for irregular migration. However, for this to become a reality, the continent will need to vigorously pursue a policy of managed free movement with better migration management that is backed by capacity-enhanced border collaboration of officials in order to respond to concerns over sovereignty and security by some stakeholders.

The Africa We Want, as defined in Agenda 2063, is an Africa that facilitates movement, free of artificial or onerous barriers inherited from colonization. Since trade and mobility are intricately intertwined, the freer movement of goods and services cannot progress smoothly without that of people. States should review trade and migration policies, legislation and practices to ensure coherence and complementarity in approach and implementation.

CONCLUSION

The African Union Commission continues to make strident steps towards continental integration, and more specifically, a freer movement of persons regime than currently prevails. This continental aspiration is very much in line with the Global Compact for Migration, which is the culmination of a process of State-led deliberations that sought to achieve mobility that is beneficial for all in this era of globalization, and to do so while also respecting the sovereignty of States to control entry into and stay within their territories, so as not to compromise on their security. Although non-binding, the Global Compact for Migration recognizes and reinforces a number of principles already endorsed at the regional and continental levels by African RECs and the African Union respectively.

The desire for free movement of persons in Africa dates as far back as the post-independence push for Pan-African political and economic integration. Recent regional and global events in the sphere of migration governance provide fresh impetus for freer movement. For this dream of Africa's founding fathers to become reality though, there is urgent need for ever more robust border management systems, with a stronger facilitation and expeditious processing orientation. Only with well-governed free movement regimes on the continent can we hope to see an Africa that is trading more with itself, as is envisioned in AfCFTA, and consequently, can the anticipated economic benefits of continental integration become reality.

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IOM Egypt celebrates International Migrants Day 2016.

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8

PAN-AFRICANISM,
REGIONAL INTEGRATION
AND MIGRATION

CHAPTER 8

PAN-AFRICANISM, REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND MIGRATION

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ABSTRACT

This chapter traces the origins and development of Pan-Africanism and its motivation for the establishment of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), its successor, the African Union, and the regional economic communities (RECs) regarded as building blocks for continental integration. The narrative of Pan-Africanism transformed the norms and principles of the continent, and fit into the policymaking and implementation processes towards the integration of the continent and in addressing the challenges of human mobility in Africa. A number of key policy instruments are cited including the following: (a) Lagos Plan of Action; (b) Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community (Abuja Treaty), through six stages of regional integration; (c) Minimum Implementation Programme for actualizing the integration agenda of the Abuja Treaty; (d) Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community Relating to the Free Movement of Persons, Right of Residence and Right of Establishment (Free Movement Protocol) in 2018; and (e) Agreement Establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). On migration and mobility, the continental response has been to increase legal pathways of migration within Africa through the Migration Policy Framework for Africa and the adoption of a free movement protocol as envisaged in the Abuja Treaty. The chapter concludes that the challenge with human movement in Africa is not that Africans are moving, but the absence of adequate protection mechanisms for those on the move. This needs to change.

INTRODUCTION

This chapter provides a description of the origins and development of Pan-Africanism as a notion¹ and the underlying impetus for regional integration and human movement in Africa today. The chapter signals Pan-Africanism as the motivation for the establishment of the OAU and its successor the African Union, and maps the interrelationships with RECs. It then posits that the solution to the current challenges of migration globally can be alleviated by the current role of the African Union and its member States in boosting positive and legal pathways for migration and free movement, as a core aspect of continental unity, solidarity and cohesion.

¹ The description of Pan-Africanism here is summarized giving the reader a broad overview for contextualization. It was not possible to reproduce the whole history here. For more information on Pan-Africanism, readers are encouraged to explore the additional references attached to this chapter.

PAN-AFRICANISM IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

Pan-Africanism as a notion was historically encapsulated in different political and cultural movements across Africa and in the diaspora. It was a rallying call for widespread African solidarity as a means to counter the oppression and impacts of slavery and colonialism, and to reclaim our common African heritage.

Dubois' mobilizing call for a united race against oppression, which he coined as Pan-Africanism in the 1900s, and the ideas of Marcus Garvey, George Padmore and CLR James, greatly influenced Kwame Nkrumah into not just fighting for Ghana's primal independence, but also his organizing of the African unity conferences of 1958 and 1959. The Négritude movement in Francophone Africa drew in Léopold Senghor, Senegal's first president, as well as the leaders from the French Caribbean like Aimé Césaire, Léon Damas and later, Frantz Fanon. The Négritude philosophy was aimed at inspiring pride in blackness and Africaness as a counter to the racist superiority and oppression of Europeans. Alioune Diop and other *Présence Africaine* thought leaders had a profound impact on the promulgation of the notion of Pan-Africanism used in modern-day discourse.

However, it is Kwame Nkrumah who is recognized as the torchbearer of the Pan-Africanist ideals that underpin the African Union today, primarily for hosting the meeting of Africa's Heads of State and Government, and the subsequent All African People's Conference (AAPC) in Ghana in 1958 and 1959, respectively. His disappointment with the African leaders' meeting led him to instead focus on African masses and their formations namely political parties, liberation movements, labour unions and women, student and youth organizations. However, ideological, cultural and linguistic divisions, national interests and sovereignty, compounded by external influences, were enormous obstacles to Nkrumah's Pan-Africanist agenda. The AAPC, which had a permanent secretariat in Accra, was held two more times in 1960 and 1961. These conferences focused on the continued domination of African countries both politically and economically. However, they also resulted in the fragmentation of Africa into what is commonly known as the Monrovia Group and the Casablanca Group, which represented the different approaches to the unity of Africa, differences that continue to define regional integration debates at the continental level, repackaged as the "immediatists" versus the "gradualists".²

The attempt to merge these factions resulted in the formation of OAU, the predecessor to the African Union. The OAU was created at the Conference of Independent States with 30 of the 32 countries that were independent at the time, signing the OAU Charter on 25 May 1963. The OAU sought to create a united Africa that would speak with one voice. Despite the imperative of unity and solidarity between African countries, the impact of colonialism, as well as the political, social and economic exigencies that were present on the continent impacted on the crafting of the document (Selassie, 2015). The charter therefore reflects those diverging interests, notably, the imperative of safeguarding territorial integrity and sovereignty, independence of the remaining African countries from domination and the principle of subsidiarity.

² "There are essentially two schools of thought within the AU on the process of integration. One school promotes immediate integration with the creation of appropriate structures and subsequently filling in of the institutional gaps, while the other promotes a gradual approach to integration with the building up of existing structures into an eventually unified continent." (CCPAU, n.d.)

The African Union, as an organization, is the result of the institutionalization of Pan-Africanism and has progressively entrenched the fundamental tenets of Pan-Africanism over the last 57 years (including the OAU), and moved the continent towards the ideals of African unity, solidarity and cohesion (Muriithi, 2007). This is reflected in the myriad of treaties, policies, decisions, recommendations, declarations and other instruments of normative value, that the OAU/African Union has adopted over the years (Louw, 2004), on various issues from gender equality to phytosanitation. While countries remain the primary sites for implementation of these norms, the African Union has provided a platform for intercountry cooperation and multilateral standardization on several aspects of mutual interest. This collective action is intended as a precursor to the establishment of a free, united and interdependent Africa (Orakçi, 2018), as elaborated in the preambles of the OAU Charter and the Constitutive Act of the African Union (Packer and Rukare, 2002).

Beyond the practice of norms and policies, Pan-Africanism is a symbol of Africa's pride over its achievements (Maimela, 2013), and a rallying call to unification and political and economic integration. Pan-Africanism has also evolved through the "heroic struggles waged by our peoples... for political independence (Mkandawire, 2015), human dignity and economic emancipation" (African Union, 2000). African citizens have embraced the notion and its ideals, entrenching them across the continent and in the diaspora, through unified action, organizing and resourcing (AUC, 2015). While there remain significant structural, legal and political challenges to achieving the Africa we want and the Agenda 2063 goal of "an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens" (African Union, 2016), Pan-Africanism in the twenty-first century remains at the heart of "transforming Africa into the global powerhouse of the future" (African Union, n.d.).

REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND THE HUMAN MOVEMENT AGENDA

Prioritization of Africa's emergence

Over the last five plus decades, African Countries have made various efforts to reignite the "founding fathers" dream of a united Africa, making adjustments and compromises as required. One such initiative for the emergence of the continent was the notion of African Renaissance, the idea that Africa would become a significant power and player in the world (Mandela, 1997). This notion was heralded by Cheikh Anta Diop's essays, and by late nineteenth and early twentieth century thought leaders from Liberia, Nigeria and South Africa. The concept was further popularized by South African presidents Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki, and reinforced by Mbeki's Millennium African Recovery Programme, and Senegal President Abdoulaye Wade's Omega Plan. The 1980 Lagos Plan of Action (OAU, 1980) was also developed to bolster Africa's self-reliance and interdependence. Unfortunately, low implementation hampered the realization of its objectives (ECOSOC and UNECA, 1990).

These initiatives ultimately led to the adoption of the African Union with greater credence for democracy, good governance, human and peoples' rights, peace and security, the fight against impunity and African citizen participation. With the recognition that economic development could not take place within a governance and democracy vacuum (UNECA, InterAfrica Group/Justice Africa, 2002), the

Constitutive Act was set to reconceive the underlying principles of Pan-Africanism, pushing the continuum of sovereignty towards intervention, rather than the previously revered territorial integrity (George, n.d). Serious internal conflicts and natural disasters of the twentieth century signalled to African governments that they could no longer be indifferent to key events occurring in countries on the continent, which were so interconnected as to elicit a collective response; and that diminishing the corollaries of oppression, domination and conquest required more robust collective action.

The African Economic Community

A major milestone³ in the road to regional integration was the establishment of the African Economic Community (AEC) with the 1991 Abuja Treaty, which was a response to the economic crises gripping the continent and its marginalization at the end of the cold war. The treaty, which is still in force and which was directly integrated into the African Union through the Constitutive Act, prescribed the integration process over a period of 34 years and envisaged full political, social, economic and cultural integration. It made provisions for free movement, a single currency and continental universal suffrage for a Pan-African Parliament. The African Union Commission (AUC) subsequently developed the Minimum Implementation Programme (MIP) after extensive consultations, which set out multilevel actions to be carried out by both the African Union and RECs. The process in the MIP towards free movement of persons included elaboration, ratification and implementation of free movement treaties where they did not already exist, judicial cooperation and interregional and intraregional security arrangements. In 2018, 29 years later, the African Union adopted a continental free trade area and a treaty on the free movement of persons.

Current regional integration and migration arrangements

The 1991 Abuja Treaty sought to promote Africa's step-by-step integration starting with the strengthening of RECs and their establishment where they did not already exist (Genge et al., 2000). Currently, the African Union recognizes eight RECs as building blocks for Africa's integration (Mkwezalamba, 2006). These are as follows: (a) Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); (b) Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA); (c) Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS); (d) Southern African Development Community (SADC); (e) Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD); (f) Arab Maghreb Union (UMA); (g) Community of Sahelo-Saharan States (CEN-SAD); and (h) East African Community (EAC) (African Union, 2005, 2006). In July 2007, the African Union adopted a treaty to formalize the relationship between the African Union and the RECs. In addition to facilitating free movement of labour, goods and services (Coulibaly, 2017), the eight RECs seek to strengthen economic growth and integration, boost African infrastructure and agriculture, and focus on gender representation and investment in youth and vulnerable people across Africa (FAO, 2008).

³ Although there were several other initiatives and progressive achievements, including those taking place at the subregional level, that led to the developments in regional integration on the continent and the formation of the African Union, only key milestones are recounted here.

The levels of integration in each of these RECs varies significantly (AfDB et al., 2013). For example, ECOWAS has gone the furthest with the free movement agenda, and the citizens of ECOWAS countries can move across the region with nothing more than an identity card. The EAC allows for easier movement on a variable geometry basis, with countries like South Sudan still requiring its neighbours to obtain visas in advance of travel, and Rwanda, which allows some of its neighbours to travel there with simply an identity card and others without an arduous visa process. ECCAS recently negotiated free movement for a special category of people like students and professionals, while a number of SADC countries still require visas from each other. COMESA has been very keen on advancing the free movement agenda and has been successful in, among other things, creating favourable conditions for traders coming to the COMESA market in Zambia. Despite the RECs, save for IGAD, having adopted free movement protocols as anticipated in the Abuja Treaty and in the MIP, the protocols are yet to have universal ratification. IGAD has, since 2019, been negotiating a protocol for the free movement of persons, which was endorsed by the ministers of internal affairs and labour of its member countries in February 2020 (IGAD, 2020).

When discussing the migration quagmire at the African Union Summit in 2016, after gory images of Africans drowning in the Mediterranean emerged in the news, African countries determined that the continental response would be to increase legal pathways of migration within the continent, and mandated AUC to hasten the development of the free movement treaty alongside, and as a necessary component, to the continental free trade area, as envisaged in the AEC Treaty.

The 2018 African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) agreement negotiation began in 2012 as a means of boosting intra-African trade, increasing interdependence and regional integration, and reducing the multiplicity of standards at the REC level. While the AfCFTA has come into force with more than 22 ratifications, the African Union Free Movement Protocol (African Union, 2018) – developed since 2013 and adopted during the January 2018 Summit – has garnered only four ratifications.⁴ The protocol provides for the progressive implementation free movement regimes in Africa and the rights to residence and establishment. The treaty provides for three phases of implementation, beginning with African countries permitting entry for African citizens and eliminating visa requirements. In addition, the treaty provides for the issuance of an African passport by African countries to their citizens. The treaty makes special provisions for movement of border communities, students, researchers and workers. The treaty also seeks to ensure the protection of Africans who move by proscribing mass expulsion and guaranteeing them the protection of the host country's laws.

The Migration Policy Framework for Africa, adopted in 2006 and renewed in 2018, provides guidelines for African States and RECs with regard to different aspects of migration, including labour migration, border management, irregular migration, forced displacement, internal migration, inter-State cooperation and the intersection of migration with issues of poverty, conflict, health, environment, trade, gender, children, youth and the elderly.

⁴ Rwanda was the first to ratify the treaty in May 2018, followed by Mali and Sao Tome and Principe in May 2019 and then the Niger in July 2019. See African Union, 2019.

All these instruments recognize that human movement is part of a bigger ideal of a united Africa, and that the free movement of Africans across continental borders is an essential element of regional integration, resulting in Africa's economic growth and development, and towards Africa becoming "a dynamic force in the international arena" (African Union, 2016).

CONCLUSION

Challenges

In 2020, there remains structural and political challenges to achieving inclusive and sustainable regional integration in Africa and the promise of free movement (Cumbi, n.d). These include the following: (a) multiplicity of mechanisms and instruments; (b) RECs facing overlaps among member States; (c) poor coordination and harmonization such as in certification; (d) lack of monitoring, evaluation and reporting towards implementation of the normative frameworks; (e) lack of financial resourcing and prioritization; (f) weak institutions; (g) an overpopulated agenda; (h) unaligned national laws and policies that hinder free movement; (i) poor national industrialization levels; (j) lack of citizen participation and engagement; and (k) lack of adherence to treaties, decisions and other legal instruments (African Union, n.d.b). The AUC has indicated in reports to the summit that the implementation rate of treaties and decisions was at 10 per cent, increasing by only 1 per cent in the last five years.

The biggest challenge with human movement in Africa is not that Africans are moving, but that there is lack of adequate protection mechanisms for those who do move (CCPAU, 2013). This means that vulnerabilities and criminality are exacerbated at the expense of migrants, with traffickers, enslavers and human rights violators stepping into gaps where protection is not availed. For women, in particular, the lack of protection mechanisms is severe due to the sectors they mostly migrant into, including the entertainment and caregiving industries. The lack of guaranteed access to sexual and reproductive health care puts them at increased risk of maternal mortality.

Solutions and recommendations

Towards reducing multiplicity of standards, three RECs – COMESA, EAC and SADC – entered into a tripartite agreement and free trade area in 2008. The African Union has encouraged other RECs to emulate this trend that brings the continent closer to convergence. In 2016, the African Union decided to implement institutional reforms to streamline its operations, enhance efficiency and improve on service delivery (African Union, n.d.c). A major aspect of the reforms has been the transformation of the midyear summit into a coordination summit between the African Union and the RECs towards increased coherence. AU-REC partnership and harmonization is required for the following: (a) create platforms for the engagement of the private sector, youth and women; (b) encourage SMEs and better national industrialisation; and to strengthen the skills and capacities of Africa's young leaders (ibid.). Better alignment between the RECs, the African Union and the member States will help Africa realize the aspirations for development and peace and security as prerequisites for free and legal migration.

Going forward, member States should demonstrate accountability to their citizens for regional and international commitments made towards migration and free movement. They should ensure broad and easy access to rules and procedures of legal movement. They need to be better at cross-border cooperation and legal assistance, increase protection, reduce criminality and enhance access to justice for migrants. African countries should mobilize, include and engage their citizens on the regional integration agenda, and enamour them to the opportunities presented by the unity and solidarity of the continent, in order to allay xenophobic sentiments and unwarranted fears. Africa has vast resources and migration can be positive when free movement of services, citizens and trade are motivated by the opportunities of economic exchange, prosperity and development of all African countries.

Pan-Africanism of the twenty-first century must transcend the instruments and institutions into which it has been ensconced, and the spirit and impetus of the call for African solidarity, unity and self-reliance must be actualized and entrenched in action, as much as it is in discourse. This would result in our doing better by Africa's migrants. No matter the cause of their movement, Africans on the move must be able to do so with dignity and in safety, and have their rights protected. This is the cause to which today's Pan-Africanism summons us. Given the 2019 Year of Refugees, Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons, there is further stimulus to ensure that those who are forcibly displaced find dignified, safe and protected asylum wherever they seek refuge on the continent. While the world sees African migrants as a burden, the tenets of unity and solidarity across the continent provides African countries with an opportunity to entrench African solutions for African problems.

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At a marketplace in Dollo Ado, Somali Regional State, Ethiopia.

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9

MIGRATION AND TRADE IN AFRICA

CHAPTER 9

MIGRATION AND TRADE IN AFRICA

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ABSTRACT

The role of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) and related migration policy frameworks in the intra-African migration–trade nexus is examined; highlighting the channels through which intra-African migration boosts trade and its potential to contribute to structural transformation. Constraints and opportunities in trade and migration are also examined. AfCFTA is geared towards wealth creation and the development of African countries and also contains special provisions for movement of persons. The AfCFTA Protocol on Trade in Services recognizes the presence of natural persons supplying services as one of its means of providing services, which would allow Africans to move within each other’s territories to supply services. The Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community Relating to Free Movement of Persons, Right of Residence and Right of Establishment complements the AfCFTA Protocol. This chapter makes a case for promoting pro-trade migration policies and conclude that intra-African migration has the potential to contribute to the continent’s economic prosperity through greater intra-African trade, greater demand for intraregional tourism and more revenues for governments and regions, as well as bridging skill gaps at the national and regional levels.

INTRODUCTION

Migration is critical to Africa’s development. Recognizing its importance in Africa’s regional integration agenda, policy frameworks at the regional and the continental levels, including the African Union’s Migration Policy Framework, have been designed to enhance the free movement of persons and labour between their member States.

Economic development is central to migration. It is well documented that countries tend to trade and invest more with countries from which they have received migrants (Ethier, 1995; Dolman, 2008; Ndiaye et al., 2011; Ratha et al., 2011; Egger et al., 2012; ICMPD and IOM, 2015; Foresti and Hagen-Zanker, 2018; UNCTAD, 2018). Trade is an important mechanism through which intra-African migration contributes to the continent’s economic development and has been recognized as an important element in the African Union’s Revised Migration Policy Framework for Africa (2018–2027). In an effort to highlight how intra-African migration contributes to the continent’s development, this chapter examines the role of the AfCFTA and related policy frameworks governing migration, as well as the

migration–trade nexus, highlighting the channels through which intra-African migration boosts trade and its potential to contribute to structural transformation. It also explores constraints and opportunities in trade and migration.

MIGRATION AND TRADE

African Heads of State and Government, in a landmark March 2018 decision, adopted the AfCFTA Agreement, a historic development creating the world's largest free trade area. Intra-African trade, defined as the average of intra-African exports and imports, hovered at around 15.2 per cent during the period 2015–2017 (UNCTAD, 2019). The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa's simulation of the modalities – adopted for tariff reduction of goods under the AfCFTA Agreement – shows that there would be a 3 per cent increase in exports augmenting the value of intra-African trade (by between 15% or USD 50 billion) and 25 per cent (or USD 70 billion) by 2040, compared to the status quo. These figures do not include informal trade – which, in Africa, is very high. Unregistered businesses, informal traders, including women, often cross African borders, buying and selling products across the continent. The cross-border nature of informal trade makes it an important part of the migration–trade–development nexus and deserves key consideration for appropriate policy responses.

Migration contributes to socioeconomic development in both countries of origin and destination. As migration is closely intertwined with trade, the economic and trade channels through which it is transmitted are particularly important.

On the one hand, migration acts as a substitute for trade, either through the transfer of labour across borders directly in the form of migration, or through the trade of labour-intensive goods. Trade liberalization is thus viewed as decreasing the need for migration by stimulating trade and favouring a convergence in factor prices that reduces incentives to migrate. On the other hand, migration is viewed as having a strong pro-trade effect with migration and trade complementing each other, and trade increasing along with higher factor mobility. In addition, pro-trade effects are channeled through factors that include the dissemination of the preferences of migrants for goods from origin countries, the removal of informational barriers between origin and destination countries and improvements in the facilitation of contract enforcement in weak institutional environments (UNCTAD, 2018). While the net effect depends on whether the trade creation effect dominates over the trade diversion impact in trade with the rest of the world, in general, when countries trade more, improvements in productivity and living standards tend to follow (Frankel and Romer, 1999; Redding and Venables, 2004; Romalis, 2007).

THE AFRICAN CONTINENTAL FREE TRADE AREA ON MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE

Since the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community (Abuja Treaty), improving the livelihoods of Africa's people has been a major African Union objective. Facilitating the movement of people for economic gain has been a central element of Africa's development aspirations. In the field of international and regional trade, the way to do this is through the establishment of treaties and legal regimes with supporting frameworks that create new and better (more favourable) treatment for African people vis-à-vis those of third countries. Trade agreements typically do this through two instruments: (a) agreements related to trade in services; and (b) agreements concerning investment. In both cases, people – both legal (juridical) and natural – form the beneficiaries of the preferential treatment accorded by virtue of the agreement.

The AfCFTA will provide preferential treatment to goods and services originating from African countries that are parties to the agreement. African businesses, enterprises and cross-border traders will be beneficiaries of new requirements against discrimination, forcing each State party to the AfCFTA to grant, immediately and unconditionally, the most favoured nation treatment that it grants to any good, service and service supplier originating from an AfCFTA contracting State Party. Vis-à-vis non-members to the treaty, the qualitative improvement in treatment should encourage other countries to join. Improved treatment should translate into greater dividends in exports – of both goods and services – thanks to dismantled tariff barriers on goods and discriminatory regulations on trade in services.

Although the entire agreement is meant for the promotion of the development of African countries, there is special provision for movement of persons. This may be understood as a trade-related aspect concerning migration in AfCFTA.

African Continental Free Trade Area provisions on movement of persons

The AfCFTA Protocol on Trade in Services recognizes the presence of natural persons supplying services as one of its means of providing services. These can be both legal/juridical persons (companies) and natural persons supplying services.

In terms of legal architecture, the AfCFTA creates preferential treatment that prohibits discrimination against African services and service suppliers, specifically in sectors where AfCFTA parties are to offer each other specific commitments (for market access and non-discriminatory treatment vis-à-vis foreign service suppliers). There is a total of 11 subsectors from the adopted services sectoral classification list – on the basis of which African countries will, through successive rounds of negotiations, give each other progressively better treatment to services within their markets.

The African Union member States have agreed to commence negotiations for preferential access on an initial five priority sectors, namely business, communications, financial, tourism and transport services. To the extent that African countries commit themselves in allowing African services suppliers to access markets in these sectors, AfCFTA promises to create new and dynamic opportunities for movement related to supply of services across African borders (UNCTAD, 2015).

In addition to the selected sectors, AfCFTA requires its members to work together to ensure that regulations adopted in these sectors support the objectives of the agreement, which in this case would consist of allowing Africans to move within each other's territories to supply services. The opportunities created in these agreements could help reduce poverty, as the very nature of movement of persons to supply services lends itself to direct beneficiation of the service suppliers themselves. The proximity between the service supplier and the user that has retained the service means that people have much more control of the gains from this trade. Moreover, such structured agreements are important for establishing a special channel for the protection of people that move for service provision under trade agreements, a movement that is largely contract based and therefore less politically sensitive than those that move in the general hope of finding work. It is also better in terms of providing fairer opportunities for protection of the rights of service suppliers (in a world where stories are rife of challenges faced by undocumented workers that operate under the radar).

Phase II of the AfCFTA negotiations will tackle investment, competition and intellectual property rights. In particular, the protocol on investment is expected to build on the Pan-African Investment Code that African Union member States have already agreed on. This protocol will build on an already provided-for ability to move within the context of intra-African trade – for investment related to trade-in services. It will therefore widen the scope of people moving across the continent, investors and those related to trading goods.

Facilitating movement for trade in other African Union instruments: The case of the Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community Relating to Free Movement of Persons, Right of Residence and Right of Establishment

In 2013, the African Union adopted Agenda 2063, which outlines the aspirations of Africa's people to be attained by the year 2063. The agenda envisages an integrated continent, politically united based on the ideals of Pan-Africanism. One of the target areas to be met by 2023 is the free movement of people within regional economic community (REC) member States, and at the continental level, by way of waiver of all visa requirements for intra-African travel. Alongside AfCFTA, 33 out of the 55 African Union member States also signed the Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community Relating to Free Movement of Persons, Right of Residence and Right of Establishment on 21 March 2018. At the time of writing, only one member State had ratified the agreement.

The rationale for such a protocol cannot be overemphasized, especially in strengthening intra-African knowledge and skills transfer, promoting a Pan-African identity, social integration and tourism, improving transborder infrastructure projects and shared development, as well as fostering a comprehensive approach to border management. And yet the African Development Bank's Visa Openness Index of 2018 shows that 50 per cent of Africans still require a visa to travel to just over half of the other African countries. If ratified, this protocol could have a significantly positive bearing on trade.

The envisaged implementation approach for this protocol is that member States of the African Union would first grant each other visas on arrival, then remove visa requirements altogether while also moving gradually to granting each other rights to residence and establishment.

Another important initiative is the African passport, which is being rolled out as a signature initiative of the African Union. At the July 2016 African Union Summit in Kigali, the assembly officially launched the common electronic biometric African passport, which when fully rolled out, will facilitate the free movement of persons across Africa. African Union member States also launched the Single African Air Transport Market (SAATM), which should improve Africa's connectivity, promote trade, investment and tourism, create more jobs and growth, as well as make it easier for Africans to travel across the continent at lower costs. To date, 23 countries have signed up to the SAATM.

The status of freedom of movement in trade liberalizing instruments in African regional economic communities

In Africa, there are a series of subregional initiatives that seek to create more ground for Africans to trade and move within such groupings. All the RECs have put in place regional trade arrangements. However, the stage and implementation of these arrangements vary from one REC to the other (UNCTAD, 2019). Regarding the free movement of people, important results have been achieved particularly in certain regions, such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), East African Community (EAC) and Arab Maghreb Union (UMA). For example, the EAC passport is operational and allows multiple entries to citizens from Partner States to travel freely within the EAC region for a period of six months (IOM and ACP, 2013). In ECOWAS, there is visa-free movement for community nationals. In the Common Market for Eastern and Africa (COMESA), visas are treated with flexibility for residents of the COMESA; and in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region, citizens can obtain a visa for a maximum period of 90 days per year. However, establishment and residency require further procedures. In the Central Africa region, progress has been slow, while in the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), countries apply reciprocity rules on visas. In UMA, as with IGAD, some form of reciprocity is applied on visas, save for Tunisia, which allows citizens of other member States to access its territory freely.

MIGRATION–TRADE NEXUS IN AFRICA


Intra-African migration boosts trade primarily through two channels: (a) demand for products from countries of origin (nostalgia trade) and for services that migrants demand such as tourism; and (b) trade generated by Africa's informal cross-border traders. Trade is also increasingly boosted by small traders from extracontinental destinations who migrate to Africa. It is however important to observe that while policies to open borders to trade abound in Africa, the same cannot be said in regards with migration, despite empirical studies and evidence that find a positive impact of migration on trade. This therefore establishes a prima facie case for promoting pro-trade migration policies.

Food trade

African migrants' demand for products, in particular food from home, stimulate food exports from their countries of origin. For example, food exports from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali, the Sudan and Zimbabwe shows linkages to emigration from these countries to destination countries elsewhere on the continent (see Figure 1). Along with the rise in demand for food products, food

export values in countries of origin have also increased in parallel. Emigration from the above four countries corresponded to a significant increase in food exports to other African countries. In the case of Zimbabwe, its food exports to other African countries rose from USD 100,000 in 2000 to USD 1 million in 2013 (UNCTAD, 2018).

Figure 1. Top sending countries by food imports from Africa




Source: UNCTAD, 2018.

Note: Top sending countries based on the classification in World Bank, 2013 and the World Bank Global Bilateral Migration database.

A similar pattern has been observed at the regional level. Intra-African migration, besides boosting food exports from countries of origin, has also contributed to the rise in food imports across Africa’s RECs. For COMESA, the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) and SADC both had the largest increase in food imports as shown in Figure 2; trade in food products also generated substantial revenues for the RECs.

Figure 2. Three-year average bilateral food imports by regional economic community (billions of USD)



Source: Authors’ internal data.

Nostalgia trade

Intra-African migration stimulates heritage (nostalgia) trade and tourism (as discussed below), with diaspora populations serving as conduits for trade. Migrants' demand for products from home is critical, as trade in products from home often generates significant revenues for countries of origin. Moreover, with "nostalgia" goods being labour-intensive and often artisanal, earnings derived from such goods contribute to local communities' economics while boosting household-level incomes (Newland and Taylor, 2010). Critically, besides the potential to develop viable linkages between diaspora markets and local producers, trade in nostalgia products can play a role in sustaining small producers in their home countries, while supporting local economic development.

Services

Intra-African migration creates significant demand for services, such as tourism and transport, which tend to rise during holidays and other festivities as migrants in the diaspora visit relatives and friends at home. With the high levels of intra-African migration in recent years, the share of intraregional tourism has increased, rising from 34 per cent in 2010 to 40 per cent in 2013 (UNCTAD, 2017). At the same time, intra-African migration creates demand for other trade services, which, in turn, generates employment. In South Africa, the continent's top migration destination, trade in services have the largest share of employment, with the sector accounting for 20 per cent of the country's employment (Belaid and Slany, 2018).

Informal cross-border trade

Opportunities in trade are an important driver of intra-African migration, influencing mobility patterns, trends and dynamics across regions on the continent. Demand in trade is a driver of informal cross-border trade (ICBT), particularly among women. An estimated 85 per cent of cross-border traders in the Great Lakes region are women (Titeca and Kimanuka, 2012), while in Malawi and Zimbabwe, women account for approximately 80 per cent and 74 per cent of informal traders, respectively (Ndlela, 2006). Similarly, in Southern Africa, women migrants comprise up to 70 per cent of traders, and account for as much as 30–40 per cent of SADC trade, with a value of about USD 17.6 billion a year (United Nations Inter-Agency Networks on Women and Gender Equality, 2011), with Zimbabwe to South Africa being a key corridor (UNCTAD, 2018).

Across the continent, women informal cross-border traders often engage in short-term, circulatory movements between and within regions. In West Africa, women from Nigeria buy and sell a variety of goods, including clothes and beauty products that they trade in neighbouring Benin and Ghana (Andall, 2018). In East Africa, women informal cross-border traders from Uganda and Kenya trade in other EAC States, including in Rwanda and United Republic of Tanzania, and interregional to the Congo and the Sudan. Protocols related to the free movement of persons, residence and establishment in ECOWAS and EAC have helped to facilitate migrant mobility within the respective region's labour markets. While ICBT is dominated by low-skilled migrants, it is important to note that increasingly, traders include better-educated individuals. In EAC, for example, informal trade is increasingly absorbing young, relatively well-educated persons, including some with professional qualifications (Ogalo, 2010), reflecting a lack of economic opportunities in origin countries.

Although ICBT-related issues are not directly and explicitly reflected in the AfCFTA Agreement and in the Protocol of Free Movement of People, their implementation is likely to indirectly benefit the informal cross-border traders. The removal of many of the challenges and barriers to trade will make it easier for informal cross-border traders to enter formal employment, thus generating important socioeconomic benefits/gains in terms of trade creation, tax collection and overall wealth.

Extracontinental small-scale trade and entrepreneurship

Extracontinental migration to Africa has grown in recent years, as migrants respond to economic opportunities in countries on the continent. Trade and business on the continent have created economic opportunities for low-skilled migrants from China, India, Lebanon, Pakistan and European countries like Portugal, among others. Lebanese migrants, most of them low-skilled small-scale traders, operate small enterprises in Senegal, while Indian migrants run small businesses in several West, East and Southern African countries. Following the economic downturn in the mid-2008s, low-skilled Portuguese nationals immigrated to Mozambique and started small businesses with these traders, most of whom operate retail and wholesale shops and small restaurants contributing to the growth of the services sector in many African countries. More recently, small-scale Chinese traders have immigrated to African countries in substantial numbers, establishing small businesses across the continent, including in Angola, Botswana, Namibia, Senegal, South Africa, Uganda and Zambia, among others (Warmerdam and van Dijk, 2016).

Policy frameworks have been crucial in fuelling migration to the continent. China's 1978 Reform and Openness policy, which liberalized emigration and the 1999 Going Out policy, which encouraged foreign investment, have been vital in fuelling Chinese migration, including among traders to Africa (Postel, 2017). At the same time, the recent influx of Chinese migrants to South Africa since the 2000s is in part due to a lower threshold for entry (Park, 2009), which has made the country an attractive migration destination for Chinese migrants, including traders with limited skills and/or insufficient qualifications or capital for entry to North America, Europe or Australia (Huynh et al., 2010).

CONSTRAINTS AND OPPORTUNITIES ON INTRA-AFRICAN MIGRATION

Constraints

“An integrated continent, politically united and based on the ideals of Pan-Africanism and the vision of Africa’s Renaissance” is the second aspiration expressed by the African people in Agenda 2063. Two of the goals under this aspiration speak to a united Africa that would be achieved through trade, exchanges of goods and services, free movement of people and capital and world-class infrastructure that criss-crosses Africa so as to improve connectivity through by rail, road, sea and air; and developing regional and continental power pools, as well as information and communications technology.

While visa openness is viewed as part of the solution to achieve this aspiration, the 2019 Africa Visa Openness Index Report (AfDB, 2019) shows that, on average, African countries are more closed off to each other rather than visa-open, noting that Africans require visas to travel to 50 per cent of other African countries. African Union member States will need to adopt more progressive visa regimes, which among others, allow for obtaining visas on arrival and accepting e-visas. This will ensure that such regional integration initiatives as AfCFTA and SAATM, as envisaged under Agenda 2063, contribute more to the aspiration of the African people.

Such constraints in intra-African migration hinder its potential to contribute to and benefit from greater intra-African trade. Lack of protocols on the free movement of persons in some RECs (CEN-SAD and IGAD) and/or their implementation/ratification by some countries hinders the mobility of individuals across countries and regions and prevents them from taking advantage of economic opportunities including in trade. In the case of SADC, only 7 of 15 member States have ratified the protocol, which remains non-operational as it would require ratification by at least 10 member States. In addition, a lack of work permits and visas targeting low-skilled migrants, including for informal cross-border traders, hinders their mobility in regional labour markets and often pushes them into irregular status. Furthermore, although remittances represent a large and stable type of capital inflow, it is still very costly to send remittances to Africa. With an average of 8.9 per cent per USD 200 sent, Africa has the world's highest remittance cost, against a global average of 7.3 per cent (UNCTAD, 2018).

For women informal cross-border traders, poor trade facilitation – which increases their transaction costs – also creates incentives for traders to circumvent time-consuming, inefficient customs and trade-related formalities and complex technical requirements. Compounding these are gender-related barriers that create significant competitive disadvantages for low-skilled women migrants and negatively impact their outcomes in Africa's regional markets. Family and care responsibilities in origin countries that are not always easily reconciled with employment options in destination countries, in addition to required logistical and care arrangements for children while providing financially for their households, pose additional challenges to women migrants (Andall, 2018).

Despite its benefits to countries and migrants, low-skilled extracontinental migration to Africa is often viewed as threat to local business development. Small-business Chinese traders, for instance, are widely perceived as stifling indigenous business by saturating local markets with low-quality consumer goods and undercutting local businesses' prices (Warmerdam and van Dijk, 2016).

A focus on skills development across various trade sectors in which African countries have comparative advantage is key, so that the opportunities created in intra-African trade are accessible for all countries. The AfCFTA Agreement needs to be an instrument whose access and utilization is truly democratized. Therefore, as countries prepare their services sectoral commitments, they should think about the unique African service supplier, with an adequate mix of both highly and semi-skilled service suppliers. However, there is a need to accelerate the finalization and adoption of an African qualifications framework to enable the movement of highly skilled migrants within the African market, thereby addressing skills mismatches as well as shortages in the continent.

Opportunities

Intra-African migration, if properly harnessed, has the potential to contribute to greater intra-African trade and the continent's economic development. As migrants tend to earn higher incomes in destination countries, countries of origin are likely to benefit further from increased exports and revenues derived from trade. In addition, given the high migration flows in African regions, intra-African migration is likely to generate greater demand for intraregional tourism and revenues for governments and regions. It further represents a way to fill eventual skills gaps at the national and regional levels.

As already alluded to in a previous section of this paper ("The African Continental Free Trade Area on movement of people"), the entering into force of AfCFTA offers great opportunity to harness not only the benefits of free trade but also migration in general. In the same vein, the African Union's Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community Relating to Free Movement of Persons, Right of Residence and Right of Establishment will complement the AfCFTA and provide opportunities for intra-African migration and the benefit that this can bring, as this will complement the efforts on free movement already obtaining in some regions such as in West Africa under ECOWAS and East Africa under EAC.

Trade positively influences labour productivity and employment in high productivity sectors in African countries. Original research undertaken by UNCTAD (2018) shows that migration enhances structural transformation within both destination and sending countries. The findings of a dynamic panel data model, based on a sample of 50 African countries, suggest that a 1 per cent increase in the stock of immigrants (emigrants) is associated with a 0.43 per cent (0.30%) increase in manufacturing value added in destination (sending) countries. With services trade having a strong job absorption capacity in countries with high migration levels, well-managed migration that allows for regular and orderly mobility to regional markets can result in further benefits for countries, including through increased labour productivity and growth in the services sector. In addition, in some countries in Africa, labour migrants' transition from a low-productivity sector such as agriculture to other low-productivity activities in the informal economy, including in trade, which presumably have higher returns to labour (Hashim and Thorsen, 2011), underscores the benefits of migration.

Intra-African trade can also address other development challenges. Increased intra-African trade in food products could ameliorate food shortages and contribute to improved food security in countries and regions across the continent, including by increasing access to diversified food items. Similarly, as both diaspora tourists, and to a lesser extent, international tourists often procure products and services from businesses in local communities, revenues are more likely to go directly into the hands of local businesses, thus generating a positive development impact (Newland and Taylor, 2010).

For small-scale traders who engage in small businesses across the continent, besides creating employment for themselves, they have created jobs for locals, while generating demand for goods and services, and helping boost private sector development in destination countries on the continent.

Regulatory cooperation is at the heart of facilitating movement. It is important to understand the regulatory underpinnings of different countries and the challenges they grapple with, which determine not only how they legislate (because the treaties themselves are open and far reaching), but the application of this legislation to foreigners at the border. Building confidence and trust is key in ensuring that Africans can move across the continent.

CONCLUSION

Africa's regional integration, underpinned by the launch of SAATM in January 2018, and the adoption of the AfCFTA Agreement by most countries in March 2018, is well underway. Given these developments, the continent is poised to reap further economic gains, including from migration and trade. African countries need to better harness intra-African migration's potential to contribute to the continent's socioeconomic development, including through intra-African trade. Well-managed migration, besides improving Africa's economic growth prospects, could substantially boost the continent's GDP per capita by 2030, and contribute to the achievement of Africa's Agenda 2063 and the continent's prosperity.

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10

REMITTANCES TO
AND FROM AFRICA

CHAPTER 10

REMITTANCES TO AND FROM AFRICA

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Leon Isaacs (Developing Markets Associates (DMA))

ABSTRACT

This chapter provides an overview of migrants' financial transfers – including remittances and diaspora investments to and from Africa – its impact on the decision to migrate and on the communities living in sending countries and analyses how these contribute to development. The overview shows that of the estimated USD 528 billion global flows to developing countries in 2018, about USD 81 billion came to Africa. Approximately 10 times more remittances are received in the continent than are sent from or within it. Africa remains the most expensive continent to send money to and within. As at fourth quarter of 2018, the average cost of remittance to Africa was 9 per cent compared to the global average of 7 per cent, but this is a significant decline when compared with 14 per cent in 2008. Challenges to migrants' financial transfers for Africa's development are examined with recommendations on how to harness the potentials of remittances including the following: (a) creating enabling regulatory framework for cross-bordering remittances; (b) improving domestic payments infrastructure with new technologies; (c) improving data collection; (d) increasing transparency; (e) improving access to remittance services for irregular migrants; (f) leveraging remittances as a tool for financial inclusion; and (g) moving informal transactions into the formal ones.

INTRODUCTION

Migrants move for a variety of reasons including economic, social, political and environmental. The main reason is due to economic drivers. Remittances, the money sent home by migrants, are the most obvious evidence of this.

For many countries in Africa, remittances significantly contribute to their development. Indeed, they are one of the clearest and measurable signs of the value that migration brings to the migrants' country of origin. Remittances take many forms, including social¹ and political, all of which can help with development. Undoubtedly, financial remittances have the most important role to play in helping reduce poverty (Adams and Page, 2005). As well as being used for everyday expenditures, they bring longer-term benefits for the recipients and

¹ "Social remittance" is defined in social elements provided to the people in the homeland/country of origin. These include ideas, behaviours, identities, skills and knowledge and technology transfers.


their communities by being used for paying for health, education (Amega, 2018), savings, financial inclusion (plus literacy and empowerment), and is proven vital to help with starting businesses and investment. Remittances have many barriers to overcome, but there is now significant research and understanding that can lead to them having even greater positive influences than those seen to date. This chapter provides an overview of migrants' financial transfers, including both financial remittances and diaspora investments to and from Africa, and analyses how they can contribute to development. It also offers recommendations and ways forward on how to harness their potential.

OVERVIEW OF AFRICAN REMITTANCES FLOWS

Remittances are defined as “cross-border person-to-person payments of relatively low value. In practice, the transfers are typically recurrent payments by migrant workers” (Bank for International Settlements and World Bank, 2007). Remittances for larger-scale investment projects are generally known as diaspora investments. This chapter will cover both categories of these financial transfers generated by migrants.

Since remittances were understood as a phenomenon, there have been major challenges with obtaining accurate data on them. The official data that exists indicates that volumes have grown tremendously since the first measurement began in 2005. Flows to developing countries from all markets were estimated at USD 528 billion in 2018 (World Bank, 2018), with around USD 81 billion being sent to Africa (see Figure 1).

Figure 1. African remittances, 2006–2018




Source: World Bank, 2018b.

Africa is primarily a receiver of remittances. Despite the fact that sending volumes by African countries (largely to other African countries) is growing, the data shows that it receives around 8 times more than it sends. In 2018, inflows to Africa were USD 81 billion and outflows were USD 10.33 billion (World Bank, 2018b).

The main remittance recipient countries in Africa are Nigeria and Egypt (accounting for over 50% of the total between them). Other significant receivers include Algeria, Ghana, Morocco and Senegal (see Figure 2). Care needs to be taken due to problematic approaches to collecting, quantifying and analysing data, as well as the large volumes of informal transactions.^{2,3}

Figure 2. Top 12 African remittance-receiving countries, 2017



Source: World Bank, 2017b.

The majority of funds that are sent to Africa originate from migrants in Europe (particularly France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom) and North America. The Gulf Cooperation Council region also send significant volumes to North Africa. Despite developing formalized means of sending remittances, informal remittances (such as *Hawala* operators, people hand carrying and so on) are a well-known feature of transferring money both to and within Africa. Some entities have estimated informal volumes to be as much as another 50 per cent of the official number. Moving money across physical, and often porous, borders informally is prevalent in Africa.


Remittances account for around 65 per cent of the income of a receiving family unit. For a sender, the average amount of their earnings that are remitted is around 15 per cent, which implies that most of their funds remain in the host country (Ponsot et al., 2017).

² The terms “informal transactions” and “informal transfers” used in this chapter refer to those flows of remittances that take place outside State or official legal systems and hence are not included in official data. Informal transactions are also not subject to taxation and can be an effective way for people to transfer money (especially when there are limited alternatives). However, these can be expensive and provide no protection for consumers should something go wrong. A typical form of informal remittances transaction is represented by the *Kafala* system.

³ For example, in the African Union and GIZ study titled “African Union Legacy Project on Diaspora Investment, Innovative Finance and Social Enterprise in Africa” (Faal, 2019), it is estimated that the total formal, informal and in-kind remittances to Africa in 2018 is USD 200 billion.

While these funds are obviously important to an individual family, they are often critical to the country that receives them, at an aggregate level (see Figure 3). The World Bank (2016) advised that personal remittances were 4.8 per cent of GDP in Africa in 2016. It has to be remembered that these are private flows of funds, but using them for local consumption and investment can often have stimulating impacts on community and national economies.

Figure 3. Top 15 African receiving countries for remittances as a percentage of GDP, 2017




Source: World Bank, 2017c.

Costs and challenges of African remittances

All available evidence shows that Africa is the most expensive continent to send money to and within. On average, it cost 9 per cent to send money to Africa in Q4 2018 compared to a global average of 7 per cent. (World Bank, 2018a). It also has the most expensive country to send money from (South Africa at 15.76%) and the costliest corridors. While the cost has dropped from 14 per cent in 2008 (see Figure 4), there is still a major challenge to meet Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 10.c, and to comply with the outcome of the Addis Ababa Action Agenda 2015, which set a target of an average of 3 per cent cost by 2030 with no corridor being more than 5 per cent.

Figure 4. Average cost to send USD 200 to sub-Saharan Africa



Source: World Bank, n.d.

The main causes of high remittance costs in Africa are as follows: (a) liquid or “thin” currency markets; (b) limited competition; (c) bank-dominated markets; (d) high perceived risks of remittances; (e) cash-dominated markets; (f) low inflow volumes; and (g) a need to make profit.

Remittance prices are composed of two elements: fees and foreign exchange costs (or FX margins). These are comparatively high for sending to and within Africa. FX margins are higher than other parts of the world due to liquid or “thin” currency markets in many of the countries on the continent. Many banks do not look positively on remittances due to perceived (often unfounded) risks (such as potential money laundering and fraud) and low inflow volumes and profit margins.

Majority of formal remittances are cash-based. The sender pays for the service in cash, normally via an agent, using a remittance service provider (normally a money transfer operator), and the receiver normally collects money in cash at a bank branch. This “traditional model” accounts for around 90 per cent of all remittance transactions (Financial Sector Deepening Africa, 2017). Encouragingly, Africa is leading the world in the introduction of mobile remittances, and their inherently lower costs and ability to be accessed in remote areas are leading to rapid traction in a number of markets in East and West Africa. The Mpesa service in Kenya has transformed the way that people manage their money domestically through digital payments and is now showing significant growth in cross-border mobile-to-mobile transfers that has added convenience, speed, reach and lower costs to users. A similar example can be seen in West Africa with mobile transfers between Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso through operators such as MTN and Airtel.

On a similar theme, the collaboration between IOM and the Universal Postal System has allowed rural dwellers to have easier access to remittances at a cheaper cost. There is low financial inclusion in Africa, especially in Africa and therefore, remittances are generally not able to be sent to bank accounts.

There is also considerable appetite for trying to use remittances for larger scale investment projects using structured investment vehicles. This practice, frequently known as “diaspora investment”, is in reality often a mixture of two phenomena, namely rechanneling remittances and accessing diaspora savings. It is a fact that the diaspora frequently sends remittances, and it is also understood that they may have savings in their country of migration (the World Bank estimates USD 50 billion within the African diaspora) (Ratha et al., 2015)). If these savings were invested in their country of origin, it could have a major beneficial impact on their home economy.

AFRICAN UNION STRATEGY FOR REMITTANCES

Through SDG Target 10.7c, the global community has committed to reduce to less than 3 per cent on the transaction costs of migrant remittances and eliminate remittance corridors with costs higher than 5 per cent by 2030. Though remittance receipts surpass Official Development Assistance (ODA) (World Bank, 2017a) and are more stable than private capital flows, the transaction costs in Africa remain high. Cognizant of the role played by remittances, the African Union has adopted strategies to ensure greater impact of remittances. The Migration Policy Framework for Africa (MPFA) promotes the following: (a) fostering competition in remittances markets; (b) adopting sound macroeconomic policies conducive to investment and growth; (c) creating incentive strategies and investment opportunities for remitters in commercial, entrepreneurial and other productive activities; (d) improving the quality of data reporting on remittance and migration statistics; and (e) accessing financial services and boosting the use and security of technology such as mobile money for cross-border remittances. To implement these strategies, the African Union has adopted a 10-year Plan of Action that includes sensitization and awareness creation, stakeholder engagement, research, surveys and studies on remittances, as well as the provision of technical assistance and capacity workshops and trainings.

The establishment of the African Institute of Remittances (AIR) as a Specialized Technical Office of the African Union is one of the most commendable steps taken by the African Union in this sector. The institute is mandated to support African Union member States in reducing the cost of remitting money to and within Africa and improving the regulatory and policy frameworks within which remittances transfers take place, including remittances data measurement, compiling and reporting systems. By the adoption of the statute outlining the governing structure of the institute in January 2018, this will ensure that the institute is well equipped to deliver on its mandate.

The African Union also acknowledges the importance of leveraging diaspora remittances and savings to fund Agenda 2063 (African Union, 2013), through diaspora remittances securitization as new commercial financial intermediation vehicle and the introduction of diaspora bonds. The African Union has developed a strategic and business framework for an African Diaspora Finance Corporation (ADFC) to harness diaspora investments by issuing and managing diaspora bonds and diaspora-related mutual and endowment funds. Formal consultations on ADFC implementation started in November 2019 (African Union, 2019).

MAXIMIZING MIGRANTS' FINANCIAL TRANSFERS FOR DEVELOPMENT

The focus paid on the contribution of remittances for development in Africa has, until recently, been lower than in other parts of the world. This is partially due to the difficulties in obtaining accurate data and also because compared to other developing regions, ODA had historically been larger as a proportion of remittances flows to the continent (Baldé, 2011).

However, in many African countries, remittances have become a major household livelihood development strategy, helping to supplement agricultural incomes for many farmers (AfDB, 2017). Historically, literature on remittances emphasizes that as remittances are mostly used for basic consumption needs, these cannot be considered as sources of capital to finance development in migrants' home countries. However, this is not the case.

In fact, it is estimated that 75 per cent of the remittance money received is used for consumption (Ponsot et al., 2017), including subsistence and housing. The remaining 25 per cent presents further opportunities to use remittances for socioeconomic production. Around 10 per cent of remittances sent are used to cover long-term goals, such as education and health, while approximately 15 per cent is available for savings and investing in housing, small assets and other income-generating activities. This latter amount has achieved significant attention, and a broad range of initiatives have been undertaken in Africa, often on a pilot basis, focused on making these funds productive in small- and medium-sized enterprises and encouraging entrepreneurship.

Remittances are often considered better than foreign aid in Africa, as they go directly to the targets and do not have conditionalities (Bodomo, 2013). While remittances do not have a direct impact on growth (Baldé, 2011), these are more effective in boosting savings and investment in sub-Saharan Africa than foreign aid.⁴ This, in turn, has a direct effect on growth. Remittances help reduce liquidity constraints and when invested, they can sustain family members in countries where unemployment is high (Shapiro and Mandelman, 2016).

Evidence from Africa also shows that remittances are associated with increased household investments in education (Amega, 2018), entrepreneurship and health, all of which have high social returns. It was found that in 18 sub-Saharan countries, primary and secondary school enrolment rose by 4.2 per cent and 8.8 per cent, respectively, for every 10 per cent rise in remittances (Amakom and Iheoma, 2014).

Remittance receipts appear to have a greater impact on secondary school enrolment. In South Africa, for example, children from remittance-recipient households (Blacks) were 30 per cent more likely to have some secondary education compared to non-migrating households without remittances (Lu and Treiman, 2007). Remittance-recipient households were also 73 per cent more likely to have some secondary education and 130 per cent more likely to have educational levels beyond secondary school.

⁴ However, when foreign aid is efficiently used, it can be an important complement to remittances by allowing vulnerable households to have income above the threshold subsistence level so they can use larger share of remittances for savings and investment purposes (Baldé, 2011).

Similarly, in Ghana, the probability that a child enrolls in primary school rises by 13 per cent if a household's status moves from a non-international remittance recipient to an international remittance recipient. Further, the likelihood of attending a secondary school rises by 54 per cent for the same household status change. Households headed by females were also more likely to invest remittances in children's education than those headed by men (Gyimah-Brempong and Asiedu, 2015).

The development impact of remittances can also be boosted by promoting savings, which in turn enables better matching of savings with investment opportunities (Agunias, 2006). Savings can be increased by encouraging remittances to be sent through banking or account-based channels and improving financial literacy. While access to bank accounts is low in Africa, it is growing. The use of mobile accounts and wallets provide significant opportunities to expand and leverage this. This is also directly correlated with reductions in poverty. In 2015, over 70 per cent of the global poor were unbanked, and this figure includes migrants and members of their families. Financial literacy courses can go a long way to support migrants to choose the most appropriate remittance service available to them, with new options for direct transfers to linked bank or mobile wallet accounts. These are empowering tools and services for remittance senders and recipients. Ratha (2007) also highlighted the fact that remittances provide capital to small entrepreneurs, reduce credit constraints and increase entrepreneurship.

DEVELOPMENT IMPACTS OF DIASPORA INVESTMENTS

Diaspora direct investment and diaspora entrepreneurship are other forms of migrants' financial transfers that can also play important development roles by fostering business development, job creation, competition, innovation and creation of transnational business networks (Plaza and Ratha, 2011).

Diaspora members are less risk averse than non-migrants. Their knowledge of the local political, economic and cultural environment, as well as their personal connections and linguistic abilities give them a comparative advantage when it comes to setting up businesses in their countries of origin (Newland and Tanaka, 2011).

Since the lack of appropriate regulations can hinder investments, an important task of African governments is to create enabling business environments with suitable policies and regulations. Unfortunately, this is not always the case, although there are positive examples of countries undertaking innovative forms of remittance enhancement and diaspora investment.

There are a number of examples of good practice in leveraging remittances. In 2017, Nigeria successfully issued a diaspora bond raising USD 300 million. The bond was oversubscribed by 130 per cent (Rambarran, 2017). Ethiopia has offered diaspora members the same benefits and rights as domestic investors through the issuance of yellow cards (that is, Ethiopian origin ID cards), and has introduced investment incentives for diaspora members, such as duty exemptions on imported goods and discounted airfares for diaspora development actors and diaspora entrepreneurs (Wolff et al., 2016).

The Government of Ghana passed a bill granting dual citizenship for Ghanaians living abroad in 2000 and in 2005, it enabled Ghanaians living abroad to vote in national elections (although this has still not been implemented) (Government of Ghana, n.d.). The National Remittances Credit Registry, housed by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, has been set up to assist the Government of Ghana to diversify the country's investments for diasporans who remit to the country. It will design and operate a centralized database to compile national remittances flow and use this information to generate financial benefits and investment opportunities for remitters, recipients and the country as a whole (Wolff et al., 2016). The Government of Ghana has also set up a special diaspora unit, the Diaspora Affairs Bureau, situated in the Office of the President (supported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), which hosts and maintains a diaspora website that provides vital information, such as labour market openings and opportunities for migrant investments, among others. The bureau also holds regular consultations with their diaspora.

Several African countries have schemes, backed by policy and legislation, that provide domestic direct investment incentives and tax breaks comparable to those available for foreign direct investment (FDI). For countries like the Gambia and Ghana, the incentive programme is managed by the national inward investment promotion agency and a variant of the FDI programme. Countries like Morocco and Senegal provide grants, co-finance and loan guarantees to diaspora investors (Faal, 2019).

Communicating effectively with diaspora and networking organizations is another way that governments can promote diaspora productive investments. Networking organizations promote diaspora entrepreneurship by offering opportunities for diaspora, local business leaders and professionals to meet one another (either in person or via the Internet) and discuss potential business and investment opportunities in the homeland. Some networking organizations are involved in public-private partnerships to facilitate meetings between locals and members of the diaspora, while others promote networking among diaspora business leaders to foster partnerships and opportunities in countries of origin, such as the South African network initiative.

In another example, the Government of Mali has set up institutional mechanisms for consultations involving diaspora communities, including the development of the National Policy on Migration. In 2015, Nigeria developed a National Policy on Migration that focused on diaspora engagement. In 2017, Nigeria passed a law setting up the Nigerians in Diaspora Commission (NIDCOM), which is now fully operational (NIDCOM, n.d.).

The African Development Bank has also established an initiative that aims to identify, for each country, the steps required to create the optimum environment for diaspora investment (DMA, 2015).

Text box 1. Diaspora and the African Union

The African Union definition of African diaspora is people of African origin, living outside the continent and who, irrespective of their current citizenship or nationality, are willing to contribute to the development of the continent and the building of the African Union.

The African Union developed a diaspora road map that was drawn during the Global African Diaspora Summit of 2012, in Johannesburg, South Africa, and represented in the African Union diaspora declaration, which provides an action plan in three areas: political, economic and social. The declaration also identified five diaspora legacy projects meant to provide practical meaning to diaspora engagement. The legacy projects are the African Diaspora Volunteer Corps, African Diaspora Skills Database, AIR, African Diaspora Investment Fund and Development Marketplace for African diaspora.

To better understand and address the gaps in diaspora engagement, the Diaspora division of the Citizens and Diaspora Directorate of the African Union Commission (CIDO) has been organizing biennial continental Diaspora Focal Points Workshop, which brings together the diaspora focal points in the African Union member States in addition to representatives of regional economic communities (RECs), civil society organizations, the African diaspora, individual experts on diaspora engagement, programme practitioners in diaspora matters and policymakers.

To mitigate the weakness brought about by the lack of effective monitoring and evaluation systems, and better understand diaspora engagement, the division has created a diaspora self-assessment tool that allows countries to measure their performance and understand their level of progress in diaspora engagement relative to other member States of the African Union.

CHALLENGES TO MIGRANTS' TRANSFERS FOR AFRICA'S DEVELOPMENT

Many challenges remain to be addressed to make African remittances a more effective and impactful development tool. Recipient households' lack of capacity to effectively manage the funds, low levels of financial inclusion and literacy among migrants and their families back home, weak or missing payment infrastructure in origin countries, and fragmented markets are just a few obstacles among many others. A number of studies have attempted to identify such challenges and develop a series of actions that can be taken to address them to achieve the untapped potential benefits from this phenomenon, including *Remittances in ACP Countries: Key Challenges and Ways Forward*. The African Caribbean and Pacific Group of States–European Union initiative, managed by IOM, undertook 14 separate technical assistance work programmes throughout the continent (Isaacs, 2017). Lessons learned from these and other practical studies, such as the International Fund for Agricultural Development's Financing Facility for Remittances, highlighted the following six key challenges.

- (a) High cost of remittances: As identified, the average cost to send a remittance to Africa is 9 per cent, making it the highest cost region globally. Intra-Africa costs are even higher.

- (b) Difficulty in access to formal remittance services in both sending and receiving markets: For irregular migrants, it is becoming increasingly difficult to obtain access to formal remittance services because host countries are mandating that money transfer operators not only check identification documents but also whether the sender has valid permits to be in the country. For receiving payments, there are severe challenges around infrastructure, underdeveloped payment systems and access to funds in rural areas.
- (c) Ubiquity of informal remittances: The use of informal transfers provides no financial protection to users should something go wrong and, at a country level, damages the economy and potentially exposes it to greater risks.⁵
- (d) Limited productivity from remittances: There is the potential for remittances to be leveraged for financial inclusion and productive uses beyond the 75 per cent used for consumption, although these also have direct development impact on recipient communities and lead to benefits through multiplier effects. Initiatives to harness the remaining 25 per cent of remittance funds that are sent have generally been low scale, uncoordinated and have shown limited success.
- (e) Stakeholder coordination: Remittances are necessarily complex as they involve at least two jurisdictions (frequently three) and multiple stakeholders within each country, including central banks, ministries of foreign affairs, regulators, private sector, non-governmental institutions, diasporans and so on. Harmonizing efforts across these entities has proved difficult in many countries.
- (f) Lack of data: Without accurate data on the flow of remittances, where they come from and go to, who uses them and others, it is challenging to make meaningful policies. Therefore, the importance of remittances and the imperative to improve them is often undervalued.

Addressing these challenges is not easy, and there is no single solution that covers them all. It requires a coordinated set of actions including the following:

- (a) Develop a regulatory framework for cross-border remittances that is effective and proportionate. A series of sub-actions are required to ensure that the legal environment is conducive to encouraging formal remittances, and that risks are proportionate to the nature of the transactions. This will provide certainty to operators and help lead to lower remittance costs.
- (b) Create or enhance domestic payments infrastructures in Africa, particularly in relation to new technologies. A most realistic way to meet global targets, such as SDG 10.7c and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, is by changing the operating model of remittance services through simplification and digitization.
- (c) Capture information and data in a systemic way on all aspects of the remittances process. By setting standards and ensuring that remittance companies and banks provide accurate and timely data, more exact data will be delivered which, in turn, will lead to more effective policymaking and development planning.
- (d) Ensure that consumers have access to all relevant remittances information in a clear and customer friendly way. Without accurate information on

⁵ Informal remittances can have positive benefits, as they can ensure that flows continue in times of crisis and can be highly convenient.

the true costs of remittances, especially foreign exchange rates, it is difficult for remitters and their families to make the right choice for users of money transfer services.

- (e) Improve access to remittance services for irregular migrants. Coordinated activities are needed between receiving countries and host governments to reach facilitative agreements on requirements for those wishing to send money.
- (f) Leverage remittances as a tool for financial inclusion. Identify “teachable moments” of the remittances “journey” to bring remittance receivers into formal financial services, building on this to provide education and awareness opportunities for savings, investments and other services. As a subset of this section, significant work needs to be undertaken to develop financial literacy training for remittance receivers, in a similar manner to that which has been achieved in other regions.
- (g) Move informal transactions into the formal sectors. Use a range of methods, including more balanced regulations, education and outreach programmes to demonstrate the benefits of using formal services. Improve formal product offerings to compete with the perceived benefits of the informal sector.

The challenges in implementing these actions are great and require strong coordination among the stakeholders in order to make them happen. Stakeholders include individual governments, regional bodies such as the RECs, monetary unions and continental organizations including the African Union. The creation of a common remittances plan for Africa can help to achieve these goals.

AIR, created as an organ of the African Union, can build on its progress to date to play a pivotal role in convening the key stakeholders in remittances within Africa to address challenges.⁶

CONCLUSION

Most people migrate for economic reasons. They live and work in another country, among other things, to earn money to send home to improve long-term life situations for themselves, their families and communities. They do this by sending remittances. Therefore, a positive impact from migration is the creation of remittances, and remittances are undoubtedly good for development.

Remittances are an important and growing inflow of funds to individuals and countries within Africa. They have the potential to contribute to development in a much greater way than they currently do. There are, however, many challenges to creating the optimum conditions for efficient and productive remittances that are consistent with the global targets, such as the SDGs and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda. A coordinated approach to delivering the solutions that have been identified, including the use of technology, can stimulate real progression in Africa. This multi-stakeholder approach requires focus and effective leadership.

⁶ AIR was created as a result of funding from the European Union and support from a number of organizations, such as IOM and the World Bank. It began its operations in 2015. It focuses on three areas: (a) cost reduction; (b) improving data; and (c) leveraging remittances for investment. Since it began, it has had notable success with limited resources, through raising awareness within the continent about remittances, demonstrating great convening powers and helping to build capacity in many countries.

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Little has been told or portrayed about the benefits of migration in Africa. Over the years, the world has been made to believe that migration in Africa is about mass exodus from conflict or climate change. However, migration has its benefits to the continent and to the world at large; it invigorates growth, fuels human endeavours, enables skills and cultural exchanges, enhances economic growth and offers potential for constructive opportunities for an energetic and growing youth population. The cover design expresses the youth's dream for freedom, infrastructural growth, productive creativity and successful ambitions – all of which safe and orderly migration pathways could facilitate.

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11

THE MIGRATION-DEVELOPMENT NEXUS IN AFRICA

CHAPTER 11

THE MIGRATION–DEVELOPMENT NEXUS IN AFRICA

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ABSTRACT

The nexus between migration and development in Africa is examined by challenging the predominant narrative that migration arises from failed development, and that it hampers development for the sending and destination countries. However, evidence shows that migration is both the result of development and a means to achieve it. Migrants' characteristics are explored, showing that development and a higher level of education is an important determinant of a person's propensity to migrate; the level of development or individual wealth will also be a determinant of where to migrate. There is a discussion on how migration contributes to the development of receiving and sending countries through the exchange of new skills and ideas; and that migration can act as an economic stimulus. The chapter explores how it is not just labour migrants who can increase development but also forced migrants who can stimulate economic growth and job creation. The chapter concludes that the nexus between migration and development is complex and varies considerably but with the right conditions and supported by policy and legal frameworks, migration can be a powerful force for development.

INTRODUCTION

This chapter examines the relationship or nexus between migration and development in Africa. Before the early 2000s, the predominant narrative was that migration is both the result of failed development and hampers development for the sending and destination country (Bakewell, 2011). More recent evidence however shows that migration is both the result of development and a means to achieve it.

This chapter firstly explores the characteristics of who migrates, showing that development and a higher level of education is an important determinant of a person's propensity to migrate. Secondly, it discusses how migration contributes to the development of receiving and sending countries through the exchange of new skills and ideas and can act as an economic stimulus. This section focuses on two particularly debated issues – the so-called brain drain and the role of diasporas in shaping brain gain (Bailey, 2010). Thirdly, the chapter explores how it is not just labour migrants who can increase development but also forced migrants who can stimulate economic growth and job creation (Betts et al., 2014).

The benefits of migration for development are not however automatic, nor is migration a panacea for development. As will be demonstrated in this chapter, the context in which migration occurs is important because there are many factors at play that affect who migrates and to what effect. As de Haas writes “migration is both a cause (among many) and a consequence (among many) of processes of social transformation, which underpin human development” (2009). Taken together, if migration is seen as a process of development in its own right and a vehicle through which development can be achieved, migration should be embraced within development planning, with laws and policies designed to facilitate and optimize its benefits.

The migration–development nexus is notably contingent upon mainstreaming migration in economic development planning to integrate migration concerns at all stages of development planning, including design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. This ensures that migration is viewed as an issue that affects all aspects of human development, and is entrenched in the broader development strategy and therefore fosters a coherent and coordinated approach.

BACKGROUND

Skeldon describes how it is curious that the possibility of an international migration phase in development could occur since it can be argued that migration has always been, and will always be, an integral part of development (2008). As early as the 1970s, academics pointed to the potential benefits of migration for origin and destination countries in Africa (Adepoju, 1977). Nonetheless, it has only been since the early 2000s that migration was considered important to development discussions.

Prior to this, rural-to-urban migration for example was thought to increase inter-household inequality (Lipton, 1980). Bakewell attributes this negative attitude more broadly to a “sedentary bias” in development approaches to Africa that were focused on the control of mobility and tend to cast migration as a symptom of development failure (Bakewell, 2011; de Haas, 2009).

It is now however recognized that much of this earlier thinking was based on inadequate theory and data (Massey et al., 1998:272). The “discovery” of remittances as constituting a significant flow of finance to developing countries has also prompted greater interest in the development potential of migration (Bakewell, 2011:137; Ratha, 2003). There has thus been a turn towards seeing the value of migration (Levitt and Nyberg-Sørensen, 2004), and there is an “international buzz” (Vammen and Broden, 2012:26) about the migration–development nexus seen among academics, policymakers, international agencies and governments alike (Black et al., 2006; Clemens, 2017; Nyberg-Sørensen, et al., 2003).

INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL MIGRATION FRAMEWORKS

The importance placed on the migration–development nexus is reflected in recent international and regional frameworks. At the international level, Goal 8 of the Sustainable Development Goals explicitly refers to migration, acknowledging the economic value of migrant labour. Moreover, Target 10.7 aims to “facilitate orderly, safe and responsible migration, including through implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies”.

At the regional level for Africa, the Revised Migration Policy Framework for Africa and Plan of Action (2018–2027) states that “it is evident that well-managed migration has the potential to yield significant benefits for both origin and destination countries. For instance, labour migration has played an important role in filling labour needs in agriculture, construction and other sectors, thus contributing to the economic development of many African countries of destination. Moreover, the beneficial feed-back effects of migration, such as remittances, knowledge and skills transfer, and return migration, have in some cases made major contributions to economies of origin countries” (African Union, 2018).

Furthermore, the Addis Ababa Action Agenda 2015 further enforces the importance of migration to development and the need for a coordinated approach. Paragraph 111 states: “We will cooperate internationally to ensure safe, orderly and regular migration, with full respect for human rights. We endeavour to increase cooperation on access to and portability of earned benefits, enhance the recognition of foreign qualifications, education and skills, lower the costs of recruitment for migrants, and combat unscrupulous recruiters, in accordance with national circumstances and legislation.”

DEVELOPMENT CONTRIBUTES TO MIGRATION


If migration is assumed to be the result of development failure, then it must be the poorest who migrate. This was the thinking that previously dominated debates about the migration–development nexus. There is now however an academic and policy consensus that actually the poorest do not migrate (Bakewell, 2011:148; de Haas, 2009; Nyberg-Sørensen et al., 2002:51).

Massey, for example, explains how international migrants do not come from poor, isolated places that are disconnected from world markets, but from regions and nations that are undergoing rapid change and development as a result of their incorporation into global trade, information, and production networks. In the short run, international migration does not stem from a lack of economic development, but from development itself (Massey et al., 1998:277).

This is because it requires resources in order to migrate. Migration involves direct costs, such as transport costs, indirect costs associated with the risk of moving to a new place without guarantees of work or housing and the opportunity costs of migrating. The wealthy however tend to be less likely to migrate because of the financial returns and investments in their country of residence. This has been characterized by Martin and Taylor as the “migration hump” whereby migration increases with the rate of development but eventually tails off (Martin and Taylor,

1996). This can be seen in Figure 1; it shows the positive relationship between GDP at purchasing power parity per capita and propensity to migrate (Dustmann and Okatenko, 2014). Data collected globally however shows the reverse trend, meaning both migration and intention to migrate tail off with increased economic development. The decision to migrate is however always complex and will involve non-economic considerations, such as familial and cultural ties and pressures.

Figure 1. Average migration intentions and GDP at purchasing power parity per capita



Source: Dustmann and Okatenko, 2014.

In fact, development can often increase migration because even if the economy is improving, earning capacity will still be higher elsewhere (Clemens, 2017). It is therefore no coincidence that wealthy people and societies tend to be generally more mobile than relatively poor people and societies (de Haas, 2009), and that middle-income countries tend to see more migration (Clemens, 2017). Development, including increased education, can also increase migration because it broadens outlooks and increases aspirations (ibid.; Flahaux and de Haas, 2016). Research by Afrobarometer shows that aspiration to migration increases with education; one in four respondents with post-secondary qualifications (25%) say they have thought a lot about emigrating, compared to 20 per cent of those with secondary education, 13 per cent with primary education, and 8 per cent without any formal education (Appiah-Nyamekye and Selormey, 2018). This therefore contradicts the logic of policies, especially by Western donor States, that aim to use development assistance to reduce migration from Africa, as well as Latin America (de Haas, 2006).

The level of development or individual wealth will also be a determinant of where to go. This means that often it is only the wealthiest who migrate to the Global North. Similarly, South–South migration, for example within Africa, is generally less costly and therefore more accessible for those who are relatively less well-off (Bakewell, 2009).

MIGRATION CONTRIBUTES TO DEVELOPMENT

The other crucial aspect of the migration–development nexus is how migration can increase development. It is however difficult to make generalizations given the diversity of migration patterns. Similarly, it is important within this discussion to not only consider migration from the Global South to the Global North as this constitutes only a small proportion of migrants (UNCTAD, 2018). Migration within Africa is more common and may be more significant for development, as the lower costs of migration make it more accessible to a wider number of individuals and even small-income increases may make a significant impact on poverty levels (Bakewell, 2009; Flahaux and de Haas, 2016).

Receiving countries within Africa stand to benefit from migration; migrants can fill gaps in the labour market and bring new skills, ideas and innovation (Bakewell, 2009). Countries require policies on how to integrate migrants, especially in the face of possible xenophobia, although research in this area is limited (*ibid.*). There can also be concerns about the pressure migrants might place on wages and public services. Evidence shows however that wage differentials remain small across African countries (excluding South Africa) with varying migration trends, including sending and receiving countries and, thus, contrary to common expectations, receiving countries do not appear to be more prone to lower wages than sending countries (UNCTAD, 2018). Similarly, there is no relation between health expenditure and education and varying levels of immigration or emigration (although, because of data limitations, formal correlation cannot be established) (*ibid.*).

Individual migrants and their families are also widely thought to benefit from migration, particularly through remittances (discussed in chapter 10). There is more debate around whether migration improves development for the sending countries at a community or national level. Developmental gains are often cited when migrants return to their country of origin, either permanently or as part of circular migration, and bring with them new technologies, skills, trade, investment and social norms (European Commission, 2011). Capital obtained through migration can be used for investment and business activities, which can in turn promote jobs and economic growth. European donors are thus funding new programmes to help returnee entrepreneurs in Africa to set up businesses in their country of origin (Åkesson and Baaz, 2015).

Rates of return migration are however low; out of the total number of international migrants, only 3 per cent in Nigeria, 9 per cent in Senegal and 25 per cent in Burkina Faso returned to their country of origin in the 15-year period after migration (Ratha et al., 2011). There is therefore more debate and more significance to analysing what happens if migrants stay abroad, particularly in terms of the loss of highly skilled individuals and the impact of diasporic links, which are discussed next.

Brain drain debate

“Brain drain” refers to the emigration of trained or qualified persons, resulting in a depletion of skilled labour in a given country (UNCTAD, 2018). A 2013 United Nations report showed that one in nine Africans with tertiary education were living in developed countries, marking a 50 per cent growth in the past 10 years (UN DESA/OECD, 2013). The medical sector is most commonly raised in this debate; one study showed that the number of sub-Saharan African physicians in the United States of America had increased by 38 per cent between 2002 and 2011; more than half of this increase was accounted for by Nigerian doctors, although Liberia was the most affected as 77 per cent of its estimated 226 physicians had migrated to the United States (Tankwanchi et al., 2013). It can seem a common-sense conclusion that the emigration of doctors, for example, will have a negative impact on the health sector of the country of origin because there will be less doctors and the loss of investment in training costs.

A closer examination reveals the complex dynamics at play that may offset the seeming losses. Migration may, for example, increase the skills and knowledge of those who emigrate, which will later benefit the country of origin – if migrants return (Black et al., 2006). Similarly, it may also prompt investment in education because of aspirations to migrate, leading to increased domestic skills development, with the likelihood that not all individuals will migrate (UNCTAD, 2018). It is also important to interrogate the nature of the challenge itself. Clemens shows, for instance, that the low health staffing levels and poor public health conditions in some African countries characterized by outmigration are actually the result of factors entirely unrelated to international migration of health professionals. He suggests the poor health indicators are instead because of the “geographic and public/private sector distribution of health professionals in the sending country, the skill mix of the health workforce, performance incentives faced by health professionals in the sending country, and the relative importance of primary care versus prevention to the disease burden in Africa” (Clemens, 2017). Skeldon also argues that low staffing levels in rural areas is because of professionals’ preference for urban areas and that outmigration is often a response to unemployment (Skeldon, 2008; de Haas, 2009; Bakewell, 2011).

There is also research that shows that “brain circulation” within sub-Saharan Africa is replacing potential brain drain to OECD countries. Countries such as Ghana, Uganda, Nigeria and Kenya, which were often brain drain countries, have instead, during the past decade, seen skilled urban professionals migrating to the booming economies of Gabon, Botswana, Namibia and South Africa (see Text box 1). Such migrants found this to be a “convenient alternatives to Europe, the United States and the Middle East (OECD, 2007).

Text box 1. Migration within Africa: Botswana

Botswana has changed from a migrant-sending to a migrant-receiving country and has attracted skilled professionals (OECD, 2007). Most of these migrants work in the private sector or at the university, taking advantage of the relaxed laws on residence and entry introduced in the early 1990s (Adepoju, 2008). Botswana has also attracted some of the three quarters of Zimbabwean doctors who have moved both there and to South Africa following the State’s economic collapse (ibid.).

Contribution of diasporas

Diasporas can also push for political changes, if granted dual nationality and the right to vote. The Ghanaian diaspora has been particularly active in pushing for dual nationality (Bump, 2006) in order to engage in domestic politics (see Text box 2). Diasporas can also bring about change through social remittances that see the spread of certain cultural or political norms (Levitt, 1998). For example, migration to countries with strong democratic institutions is found to influence attitudes on voting and democracy at home. A comparison of attitudes to political institutions in Mali between those who had not migrated and Malian migrants living in Côte d'Ivoire and France found that non-migrants had different perceptions of Malian democratic institutions than migrants. Where the migrant had lived also had an impact, as those who had lived in France were less interested in politics in Mali and more sceptical, while those who had lived in Côte d'Ivoire seemed less sceptical of political institutions in Mali, although this depended on education level (UNCTAD, 2018).

Text box 2. Political contribution of the Ghanaian diaspora

The Ghanaian diaspora was keen to maintain a political stake in Ghana and actively engage in domestic politics, particularly as politics liberalized in the 1990s. Diaspora members, particularly those living in Canada and the United Kingdom, thus pushed for dual nationality. Progress was initially slow, possibly because of the perception that the diaspora were opponents of the incumbent government. After years of lobbying, the Ghanaian diaspora was finally granted dual citizenship in 2000. The new government elected in 2000 subsequently took a proactive stance towards the diaspora and implemented the dual citizenship provisions and granted them the right to vote in 2002 (Whitaker, 2011).

Beyond the individual level, engagement with diasporas can also take place through government-led initiatives, implemented for example, through embassies. The Nigerians in Diaspora Organization – with branches in Europe, North America, Asia and Africa – has forged partnership with the Government of Nigeria to organize annual diaspora events and promote development activities, skills transfer, trade and investment (Adepoju, 2010). Governments are recognizing the role of diasporas as potential ambassadors or lobbyists in defence of national interests abroad, as well as the economic potential of encouraging and coordinating collective investments and engagements (Nyberg-Sørensen et al., 2002).

Governments also seek to engage with the financial contribution of their diaspora (see Text box 3). One approach has been to offer diaspora bonds, as initiated by the Government of Nigeria. Members of the diaspora can see government bonds as a way to contribute to development, incentivized by potentially high returns to their investment. Governments may target members of their diaspora because their personal connections may make them more willing to purchase their home government's debt, making debt-raising cheaper, and less likely to divest during times of economic uncertainty (Famoroti, 2017).

Text box 3. Engaging the Kenyan diaspora financially

Kenya has sought to encourage the economic engagement of its diasporas. In 2017, IOM launched *Send Money and Invest in Kenya: A Guide for Diaspora Remittances and Investments*, in partnership with the Kenyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The booklet provides advice to the Kenyan diaspora on three main areas: (a) how to choose a remittance service provider and know which one is most cost effective; (b) how to open a bank account in Kenya while abroad and make payments (such as utility bills); and (c) how best to invest in Kenya, both for profit and not-for-profit, including how to start and register a business, invest in Kenya's capital markets, and coordinate group investments (ACP-EU Migration Action, 2017).

Diasporic links are also established through diaspora organizations – often referred to as hometown associations. Hometown associations aim to pool their resources and remit and invest money collectively. These usually take the form of basic infrastructure and communication projects, such as the construction of roads, bridges, potable water systems, drainage, wells, electrification and telephones (de Haas, 2009). For example, the UK-based diaspora organization African Foundation for Development (AFFORD) was established in 1994 and aims “to expand and enhance the contributions Africans in the diaspora make to African development” (AFFORD, 2018). It aims to improve job growth through providing grants and setting up business resource centres in the United Kingdom and Sierra Leone to impart knowledge and assistance to entrepreneurs from business advisors.

CONCLUSION

The nexus between migration and development is complex and varies considerably. It is clear however, that under the right conditions, supported by policy and legal frameworks, migration is a powerful force for development. Economic migrants are often well educated and engage in migration as a deliberate strategy to contribute to the development of their family and home communities. The drive to better one's outlook is particularly demonstrated by the ability of forced migrants who, despite difficult circumstances, create economic networks and employment. Migrants nearly always have some form of contact with their country of origin. This can be through return visits or circular migration or without their physical presence through remitting not just money but also skills, ideas and social norms, which can offset concerns about brain drain and acknowledge the great possibility of brain gain. This transnational circulation helps develop networks that can facilitate trade, investment and innovation. Overall, it creates dynamic economies, engaged diasporas and international exchange that are crucial for development.

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Ethiopian returnees from Yemen arriving at Addis Ababa International Airport.

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12

MIGRATION AND SECURITY IN AFRICA: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FREE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS AGENDA

CHAPTER 12

MIGRATION AND SECURITY IN AFRICA: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FREE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS AGENDA

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ABSTRACT

The chapter discusses the concept of the securitization of migration and how it impacts migration policies in Africa, and the impeding progress towards the continent's free movement of persons' agenda. There is, however, an acknowledgement of the fragility of Africa's security environment with a wide array of ongoing and emerging threats including non-State threats. Militia factions and armed gangs are ubiquitous in the continent's civil wars, fighting both for and against African governments. A nexus has also developed among organized criminal groups involved in transnational organized crimes, such as terrorism, kidnapping, human trafficking, smuggling of migrants and smuggling of arms and weapons. Similarly, porous borders, the absence of harmonized travel documents, lack of policy harmonization by member States and lack of capacity and appropriate infrastructure for border management are additional concerns for African member States. The securitization of migration is practically demonstrated through enhancing border controls, tightening visa policies and population profiling. Nevertheless, evidence on the prevailing narrative on links between migration and security remains largely anecdotal. The chapter asserts that no clear correlation between free movement of persons and increasing insecurity can be found, and therefore note that it is important to bring evidence on the linkages between migration and security in order to disprove an often misinformed public debate.

INTRODUCTION

This paper analyses how increased securitization of intra-African migration impacts Africa's free movement of persons agenda. The chapter has six sections. The first section highlights trends of African migration. The second section sheds light on securitization of intra-African migration. This is followed by a section that discusses the continent's free movement of persons agenda. The fourth section analyses how securitization of migration impacts the expansion of the free movement persons in Africa. The sixth section discusses how benefits of free movement of persons outweigh security concerns. The chapter concludes by highlighting key policy recommendation points, such as the importance of enhancing coordination

to address transnational security threats, shaping African citizens' perceptions of free movement and tracking progress of the implementation of the free movement of persons protocol.

AFRICAN MIGRATION TRENDS

African migration is predominantly intracontinental. In 2019, 53.2 per cent, that is, 21 million of the 39.4 million of African-born migrants lived within the continent (IOM, 2019). The number of African migrants in the continent showed significant increase; in 2015, approximately 18.5 million African migrants lived within the continent (ibid.). South Africa¹ is the major destination of international migrants with 4 million migrants, followed by Côte d'Ivoire with 2.5 million. Among the top 20 migration corridors involving African countries in 2019, the corridor between Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire constitute the second largest (IOM, 2019).

Europe is a top destination for African outbound migrants. In 2019, 26.9 per cent (i.e. 10.6 million) of the total 39.4 million African migrants worldwide lived in Europe, followed by Asia (4.6 million) and North America (3.2 million) (ibid.). Despite what the mainstream narrative portrays, the number of African migrants in Europe is one of the lowest. In 2019, only 12.9 per cent² of the international migrants in Europe were originally from Africa (ibid.).

These figures relate to regular migration. Data on irregular migration between African States is hard to find. To address the issue, the continent is making some efforts. In this respect, the Thirty-third African Union's Heads of States Summit in February 2020 adopted draft statutes of three continental institutions that enhance data and analysis of Africa's migration management. These include the following drafts: (a) Statute for the Establishment of African Centre for the Study and Research on Migration (Mali); (b) Statute for the Establishment of African Migration Observatory (Morocco); and (c) Statute for the Establishment of Continental Operational Centre in Sudan for Combating Irregular Migration (the Sudan).

The establishment of these institutions is timely since intra-African migration shows increase in number. Within a span of three years (2015–2018), the number of regular African migrants within Africa increased by 2.5 million. It is important to also have better information on irregular migrants and the institutions that can provide strong support in this respect. Among other things, it will offer African governments a holistic picture on the movements of Africans within Africa, so that they can develop appropriate policies. The ever-increasing number of migrants, together with the escalated number of forcibly displaced people in the continent that stand at 25.2 million, can be one reason that is leading to increasingly viewing migrants as a security concern.

¹ Migrants in South Africa consist of both migrants from Africa and those outside the continent.

² This constitutes 10.6 million of the 82 million international migrants.

SECURITIZATION OF INTRA-AFRICAN MIGRATION

The concept of securitization³ originated from the Copenhagen School of Security Studies.⁴ It argues that it is not only the military aspect that constitutes a security threat, but also societal, environmental, economic and political dimensions (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 2010). Further, it stated that security threats are socially constructed through framing an issue discursively. Providing justifications for extraordinary responses outside the normal bounds of political procedures (Behr, n.d.), policy implications of the securitized discourses is stronger.⁵

The securitization of migration is an extension of the concept of securitization and refers to the framing of migration as an existential security threat to a State or society (Buzan et al., 1998). This conception is increasingly limiting legal migration possibilities as governments respond by instituting more restrictive policies against migrants, as well as justifying greater surveillance, detention and deportation of migrants. This in turn has a negative impact on the security of migrants, by forcing them to use more dangerous routes as well as using migrant smugglers and human traffickers to whom they pay exorbitant fees to reach their intended destinations. Securitization of migration has also contributed to growing anti-migrant tendencies.

The fact that a migrant represents an outsider that comes from different context serves as a critical entry point for securitizing narratives such as “invasion” on society (Bigo, 2002). It also forms the basis for disproportional focus on fighting irregular migration, painting a picture that all migration is irregular.

Securitization of migration is practically demonstrated through enhancing border controls, tightening visa policies and population profiling, among others. In apparent reflection of this, some of Africa’s upper-middle-income countries tend to follow stricter visa rules towards African travellers. Fear of major influx of people from low-income countries and increased competitions for jobs between migrants and nationals are some of the reasons given for such stricter policies (Abebe, 2018). In some cases, these concerns have led to xenophobic tendencies that took the lives of migrants and destroyed their properties. These partly accounts for increasing securitization of migration that leads to restrictions of overall movement of Africans within Africa, which ultimately impacts the expansion of Africa’s free movement of persons agenda.

AFRICA’S FREE MOVEMENT AGENDA

The free movement of persons is a major component of Africa’s integration agenda. Promoting free movement of Africans within the continent is the fourth flagship project of Agenda 2063 (African Union, n.d.), which aspires to build an “integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens, representing a dynamic force in the international arena” (ibid.). Free movement of persons is also a pillar of the Organisation of African Unity’s Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community (Abuja Treaty).

³ This section of the chapter is drawn from the report by Abebe (2020).

⁴ In relation to this, the writings of Buzan et al. (1998) is quite important.

⁵ This recognition was made by the Paris School of thought based on Balzacq, 2010 quoted in Vermeulen, 2018.

The Abuja Treaty calls for the adoption of a protocol on the free movement of persons. Accordingly, the African Union adopted the Protocol Relating to the Free Movement of Persons, Right of Residence and Right of Establishment (African Union Free Movement Protocol) in 2018. The protocol enshrines the right of African nationals to move freely, reside, work, study or do business in any of the 55 member States of the African Union (Abebe, 2018).

In terms of implementing the free movement of persons agenda, some of the regional economic communities (RECs) have also gone far. In this respect, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and East African Community (EAC) have achieved significant reciprocal open visa policies between their respective member States. ECOWAS' is at 100 per cent, and EAC is at 90 per cent. Meanwhile, through other arrangements, such as under the Common Market for East and Southern Africa, Southern African Customs Union and bilateral arrangements with the Southern African Development Community, many African countries have reciprocal visa arrangements allowing for some degree of freedom of movement. In February 2020, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development has also endorsed the Protocol on Free Movement of Persons establishing four freedoms: (a) movement; (b) work; (c) business; and (d) residence (Maru, 2020).

All these led to a decrease in the number of African countries that require visas for African travellers, a third of African states follow liberal visa policies. However, still "Africans need visas to travel to 51 per cent of other African countries" (African Development Bank, 2018).

IMPACT OF SECURITIZATION OF INTRA-AFRICAN MIGRATION ON FREE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS AGENDA

The increased securitization of intra-African migration impacts the ratification of Africa's free movement of persons agenda. As of February 2020, the protocol was ratified only by four countries (Mali, the Niger, Rwanda and Sao Tome and Principe) out of the required 15 (African Union, 2019). This speaks volumes on the reluctance of African States in easing the existing difficulty of Africans to move within Africa. This is despite the relative success in implementation of free movement of persons arrangements through the RECs and/or bilateral arrangements (Maunganidze, 2017).

Different reasons are given for the increased securitization of migration within Africa that directly concerns the expansion of the free movement of persons agenda. The first reason is related to Africa's existing security environment, which remains fragile with a wide array of ongoing and emerging threats including non-State threats. Militia factions and armed gangs are ubiquitous in the continent's civil wars, fighting both for and against African governments. Threats emerging from terrorist groups, such as Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram and the Islamic State, are especially considered a major security concern.

In this respect, Al-Shabaab is active in the Horn and Eastern Africa, an epicentre region that consists of origin countries of migrants destined to the Middle East and Gulf (the eastern route); to countries in Southern Africa (southern route); and Europe (northern route). The region also hosts over 4 million of the 7.4 million

refugees of Africa and over 8 million of the 17.8 million internally displaced persons (Abebe, 2020). Similarly, a number of militant groups including Boko Haram are active in West Africa (including in the Lake Chad basin, the Sahel and Sahara), a region that has achieved one of the most successful free movement of persons regime (Gandhi, 2018).

Other major points of concern that hinder African member States from the implementation of the free movement of persons agenda are as follows: (a) porous borders; (b) absence of harmonized travel documents; (c) lack of policy harmonization by member States; (d) lack of capacity and appropriate infrastructure for border management; and (e) information paucity on the Protocol on Free Movement of Persons. These concerns have led to tendencies to securitizing border control between some African States. Examples include Algeria and Morocco. In 2014, Morocco has stated building a security fence on its shared border with Algeria with electronic sensors to stem the flow of human smuggling and prevent possible infiltration of terrorists. Similarly, Algeria completed building a trench along its border with Morocco to address illicit cross-border trading such as smuggling of fuel, dates and milk (Boukhars, 2019).

BENEFITS OF FREE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS OUTWEIGH SECURITY CONCERNS

Experiences of African countries that have implemented free movement regimes, such as Benin, Ghana, Mauritius, Rwanda and Seychelles, indicate no direct link with exposure to security threats. These countries have not faced serious security threats arising from their implementation of relaxed visa regimes. In fact, the border continental experience shows that benefits of free movement regime outweigh security threats.

First, expansion of free movement regimes can contribute towards labour mobility, skills and technology transfer among African citizens, since the protocol aims to facilitate free movement of professionals, students and trainees to gain relevant skills (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2019). In this respect, Rwanda's expanding technology sector continues to attract workers from the eastern and southern regions (IOM, 2019). Similarly, South Africa's economy, including the finance and information technology sector, together with the well-established mining sector continue to attract migrations mainly from the Southern Africa region (IOM, 2019). If the argument of the securitization was applied, Rwanda would not have a free visa regime due to the security concerns arising from across the border in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. Today, the border between Rubavu in Rwanda and Goma in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is the busiest border in the continent (KT Press, 2018).

Second, the promotion of free movement of persons in the continent can lead African countries to adopt a comprehensive approach to border management,⁶ which requires better political institutions and enforcement capacities. Particularly, this entails putting in place improved integration of border and security infrastructure, enhancement of the integrity of travel documents and embracing

⁶ George Mukundi, Chief Executive Officer of Maendeleo Group and former Head of the African Governance Architecture Secretariat of the African Union quoted in Abebe, 2018.

innovation and technology to manage borders and national security (Abebe, 2018). In 2014, Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda have launched a single tourist destination visa.⁷ These countries have put in place the required infrastructure including border and security, which led them to benefit from an effective borderless cooperation. So far, the countries have not been affected with greater security challenges.

Third, expansion of the free movement regime will also have direct relevance to better implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), which aims to establish a single continental market for goods and services (African Union, n.d.c). The AfCFTA Protocol was adopted in 2018 and entered into force in May 2019. The fast-paced move to implement AfCFTA confirms the greater political support it received across the continent. This is a good move since it can support Africa's development through enhancing trade. In 2016, only 18 per cent of Africa's total exports were intracontinental, compared to 59 and 69 per cent for intra-Asia and intra-Europe (Sow, 2018). In this regard, the experience of Chirundu, a one-stop border point established in 2009 between Zambia and Zimbabwe, provides a very good example. The border point has managed to facilitate the movement of people and goods while ensuring effective revenue collection and enhanced public security. It has also reduced border crossing time and facilitated better information, while sharing simplified trade regimes through the establishment of trade information desks at selected border areas (Chanda, 2018). So far, the border point has not faced security threats.

CONCLUSION

The expansion of the free movement of regime in Africa depends primarily on the political will of the African Union and its member States (Abebe, 2018). Despite the security challenges associated with free movement of persons, none of the challenges is insurmountable to justify the option of closing borders to genuine African travellers. Rather, the benefits of opening up borders to Africans outweigh negative security implications. To better implement Africa's free movement of persons agenda, the following policy recommendation points should be considered.

(a) Enhancing coordination to address transnational security threats

Transnational security threats are borderless; therefore, putting in place effective joint preventive mechanisms and systems is necessary. In this respect, African countries need to enhance coordination, cooperation and information-sharing in the common fight against transnational security threats, which minimizes security risks associated with free movement of persons. Linked with this, building strong migration management system is important, which includes putting in place effective civil registration systems and integrating border management systems. Similarly, all national intelligence and security services of African Union member States, including law enforcement agencies, the judiciary and immigration should be innovative and adapt to the complex contemporary security threats. Investment to advance information and communication technology and the training of highly skilled personnel should also be considered.

⁷ The East Africa Tourist Visa is a single-entry visa for foreigners visiting Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda.

(b) Shaping African citizens' perceptions of free movement

African Union member States should work on citizens' perception to embrace and appreciate the benefits of free movement through education, advocacy, sensitization and public awareness. Sensitizing their citizens on advantages relating to free movement of persons to promote migrants' acceptance and integration is especially critical. This can be done through adoption and implementation of policies that foster positive bonding between immigrants and the local population and promotion of social mobility for immigrants by improving labour market mobility, facilitating entrepreneurship, better skills training and encouraging access to education. This contributes to preventing social exclusion, xenophobic tendencies and overall securitization of migrants.

(c) Tracking progress of implementation

Tracking progress of implementation of the protocol will equally be crucial as called by the protocol. Thus, a systematic way of tracking implementation should be established to document best practices and challenges faced by member States. Cost-benefit analysis on free movement of persons should also be conducted, especially to convince reluctant member States to comply (Isaacs, 2015).

(d) Enhancing cooperation with partners

Different partners are already offering capacity-building support to African countries to enhance their migration governance. African countries should ensure that such support is at all times aligned with Africa's vision of continental integration and does not counter their agenda for free movement of persons and continental integration. In this respect, the European Union Trust Fund, for example, can be a critical vehicle to enhancing free movement of persons and AfCFTA in building a robust border management system that facilitate movement of persons. Experiences of partners such as the European Union can also provide important lessons towards implementation of Africa's free movement of persons agenda.

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A woman charging her phone using a solar lantern in Dollo Ado, Somali Regional State, Ethiopia.

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13

MAXIMIZING HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT
OUTCOMES OF LABOUR
MIGRATION IN AFRICA

CHAPTER 13

MAXIMIZING HUMAN DEVELOPMENT OUTCOMES OF LABOUR MIGRATION IN AFRICA

Authors: Marina Manke (IOM), Oumar Diop (AUC), Samia Kazi Aoul and Kenza Dimechkie (International Labour Organization (ILO))

ABSTRACT

The chapter examines labour migration in Africa in the context of human development and highlights the main labour migration trends, its governance and collaboration frameworks governing labour migration in Africa. The five thematic pillars for enhancing labour migration governance are discussed, highlighting the following: (a) coherence of existing policies and strengthened capacities; (b) bilateral and regional cooperation; (c) social protection; (d) quality and availability of labour migration data; and (e) skills development, matching and recognition. It is noted that though demand for highly skilled workers in sectors such as engineering drives migration across the continent, most migrants are concentrated in low-skilled occupations and sectors often characterized by poor working conditions and low wages. The chapter also cites that migrant women are more likely than migrant men to be in vulnerable forms of employment. In response to protection gaps affecting migrant domestic workers, several African countries have sought to conclude bilateral labour arrangements with major destination countries to better regulate labour migration flows. Poorly governed labour migration can increase irregular migration, perpetuate exploitation and governance challenges for countries of origin, transit and destination. The Protocol on Free Movement of Persons and of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) underscore the need for strong labour market institutions and governance with appropriate protection of the rights of migrant workers.

INTRODUCTION

The search for decent work and livelihood opportunities is a key driver of human mobility around the world, with 70 per cent of working age international migrants counted as migrant workers, according to the latest International Labour Organization (ILO) estimates (ILO, 2018a). On the African continent too, labour migration has grown in significance in terms of its complexity and scope. As a result, the governments, regional economic communities (RECs), the African Union Commission (AUC) and their partners attach great importance to designing effective governance systems and rights protection measures that help to enlarge migrants' opportunities and contribute to development. In that context,

this chapter presents the key issues related to labour migration and its governance in Africa and highlights the main labour migration trends and ongoing efforts and collaboration frameworks governing labour migration on the continent.


LABOUR MIGRATION IN AFRICA WITHIN THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT

Africa's youthful population and long-rooted history of human mobility, if properly harnessed, can create opportunities for boosting well-being and prosperity for migrants, their families and communities alike. The region has the world's fastest-growing population, which offers tremendous potential to fuel economic activity and growth by contributing to an estimated 10 to 15 per cent increase of the continent's gross GDP volume by 2030. Yet, this potential may remain underutilized if the creation of adequate quality jobs and investment opportunities does not catch up with the projected growth of the labour force.

Indeed, while the economic outlook for Africa is set to improve, with an estimated growth of 4.1 per cent in 2018 and 2019 (AfDB, 2018), this growth will still remain below the level needed to tackle Africa's current social and labour market challenges effectively. These include slow job growth and limited opportunities for formal employment, affecting young people and women in particular. Northern Africa has the highest youth unemployment rate in the world (29.3%) (ILO, 2016a), with women's unemployment rate there (19.8%) being more than double that of men (9.3%). In sub-Saharan Africa, job quality remains poor, with high levels of vulnerable employment (66%) and working poverty (around 30%) (ILO, 2016a, 2018b).¹

The insufficient quantity and quality of income-earning opportunities in home communities is a key driver for young African women and men's decision to migrate, both within Africa and towards other regions, where declining workforces, changing lifestyles and skills profiles suggest that migrant workers will continue to play an important role in filling labour shortages and contributing to social protection systems (van Panhuys et al., 2017).

Figure 1. Migrant workers as a proportion of all workers (%)



Source: ILO, 2018a.

¹ ILO defines vulnerable forms of employment as "own-account work and contributing family work" (2018b).

MIGRANT WORKER ESTIMATES, MIGRATION TRENDS AND DEMOGRAPHICS

Africa hosts an estimated 7.9 per cent of the global migrant workforce, much of which originates from within the region. While the numbers of migrant workers are increasing, they continue to represent a relatively small share of the African workforce (see Figure 1). Within sub-Saharan Africa, there are 11.9 million migrant workers, representing 2.9 per cent of its workforce. Northern Africa hosts 1.1 million migrant workers, representing just 1.6 per cent of its workforce (ILO, 2018a).

The African migrant workforce is young, with a median age of 31 years old, eight years below the global median (UNCTAD, 2018). This is due in large part to the young population and the high levels of youth unemployment in the region, which drive both intraregional and extraregional migration.

The numbers of African women migrating independently for work and education are rising (Jonsson, 2009). Currently, women account for an estimated 30 per cent of the stock of all migrant workers in Africa, reflecting the higher likelihood of women moving for other reasons (such as family reunification), as well as possible effects of discrimination and declining employment opportunities (ILO, 2018a).² The large numbers of migrant women engaged in informal, unpaid or underpaid work, including unpaid care and domestic labour, may also explain their lower representation in labour force statistics (ILO, 2016b).

EMPLOYMENT, WORKING CONDITIONS AND SKILLS PROFILES OF INTRA-AFRICAN MIGRANT WORKERS

Globally, migrant workers tend to have higher rates of labour force participation than non-migrants, although there are significant variations according to gender and subregion. In Northern Africa, women migrants have much higher rates of labour force participation than non-migrant women (33.0% compared to 21.7%), whereas the opposite is true in sub-Saharan Africa (47.3% compared to 65% for non-migrant women) (ILO, 2018a). At the country level, recent joint studies by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and ILO of immigrants' contributions to economies in Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Rwanda and South Africa found that immigrants are relatively well integrated into national labour markets (OECD/ILO, 2018). In both South Africa and Côte d'Ivoire, immigrants have higher labour force participation rates than native-born workers, and unemployment rates that are roughly half of those of native-born workers. In Ghana and Rwanda, however, migrant women fare less well than native-born women both in terms of labour force participation and unemployment rates. This could be partly due to the fact that females are more likely to migrate for family than for work reasons, and those who do seek to enter the labour market are more likely to suffer from discrimination as both women and immigrants.

² These figures reflect the stock of migrant workers, and thus do not capture potentially significant flows of women migrants who may migrate on a temporary or circular basis to engage in activities, such as cross-border trade and seasonal agricultural work.

Despite migrant workers' access to employment, they continue to face challenges in terms of the quality of employment. African migrant workers are concentrated in low-skilled occupations and sectors often characterized by poor working conditions, including seasonal agricultural work, construction, mining and domestic work. Studies from selected African countries suggest that, although migrant workers are more likely to be in wage employment than native-born workers, they still tend to suffer from wage penalties and poor working conditions (ibid.). For example, in South Africa, the wage gap between migrant and native-born workers in low and semi-skilled occupations ranges from 10 to 19 per cent (ibid.). There are also clear gender differentials in the quality of employment. In Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire and Rwanda, for instance, migrant women are much more likely than migrant men to be in vulnerable forms of employment.³

The increased global demand for domestic workers, as well as other forms of “care work”, including teachers, health workers and other home-based care workers – traditionally carried out by women – has expanded opportunities for African women to migrate for employment, while raising concerns over the quality of working and living conditions abroad. Outside of the region, demand for care workers in Gulf Cooperation Council and Middle Eastern countries has generated significant flows of women migrants, in particular from East Africa, and also from West Africa (ILO, 2013). Over the past five years, in response to protection gaps affecting migrant domestic workers in particular, several African countries, including Ethiopia, Ghana and Uganda, have sought to conclude bilateral labour arrangements with major destination countries to better regulate labour migration flows.

Demand for highly skilled workers in Africa in sectors, such as engineering, information technology, education, finance and management, is also driving migration across the continent. The share of migrants in highly skilled positions is relatively high in South Africa (25.2%), Zimbabwe (16.1%) and Ghana (9.4%). A significant portion of migrant workers originating from these same countries are also highly skilled, as are large shares of migrant workers from Senegal (11.9%) and Ethiopia (11.9%) (UNCTAD, 2018).

EXPLORING THE NEXUS BETWEEN LABOUR MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT

At individual or household level, opportunities for employment away from home help generate additional income for migrants and their families, often transferred back via either formal or informal channels. Migrant remittances are known to be used for improved diet, health care, education, housing and also entrepreneurship, helping to enhance human capital, reduce inequality and eradicate poverty.

At community or country level, in countries of destination, migrants can have either a neutral or positive impact on economic growth, productivity and employment. For instance, in South Africa, immigrants have no negative impact on labour market outcomes of native-born workers. On the contrary, recently arrived migrants helped increase native-born employment rates and monthly wages, as well as decrease their unemployment rates. In terms of productivity

³ “Vulnerable employment” is defined as being an own-account or contributing family worker (OECD/ILO, 2018).

in South Africa, the impact of immigration on GDP per capita was found to be positive too, with the estimates predicting that immigrant workers may raise income per capita by up to 5 per cent. In Côte d'Ivoire, immigrants' contribution to economic growth is higher than their percentage in the population (OECD/ILO, 2018).

When migrant workers are employed in the formal economy, their employment can have a positive effect on public finance through payment of taxes and contributions to social welfare systems. In South Africa, immigrants have a positive net impact on the Government's fiscal balance. Similarly, in Ghana, the contribution of immigrants to the Government's fiscal balance exceeds the contribution of the native-born population (on a per capita basis). In Côte d'Ivoire, where an estimated 10 per cent of workers are foreign-born, effects on the labour market and economy are found to be fairly neutral on balance. Immigration is not found to be associated with a loss of employment or loss of revenues for national workers (ibid.).

LABOUR MIGRATION GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA

The research cited above shows that migrants' contribution to the economy is directly linked to how well they are integrated into the destination country's societies and the labour market, both in terms of labour market participation and quality of jobs (ibid.),⁴ highlighting the need to prioritize the protection of the rights of migrant workers and prevention of all forms of discrimination and racism. In other words, labour migration is more likely to have a positive impact on countries of origin and destination, and on migrant workers themselves when appropriate policies are in place to facilitate migrant workers' integration and when equality of treatment between national and migrant workers is enforced, for example in terms of wages or access to social protection. On the contrary, poorly governed labour migration can increase the incidence of irregular migration and raise the risk of exploitation, presenting governance challenges for countries of origin, transit and destination.

Given the cross-cutting and complex nature of labour mobility, its governance should be pursued in a truly whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach in partnership among migration-related authorities, ministries of labour, employment and education and other labour market institutions at local, national and regional levels. In addition, practical solutions should be developed through collaboration with the private sector, civil society, social partners and migrant worker organizations.

To the effect of safe, orderly and regular labour migration, and in line with Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 10.7⁵ in particular, the African Union Assembly of Heads of States endorsed the AU-ILO-IOM-ECA Joint Programme on Labour Migration Governance for Development and Integration (known as the JLMP) aimed at strengthening continental-wide collaboration on the governance of labour migration in Africa. The beneficiary targets are migrant workers in and from Africa, as well as their origin and destination communities.

⁴ See also ILO, OECD and World Bank, 2015.

⁵ SDG 10.7 is to "facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through the implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies".

Figure 2. Core thematic focus areas of the Joint Labour Migration Programme in Africa



Note: Figure elaborated by the authors.

According to provisions in the JLMP, the African Labour Migration Advisory Committee (LMAC) was established as a tripartite structure to further enhance coordination and cooperation on labour migration on the continent, with the overarching goal to promote and protect the rights of migrant workers and members of their families. The LMAC membership includes representatives of all the RECs, the employers' and workers' organizations, women cross-borders' organizations, academia, diaspora organizations, the Pan-African Parliament, Economic, Social and Cultural Council, ILO, IOM and United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA). The LMAC roles and responsibilities cover facilitation of coordination and harmonization of actions aimed at protection of the rights of migrants, consultation with decision makers and non-State actors and monitoring of initiatives related to enhancement of labour migration systems and policies.

The following part highlights key areas of work of relevance to enhancing labour migration governance in Africa around five thematic pillars namely: (a) coherence of existing policies and strengthened capacities; (b) bilateral and regional cooperation; (c) social protection; (d) quality and availability of labour migration data; and (e) skills development, matching and recognition.

Pillar one – Enhancing coherence of existing policies and frameworks and strengthening capacities on labour migration governance at the continental level

Labour migration, and broader freedom of movement, has been in the development and integration agenda of African leaders for many decades (Olivier, 2018). It was explicitly envisaged in the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community (Abuja Treaty), which urged its member States to cooperate with a view to developing, planning and utilizing their human resources, adopting employment policies that allow the free movement of persons within the community. This involved harmonizing their employment, income, labour and social security policies, career guidance and counselling, and strengthening and establishing labour exchanges aimed at facilitating the employment of available skilled labour of one member State in another member State. Agenda 2063, adopted in 2015, advocates for the free movement of people as part of the continental integration agenda. In January 2018, the African Union Heads of States Summit adopted the Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, which contains specific provisions on how to speed up the operationalization of the free movement of workers along the right of residence and the right of establishment on the continent in the coming years. Guidelines were developed to assist stakeholders at all levels in implementing the labour migration-related provisions of the protocol. The Agreement Establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area was also adopted in March 2018 by the African Union Heads of States Extraordinary Summit in Kigali, and will boost labour migration as movement of goods, services and capital will be intensified.

The Migration Policy Framework for Africa (MPFA) – adopted by AUC member States in 2006 and updated in 2018 (AUC, 2018) – recognizes that labour migration has played an important role in filling labour needs in agriculture, construction and other sectors, thus contributing to the economic development of many African countries of destination. The MPFA requires that member States and RECs establish transparent, comprehensive and gender-responsive national labour migration policies, structures and legislation.

Trade unions play significant roles in workers' education on labour migration and have extensive cooperation with their sister organizations in Europe and Middle East. At the continental level, the African Trade Union Migration Network and the Organization of African Trade Union Unity monitor, report and respond to violation of the rights of workers, including migrant workers and members of their families. They intervene through engagement and contributions to policy development processes at national, subregional and international levels.

As a continental employers' organization, Business Africa participates in various policy dialogues and platforms on the continent and outside, particularly in Europe, with an overarching objective of helping to create decent jobs in Africa for African residents. It is also involved in intra-Africa migration processes for free movement of labour across Africa and is committed to uphold decent work principles for both national and migrant workers, including in the Africa–Middle East labour migration.

Pillar two – Bilateral and regional cooperation

Countries in Africa have gathered some experience in developing and implementing bilateral and multilateral labour mobility and social security arrangements, both within the continent, primarily for flows directly towards South Africa, and also outside of the continent. Further, RECs have started working on freedom of movement and labour mobility facilitation to a varied degree, with most significant advances made in Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), SADC and East African Community (EAC).

Regional cooperation in the area of labour mobility regulation is probably most advanced in ECOWAS, which has incorporated migration and migrants' rights protection into a number of regional instruments, as well as developed concrete progress on reducing procedural formalities related to visas or border crossing. ECOWAS has the oldest regional freedom of movement protocol (ECOWAS, 1979) on the continent, accompanied by several supplementary protocols, covering issues of employment and enterprise creation.

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) 2014 Labour Migration Policy Framework promotes intra-labour migration, regular migration and migration governance, such as fair recruitment practices and labour migration data. It has provisions for national policies in place by 2020. A number of SADC countries have since engaged in developing national labour migration policies, including Eswatini, Lesotho, Namibia, Seychelles and South Africa. EAC has also made significant progress on facilitating labour mobility and moving towards free movement.

Countries in Africa have made considerable advancements in recent years in enhancing coherence on labour migration governance. Labour migration issues have become part of migration-related policies and frameworks, and migration aspects are being included in employment policies and overall labour market instruments. Also, some African countries have developed stand-alone labour migration policies in recent years, including Eswatini, Ghana, Lesotho, Nigeria, Seychelles and Zimbabwe.

Despite these efforts, more work needs to be done to enhance capacities of relevant institutions and partners who are directly involved in developing and implementing policies regulating labour mobility, including governments, other labour market institutions and social partners.⁶ Strengthening labour market institutions is a key objective of JLMP.

Pillar three – Strengthening social protection

Migrants in Africa, as elsewhere in the world, face important challenges to accessing social protection benefits. This is partially due to legal restrictions pertaining to their particular circumstances (such as the length of their period of employment and residence, their nationality and migrant status) and also to more practical obstacles including the lack of information or contributory capacity and the complexity of administrative procedures (van Panhuys et al., 2017). ILO conventions

⁶ Based on the findings of an online "Assessment survey for identifying capacity-building needs of labour market institutions in the governance and management of labour migration" conducted within the AU-ILO-IOM-ECA Joint Labour Migration Programme, October 2018.

and recommendations⁷ recognize and address the specific challenges faced by migrant workers in accessing social security and call for increased coordination between countries through bilateral and multilateral social security agreements guaranteeing the portability of social security benefits. AUC, as well as RECs and in particular ECOWAS, SADC and EAC, have made this a priority. Within the JLMP framework, priority actions for extending social protection to migrant workers include fostering the implementation of the ECOWAS revised General Convention on Social Security (2013) and the SADC Portability of Accrued Social Security Benefits Policy Framework (2016), as well as disseminating information on migrant workers' social security rights. The JLMP will also seek to address the specific barriers to accessing social protection faced by migrant workers in the informal economy, which represent the bulk of migrant workers in the region.

Pillar four – Improving quality and availability of labour migration data

The quality and availability of labour migration data in Africa is one of the core strategic areas of intervention within the JLMP. The overall objective is to enhance collection of gender and age disaggregated data on migrants' economic activity, employment, skills, education, working conditions and social protection situations. At continental level, considerable progress has been made with the production of the first edition of the *Labour Migration Statistics Report* in 2017 (AUC, 2017), with the active participation of national statistics offices from 34 member States. Further steps on labour migration data enhancement include continued work on the quality and comparability of the statistical sources based on household surveys and censuses, and also piloting the collection of data using administrative sources. The Institute of the Pan African University of Yaoundé represents the academia in the African Union Labour Migration Advisory Committee and has responsibility of coordinating research programme on labour migration in support to the work of the committee. The establishment of the African Union Migration Observatory in Morocco and the Migration Research Centre in Mali are important steps that will help improve quality and comparability of data.

Pillar five – Addressing skills mismatch through skills development, matching and recognition

Migrant workers can potentially reduce skills mismatch by bringing in skills in short supply on local labour markets. However, the skills and qualifications of medium- to highly skilled migrant workers are often underutilized in jobs for which they are overqualified. Migrants can also face difficulties accessing training and education opportunities to develop relevant skills, making it difficult to move out of lower skilled positions. In origin countries, skills development systems are often underdeveloped or unresponsive to labour market needs, inciting youth to seek education, training and employment abroad (ILO, 2018c).

Governments in Africa have begun to prioritize skills development and recognition as a key strategy for enhanced productivity, economic competitiveness and growth. The Protocol on Free Movement of Persons reiterates the crucial feature of free movement of workers (Article 14), facilitated by permits or passes (Article 15), mutual recognition of academic, professional and technical

⁷ Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention, 1952 (No. 102), Equality of Treatment (Social Security) Convention, 1962 (No. 118), Maintenance of Social Security Rights Convention, 1982 (No. 157), Maintenance of Social Security Rights Recommendation, 1983 (No. 167) and Social Protection Floors Recommendation, 2012 (No. 202).

qualifications (Article 18) and portability of social benefits (Article 19). The 2014 Revised Convention on the Recognition of Studies, Certificates, Diplomas, Degrees and Other Academic Qualifications in Higher Education in African States (Addis Convention) is an important instrument that stipulates bodies and procedures in compliance with the agreement.

As an example of collaboration at the regional level, between 2011 to 2016, EAC member States signed mutual recognition agreements for four professions (accountants, architects, engineers and veterinarians) in the region to facilitate labour mobility of highly skilled workers (Werquin and Panzica, 2018.). In the SADC region, a Regional Qualifications Framework (SADCQF) was drafted, which provides a benchmark for member States to develop and align their national frameworks with regional descriptors and quality assurance guidelines.

In addition to skills development and recognition, governments and development cooperation partners have an important role to play in piloting and scaling up experience of skills mobility partnership that have been tested out in other parts of the world. The Skills Pillar of the JLMP envisages support to governments and countries in Africa with establishing such skills partnerships along a few migration corridors on the continent. This work will benefit from the recently set up Global Skills Partnership among three UN organizations – the ILO, IOM and United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, which was announced in December 2018 in Marrakech. Specifically, JLMP partners and other stakeholders will be assessing labour market dynamics in specific sectors and across a few clusters of origin and destination countries. The partners agree on some pilot work that will bring efforts across several institutions, such as training and educational institutions supporting migrants with pre-departure orientation, employer organizations sharing terms of reference for specific job profiles where skilled migrants might be in demand, ministries of labour and ministries of interior in destination countries working together in ensuring legality of employment in terms of employer–worker relationship and existing migration regimes, communities and local administrations back in countries of origin developing specific support programmes to capitalize on migrants’ skills and experiences upon return. Such skills partnerships have been piloted in South-East Asia, in the Asia-Pacific region, between some European countries and Northern African countries. This experience envisaged within the JLMP Priority Action will be further analysed and promoted for replication across the continent.

CONCLUSION

Labour migration and mobility on the African continent have always played, and will continue playing an important role as a poverty eradication and livelihood strategy, as a manifestation of growing ties between migrant networks, families and economies, and an important contributor to the continent's pathway to integration, prosperity and sustainable development. The continent has a young and growing labour force, and labour migration both reduces pressures on national labour markets and provides needed skills in growing economic sectors. The challenge remains to ensure that migration is a choice, and not a necessity, by creating decent work opportunities across the continent (ILO, n.d.).

The African countries' commitments to pan-African and regional approaches to migration governance have allowed for clear priorities to be established. There have been notable advances at the regional level, in particular on skills recognition, social protection and data collection. Continued efforts are needed to harmonize national-level policies with regional governance frameworks. The JLMP provides a unique opportunity to further improve collaboration among AUC, RECs, governments, labour market institutions and social partners. In the changing world of work, the modern challenges of informality and skills mismatches can only be solved through joint efforts of all partners working on migration, employment, education, and also economic development and other sectors.

Considering the impact of the Protocol on Free Movement of People and AfCFTA on migration and free movement of workers on the continent – with the impulsion of accelerated industrialization on the continent – member States, RECs and the African Union need to accelerate the implementation of existing policy frameworks and legal instruments (to which they have committed) supporting availability of skilled workforce throughout the continent with appropriate protection of the rights of migrant workers. Capacity-building of the labour institutions and all other relevant stakeholders, international cooperation including inter-RECs cooperation and communication on the benefits of labour migration are of paramount importance for their implementation. Social dialogue on labour immigration, pilot testing of skills partnerships and reliable comprehensive labour migration statistics will be helpful to align labour immigration with labour market needs and facilitate integration of migrant workers in host societies and countries.

Also, further research is needed to enrich knowledge about the significant economic contributions of labour migrants in the economy of countries of origin and destination.

By signing the common position on the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, the governments and partners in Africa have once again affirmed their readiness to work together in identifying policy and practical solutions to improve the situation of migrant workers, their families and also communities where they reside or come from. Next is the implementation of the Global Compact for Migration and related policy and legal instruments to maximize the benefits of labour migration while ensuring safe and orderly migration (SDG 10.7).

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IOM staff taking a sample at a Medical Health Assessment Centre.

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MIGRATION
AND HEALTH

CHAPTER 14

MIGRATION AND HEALTH

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ABSTRACT

The relationship between migration and health is explored, including resilience, vulnerability and social determinants of health throughout the migration cycle. The chapter maintains that migration health governance should include the control of communicable diseases, health security, universal health coverage (UHC) and migration-responsive systems, which are all critical to health security, public health and development. Goal 3 of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), African Union's Agenda 2063, Africa Health Strategy and the African Union Migration Policy Framework for Africa, World Health Assembly (WHA) Resolutions 61.17 and 70.15 are suggested as implementation frameworks. Great emphasis is placed on research and data, inclusive policy and legal frameworks, migration-sensitive health systems and partnerships. Furthermore, a case is made that international and regional human rights instruments recognize that everyone has the right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health irrespective of legal status, guarantee equality and embrace non-discrimination. These instruments therefore encompass and protect migrants, regardless of their status. It is nevertheless noted that African migrants face barriers in accessing services in already stretched health systems where migration health is considered through the lens of health security, and migrants are seen as vectors of disease. The chapter concludes that migration health is critical to effective migration management and must be embedded into health programming goals.

INTRODUCTION

When individuals migrate, they enter and pass through new environments that may have different health risks (Urquia and Gagnon, 2011). The World Health Organization (WHO) defines health as a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity. Migration health broadly refers to the health and well-being of migrants, their families and communities affected by migration, and the health impacts of human mobility.

This chapter explores key considerations related to migration health in Africa, and argues that its governance should include the control of communicable diseases, health security, UHC and migration-responsive systems, which are critical to public health and development, as well as health security. WHA Resolution 61.17 provides an implementation framework that can guide these efforts, with emphasis

on research and data, inclusive policy and legal frameworks, migration-sensitive health systems and partnerships.

This chapter begins by exploring the relationship between migration and health, including resilience and vulnerability throughout the migration cycle. It considers migrants' right to health at all stages and key migration health frameworks at global and continental levels, which lay the groundwork for effective incorporation of health in migration governance. Next, the chapter examines migration health in the African context, focusing particularly on communicable diseases, health security and UHC. Migration health action on the continent has focused on communicable disease prevention and control. The section aims to address the linkages and legitimate concerns, ultimately demonstrating that integration of migration health within routine health systems and migration management action is essential if the social determinants of migrant health are to be meaningfully addressed. Health systems that are migrant inclusive and migrant sensitive are critical to achieving UHC and global health security.

Investment in migration health – with the needs of migrants and communities incorporated into health service delivery, financing, policy, planning, implementation and evaluation – support efforts towards achieving UHC, which is essential for upholding the right to health for all and contributes to social and economic development.


BACKGROUND

Relationship between migration and health

Social determinants of health are the conditions in which people are born, grow up, live, work and age. These determinants – which cut across sectors, such as education, employment, social security and housing, and include the role of gender in society, literacy, income, availability of the public health system, living and working conditions and so on – are responsible for health inequities and the avoidable differences in health status within and between countries (WHO, 2008). Conditions and circumstances surrounding migration may pose risks or act as positive enablers to the physical, mental and social well-being of migrants.

Health determinants vary throughout the migration process (see Figure 1) and can aggregate health vulnerabilities for individual migrants as well as communities and societies. At the same time, social determinants of health can also support resilience – the ability to recover from shocks and overcome adversity – such as through support networks and access to services including health (Siriwardhana et al., 2018).

Figure 1. The social determinants of the health of migrants



Source: IOM, 2019.

Resilience and vulnerability throughout the migration cycle

Migrant categories and trajectories are diverse. Some migrants have better health outcomes than host communities, while migrants from areas of poverty, displaced persons, vulnerable groups (including people with pre-existing health conditions, unaccompanied or separated children, the elderly, disabled migrants and trafficked persons) and those with limited educational, job and linguistic skills, are at greater risk of adverse mental and physical health outcomes in the migration process (Mosca et al., 2012).

Moreover, migration is a gendered experience. While women are not necessarily vulnerable, the health impacts for women and men throughout migration depend on many factors: (a) type of migration; (b) policies and attitudes of countries of origin, transit and destination; and (c) gender relations within the household. During transit, women and girls – especially irregular migrants – are at particular risk of sexual harassment and abuse. Discriminatory policies can limit legal migration channels, relegating many women to vulnerable labour sectors or as dependents, increasing their vulnerability. Women are often restricted to traditionally “female” occupations – such as domestic work and sex work – as well as unstable jobs with low wages and poor conditions. Women also have needs relating to sexual and reproductive health and rights, but legal, cultural or language barriers may inhibit access to information and services (United Nations Population Fund and IOM, 2006).

Migrants' right to health

The WHO Constitution and international human rights treaties recognize the right to health of all persons, irrespective of legal status.¹ Most guarantee equality and embrace non-discrimination; accordingly, they encompass and protect migrants, regardless of their status. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) recognizes that everyone has the right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health. Regionally, the African Charter on Human and People's Rights recognizes that every person has the right to enjoy the best attainable state of physical and mental health.

Another particularly relevant treaty is the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (ICRMW), which guarantees all migrants the right to receive emergency medical care, and regular migrants social and health services on equal terms with nationals. However, ICRMW states that it shall not affect more favourable rights from other treaties. Therefore, States are bound by ICESCR to fulfil the right to health for all, without discrimination, and to not focus on emergency care only. However, some States have indicated that they cannot or will not provide the same level of protection to certain migrant groups as nationals (Wickramage et al., 2018).²

¹ The right to health implies that all the underlying preconditions that determine good health are met – that is, the social determinants of health, such as food, housing, safe water and adequate sanitation, safe working conditions and healthy environments. It also implies that health care is provided according to AAAQ standards – that is, it is available, acceptable, accessible (financially, physically and without discrimination) and good quality, as referenced in Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights General Comment No. 14 on the Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (2012). ICESCR recognizes resource constraints, but holds that States are obliged to take concrete steps to achieve progressive realization of the rights in the covenant, while guaranteeing that the rights will be exercised without discrimination on any grounds.

² Fifty (50) African States have ratified ICESCR, with one signatory; ICRMW has been ratified by 24 African States and signed by 7.

The right to health holds throughout the migration process: at entry, border policies and procedures should respect the dignity and human rights of migrants. While States have the power to control entry, they must do so in respect of international law and the International Health Regulations (WHO, 2005). The IHR aim to prevent, protect against, control and provide a public health response to the international transmission of diseases while limiting unnecessary restrictions on free movement. The only diseases justifying exclusion are public health emergencies of international concern with epidemic potential, as defined by IHR and determined by WHO. Once in a country, all migrants have the right to health care. In some cases, health grounds can be legal justification for regularization of undocumented migrants and prevent deportation (IOM, WHO and OHCHR, 2013).

Key migration health frameworks

Health is essential to safe, orderly, regular and humane migration, but it is often neglected in decision-making in migration governance. Migration policies often remain one dimensional, failing to address the social determinants of migrant health. Nevertheless, key global and continental frameworks increasingly signal commitment to address migration health as a global and public health issue (Wickramage and Annunziata, 2018).

Globally, the 2030 Agenda, premised on “leaving no one behind”, is anchored in the SDGs.³ To achieve SDG 3 on good health and well-being, migrant health needs must be addressed. Of particular note is Target 3.8, which focuses on UHC, and is thus intrinsically inclusive of migrants. Progress in other SDGs will enhance migrant health, including safe and secure working environments, cheaper remittances and safe and orderly migration. Progress in health is also critical to achieving the social, economic and environmental domains of sustainable development, and migrants face disproportionate health vulnerabilities in some contexts. Thus, addressing migrants’ health is a precondition for development (IOM, 2017).

The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, adopted in December 2018, is consistent with SDG Target 10.7, in which member States committed to cooperate internationally to facilitate safe, orderly and regular migration (IOM, 2018a). The Global Compact for Migration is a global framework expressing common goals in managing international migration. The Global Compact for Migration features health as a cross-cutting priority and encourages States to include migrants in policies and strategies. Further, WHA Resolution 61.17 on the health of migrants (2008) and WHA Resolution 70.15 on promoting the health of refugees and migrants (2017) call upon governments to promote migration health through inclusive policies, programmes and cooperation. The 2010 Global Consultation on Migrant Health resulted in an operational framework for implementation, based on the following key pillars: (a) monitoring migrant health through research and data; (b) inclusive policy and legal frameworks across sectors and borders; (c) migrant-sensitive and responsive health systems; and (d) partnerships and multi-country frameworks.

³ The 2030 Agenda was influenced by the Common African Position (CAP) on the Post-2015 Development Agenda, adopted by the African Union in 2014. The CAP articulates African consensus on development goals, including eradication of poverty, which, the document notes, is premised on empowering everyone, including displaced persons and other migrants, through inclusive growth and increased access to social protection. The CAP also expresses commitments to ensuring universal human rights without discrimination and universal and equitable access to health care (African Union, 2014).

At the continental level, the African Union's Agenda 2063 is a framework to achieve growth and sustainable development. Among the goals is healthy and well-nourished people, which calls for universal access to quality health services and recognizes the importance of addressing social determinants of health. The Africa Health Strategy 2016–2030 promotes well-being for all, and recognizes migrants including displaced persons as vulnerable groups. Among the guiding principles is that health is a human right for all, equity in accessing health services and addressing the social determinants of health. The African Union Migration Policy Framework for Africa (MPFA) aims to guide member States and regional economic communities in migration management and considers health a cross-cutting issue. MPFA highlights the need for evidence of the interconnections between migration and health to contribute to effective health strategies, and notes that xenophobia and marginalization compound vulnerabilities and conditions that hinder access to care. It calls for the development and implementation of inclusive policies, programmes and strategies, and including migrants in national systems.

MIGRATION AND HEALTH IN THE AFRICAN CONTEXT

Africa is characterized by large, complex and heterogeneous migratory flows, including labour migration, mixed and irregular migration, and displacement due to conflict, political instability and environmental disaster. The continent features acute, crisis-driven flows, and long-term structural flows, such as migrant workers and students.

Many countries in Africa have struggling health systems and high burdens of disease (WHO, 2018a), thus challenging health authorities in ensuring UHC. Migrants face barriers to accessing health services in already stretched health systems. Barriers include lack of affordable health insurance and social protection. While migration for labour, trade and education is promoted across many regions/subregional blocs in Africa for economic growth, development and poverty alleviation, there must be concomitant attention to ensuring social and health protections of migrants.

Additionally, Africa is predicted to be home to over half of expected global population growth between 2015 and 2050, and by 2050, nearly 60 per cent of the continent's population is expected to live in urban areas (UN DESA, 2017). Many move to urban areas in search for improved livelihoods or education, but live in informal, unsafe settings and experience social disruption, face employment insecurity and have poor access to services. Urbanization can increase vulnerabilities to conditions such as tuberculosis (TB) due to overcrowded housing, and non-communicable diseases due to changes in lifestyle (Vearey et al., 2019; Oni et al., 2016).

Global health security, communicable disease prevention and control and migration

Migration health is often considered through the lens of health security, where migrants are seen as vectors of disease. However, despite this common misperception and harmful stereotype, there is no systematic association between migration and infectious diseases in host populations (Abubakar et al., 2018; Aldridge et al., 2018).

COMMUNICABLE DISEASE AND MIGRATION IN THE AFRICAN CONTEXT

Communicable diseases are associated with socioeconomic determinants including poverty. Many migrants across Africa come from communities affected by conflict or economic crisis, and undertake long journeys that increase their vulnerability to ill health. At the same time, frequent mobility challenges access to prevention, testing and treatment services and continuity of care.

- Research on some migrant workers throughout Africa – particularly long-distance truck drivers, miners and fisherfolks – demonstrates heightened vulnerability to HIV/AIDS (e.g. Kissling et al., 2005; Morris and Ferguson, 2007; IOM, 2010). The locations most heavily affected by HIV are often linked with long-term mobility, adjacent to main transport routes or in border regions, although there is no epidemiological link between migration and HIV in the general population. These groups face increased vulnerability due to inequities, insufficient social protection, violations of human rights, stigmatization and discriminatory policies, as well as behaviour changes associated with mobility and their work, e.g. higher-risk behaviour due to long absences from home or dangerous working conditions (Mosca et al., 2012; Deane et al., 2010).
- Mapping has shown that population movement and malaria transmission are linked. For example, in Nairobi, Kenya, although there is limited or no local transmission of malaria, the disease is a common cause of morbidity, largely attributed to migration from higher endemicity areas such as Lake Victoria. Factors including infrastructure, deforestation and political instability result in movement to and from malaria-endemic areas. Other factors, particularly in border areas, include poverty, which can increase exposure through poor housing and clothing, limited prevention measures, high-risk work environments and inadequate access to care. Thus, understanding socioeconomic and environmental circumstances as well as population movement is essential for malaria control and elimination (Ward et al., 2013; Pindolia et al., 2014).
- With regards to TB, research on migrants moving from high- to low-incidence areas indicates that risk is elevated within migrant households and communities, but not host populations (Aldridge et al., 2016). Migrants often face higher exposure due to poor living conditions in overcrowded, poorly ventilated spaces and occupational risk (e.g. among migrant mineworkers in Southern Africa, nearly one third of TB infections are estimated to be linked to mining), as well as increased vulnerability to HIV and malnutrition, which are risk factors. Mobility and barriers to care can also delay diagnosis and treatment, and lack of continuous care can lead to treatment default. Default increases vulnerability to multidrug-resistant (MDR) TB, with increased morbidity and mortality and higher costs. Without timely diagnosis, treatment, contact tracing and cross-border continuity of care for migrants and communities, MDR-TB control will remain a challenge (IOM, 2012).

GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY IN THE AFRICAN CONTEXT

Health security – the efforts to prevent and mitigate the effects of public health events, usually infectious disease, that impact the health of populations living across borders – is a non-traditional security issue embraced by governments, particularly in light of the West Africa Ebola virus disease (EVD) outbreak (McInnes and Lee, 2006). The Ebola crisis has indeed put the spotlight on the importance of reducing the vulnerability of societies to infectious disease threats, which can easily spread across national borders. However, it is also true that the transmission of such diseases is strongly related to socioeconomic determinants including poverty. Migrants often come from communities affected by war, conflict or economic crisis and undertake long, exhausting journeys that increase their risks for diseases, which include communicable diseases.

In 2018, Africa faced multiple outbreaks of infectious disease with potential cross-border implications, including cholera and waterborne diseases in East, Horn, Southern and West Africa, and two outbreaks of EVD in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The first outbreak, declared on 8 May 2018 in Équateur Province, ended on 24 July, with 54 cases and 33 EVD-related deaths (WHO, 2018b). On 1 August 2018, an unrelated outbreak was declared in North Kivu, which saw more than 600 cases in 2018 and continued to accelerate into 2019. The Democratic Republic of the Congo's nine neighbouring countries⁴ undertook extensive efforts to support IHR capacity and preparedness in response to both EVD outbreaks, given risk from transportation and trade links and displacement.

Cross-border mobility could increase risk of international transmission of EVD; however, this mobility is largely through border communities in which international movements are part of daily life through small trade, family ties and so forth. Measures to inhibit international travel are neither advisable nor likely to be effective; rather, strengthened IHR capacity and strong health systems able to implement prevention, early detection and care for communicable and non-communicable diseases are necessary to protect public health (Heyman et al., 2015). Against this backdrop, despite the success of anti-immigration narratives, the risk for importation of infectious agents into the developed countries, such as Ebola, Marburg, Lassa and Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS) viruses, remains low. Experience has shown that, when importation occurs, it involves regular travellers, tourists or health-care workers rather than refugees or migrants.

Universal health coverage inclusive of migrants in the African context

UHC holds that all individuals receive needed health services – from health promotion to prevention, treatment, rehabilitation and palliative care – without financial hardship (WHO, 2019). Ensuring UHC is key to the best investment for a safer, fairer and healthier Africa. Nevertheless, migration is a critical determinant of health, and migrants in Africa often face inequalities in health status and care.

The last few years have seen a growing commitment to UHC around the world, with many African countries embarking on UHC-inspired health reforms (Wagstaff et al., 2016). However, recent analysis indicates that the WHO Africa

⁴ Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, the Congo, Rwanda, South Sudan, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia.

region is able to provide only 48 per cent of necessary health-related services, with substantial variation across countries (WHO, 2018a).

Health financing remains a critical challenge. With the 2001 Abuja Declaration, African countries committed to invest 15 per cent of their annual budget on health. However, very few have met and sustained this target. Additionally, in 2015, global estimates indicated that countries need to invest USD 86 per capita in essential health services and health systems strengthening. While several African countries, such as Algeria, Equatorial Guinea, Mauritius and Seychelles, have surpassed this level of spending, most have not yet achieved it (Mcintyre et al., 2017).

Moreover, vulnerable groups including migrants, particularly undocumented migrants, face barriers that undermine UHC, despite the fact that including migrants in health systems is generally cost-effective. Many countries recognize migrants or specific migrant groups as vulnerable populations in health-related strategies and policies. Migrants are reflected in regional and subregional initiatives, including the following: (a) Regional Migration and Health Strategy for Southwestern Islands of the Indian Ocean (2016–2018); (b) Southern African Development Community's (SADC) Declaration on Tuberculosis in the Mining Sector (2012); (c) Policy Framework for Population Mobility and Communicable Diseases in the SADC Region (2009); and (d) Regional Strategy on Integrated Health, HIV and AIDS Programming along East African Community Transport Corridors (2015–2020), among others. However, while WHA Resolution 61.17 and global and continental frameworks call for inclusive policy and legislation, national health-related frameworks vary throughout the continent, with some health laws and policies addressing health for all persons, and others limited in scope to nationals. To reach UHC, it is necessary to analyse relevant laws, policies and practices at the national level and address gaps (Onarheim et al., 2018).

The health workforce poses another challenge to achieving UHC, as well as health security. To achieve UHC, health system resources must be distributed to match population needs. Human resources for health – doctors, nurses and other health workers – are necessary to ensure health coverage aligned with availability, accessibility, accessibility and quality (AAAQ) criteria standards, that is, it is available, acceptable, accessible (financially, physically and without discrimination) and good quality (Campbell et al., 2013). Globally, more than 18 million additional personnel will be needed by 2030 to reach the SDGs and UHC. Africa has the lowest number of health workers per 1,000 population, although high-income countries have eight times the health workforce of low-income countries in Africa. Health workers are generally concentrated in urban areas, which undermines equitable access (WHO, 2018a). Despite the low concentration, many countries experience net outflow, with trained health personnel migrating internationally. While countries of origin can benefit from remittances and improved knowledge, technologies and skills gained by health workers abroad, it is important to create more conducive environments, with enhanced training and working conditions to ensure that service capacity supports UHC (Aluttis et al., 2014). Migration of health workers will nevertheless continue to increase. Global and continental tools, including the WHO Global Code of Practice on the International Recruitment of Health Personnel and African Regional Framework for the Implementation of the Global Strategy on Human Resources for Health, as well as WHA Resolution 61.17, provide a framework to promote good practices and prevent negative impacts of health worker migration (IOM, 2018b).

CONCLUSION

A shift towards equity and inclusiveness for migrants, and to “leave[ing] no one behind”, as member States committed to through the SDGs, is essential for promoting and improving the health of migrants and host communities, as well as overall public health. Excluding migrants from accessing health services is not only contrary to human rights law (Ammar, 2018) but also constitutes poor public health practice. Such exclusion not only increases their vulnerability to poor health but also exacerbates discrimination and health inequities. Restrictions on when migrants can access services and the types of services that they can access can place them beyond the reach of prevention programmes, impact their ability to prevent illness and obstruct their access to care in the early stages of illness when treatment is more likely to be cheaper and effective (IOM, 2016; Bauhoff and Göppfarth, 2018). The denial of migrant-sensitive, affordable and comprehensive health services for migrants poses a risk to public health, with possible negative health outcomes for both migrants and communities. Ultimately, higher health and economic costs are incurred directly by the migrant and the health systems, as well as indirectly by the wider society as a result of the disabilities and burdens resulting from illness. Lessons from past migration contexts show that restricting access to preventative health services and primary health care to migrants is counterproductive in terms of cost effectiveness due to the heightened cost associated with emergency care, as well as possible risks to public health (Bozorgmehr and Razum, 2015).

Nevertheless, migration health is often left behind in decisions around migration governance (Wickramage and Annunziata, 2018). However, the global health community and African governments must consider migration health as a critical component of effective migration management. Moreover, migration health must be embedded into health programming goals as an applied lens to ensure that mobility dimension is taken into account. This lens can be integrated within various agendas, such as the African urban health agenda, as well as trade and development. The needs of migrants and communities affected by migration should thus be incorporated into health service delivery, financing, policy, planning, implementation and evaluation (Siriwardhana et al., 2018). Investing in migration health will mitigate negative health impacts of migration, and ensure sustainable migration gains for Africa. To achieve this, technical capacities for migration health need to be built at the national and regional levels through intersectoral means. Experiences from other locations have shown that interministerial effort to advance migration health through evidence-based means can yield positive development trajectories and mitigate health risks (IOM, 2017).

To support people-centred, inclusive and responsive health systems that ensure migrants access quality health services, the implementation framework for WHA Resolution 61.17 serves as a guide. Improved research and data will support evidence-informed policy and practice, monitoring of migrant health, as well as efforts to address migration health. Policy and legal frameworks that mainstream migration and health and are aligned with international law, across sectors, are critically important. Both research and policy can support an enabling environment that addresses xenophobia, exclusion and harmful myths and stereotypes, which serve to undermine migrant health. Partnerships, dialogues and cooperation across sectors and borders can support these efforts, as well as health security (WHO and IOM, 2010, 2017).

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Ethiopian returnees from Djibouti playing table foosball at the IOM Transit Centre in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

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15

THE UNSEEN
VULNERABILITIES OF
UNACCOMPANIED AFRICAN
MIGRANT CHILDREN

CHAPTER 15

THE UNSEEN VULNERABILITIES OF UNACCOMPANIED AFRICAN MIGRANT CHILDREN

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ABSTRACT

This chapter describes the vulnerabilities and the traumatic situation of unaccompanied migrant children (UMCs) in Africa and explores the global and continental frameworks that provide response to, and should mitigate these vulnerabilities. Cross-border trade, family ties, conflict, insecurity, fear of persecution, human rights violations, seasonal labour opportunities, limited access to education and health services are identified as reasons why children including UMCs migrate or flee within Africa. Systematic and harmonized data on UMCs across Africa is not available, as movements of children within and between countries are underreported. The chapter notes that UMCs are susceptible to sexual abuse and exploitation, forced labour, detention, physical and gender-based violence. This is further aggravated by the brunt of xenophobia, statelessness and discrimination from the misperceptions that migrants are criminals and social and economic burden on receiving States. The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACERWC), Organisation of African Unity's (OAU) Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa and the Kampala Convention offer protection to UMCs in addition to international human rights, refugee and humanitarian law, but the chapter concludes that more remains to be done to bridge the gap between commitments and implementation of these frameworks. Governments need to adopt an all-inclusive approach to child protection regardless of nationality and status, harmonize data across the continent, and utilize existing forums to advocate for African UMCs.

INTRODUCTION

In today's world, there are more and more children migrating, including several who are undertaking the journey alone. In 2017, at least 300,000 unaccompanied and separated child migrants transited in 80 countries – a fivefold increase from five years earlier (UNICEF, 2017a). The figure of UMCs globally is likely much higher and now recognized as part of today's worldwide mixed migration flows.

According to article 2 of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACRWC), “a child means every human being below the age of 18 years”. Unaccompanied children, in turn, refer to persons under the age of 18 “who have been separated from both parents and other relatives and are not being cared for by an adult who, by law or custom, is responsible for doing so” (United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child, 2005:para. 7). To contextualize the response for UMCs in Africa, it is important to understand the role of the child in the African society. The African child plays an integral part in the well-being of their family and community, and is encouraged to contribute to household subsistence, particularly in rural societies (Hashim and Thorsen, 2011).

The reasons why children – including UMCs – migrate within Africa are multifaceted and contingent upon social, economic and cultural factors. Cross-border trade, family ties, conflict and seasonal labour opportunities are some of the factors that push children and/or their families to migrate. They flee because of fear of persecution, insecurity, human rights violations, lack of protection from violence, poverty and limited access to education and health services.

The challenges associated with travelling and resettling without a parent or trusted adult make UMCs one of the most vulnerable groups of persons on the move. Such children are easy prey to abusers, exploiters, smugglers and traffickers, making them vulnerable to sexual abuse, forced labour, detention, physical and gender-based violence (European Commission, 2017). Their situation is aggravated by the fact that children bear the brunt of xenophobia, statelessness and discrimination from the misperceptions that migrants are criminals and socioeconomic burden on receiving States (ACRWC, 2018).


This chapter focuses on the realities of UMCs in Africa and their challenges by region. It highlights the intra-Africa migration discourse on UMCs and their impact, with the goal of reinforcing the importance of regional perspective (cross-border cooperation). Further, it will provide recommendations to create specific dialogue on UMCs on a continental level with the goal of developing a protection sphere for UMCs in Africa.

SITUATION ANALYSIS OF UNACCOMPANIED MIGRANT CHILDREN IN AFRICA

According to UNICEF, 13.5 million children in Africa are displaced by poverty, conflict and climate change. These children, with or without their families, are likely to consider migrating to another location in search of livelihoods and other social support that allows them to access their basic needs. Existing research has showcased various migratory patterns in different regions in Africa. Children on the move that are of concern are those who are internally displaced, asylum seekers and refugees, migrants (moving for economic reasons or in response to climate change), as well as trafficked persons (ACERWC, 2018).

The data shows that about 75 per cent of the nearly 1 billion migrants globally move within the borders of their own countries. In addition, 3 per cent of Africans live in a country different from the one they were born, and only less than 1 per cent of the population of Africa has moved to Europe (Migration for Development, n.d.). Furthermore, the scale of circular migration within the African continent far exceeds that of international migration, with over 80 per cent of African refugees finding asylum in other African countries. In terms of child and young migrants, the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA, 2019) reported that 14 per cent of the total migrant population are child migrants, while 11.4 per cent were young migrants aged between 15 and 24 years old. Africa, Asia and Latin America continue to have the highest percentage of child migrants compared to other regions (see Figure 1).

Figure 1. Child and young migrants as a percentage of the migrant stocks by host region, 1990–2019



Source: UN DESA, 2019.

It is unclear what percentage comprised of UMCs, which showcases a limitation in terms of data and research highlighting the plight of UMCs in general, as well as within Africa. Nevertheless, the data collection on the movements of children within and between countries in Africa are commonly underreported, but there have been some small-scale studies highlighting some of the issues facing unaccompanied children as victims of human trafficking (van Reisen and Al-Qasim, 2017). The existing data is often patchy, as children are frequently hidden/invisible, in many cases due to the illegal nature of their migratory journeys. Hence, systematic and harmonized data on UMCs across Africa is not available, and therefore the full extent of the problem cannot be clearly quantified.

These studies revealed the anxiety and challenges associated with moving and relocating without a parent, guardian or other adult often triggers hopelessness and signs of post-traumatic stress disorder in children compared to other refugee and migrant groups (Sanchez-Cao et al., 2013; Vervliet et al., 2014; Oppedal and Idsoe, 2015).

Separation from families and networks creates hardships and stressors and expose UMCs to violence both in their country of origin and transit countries. In destination countries, UMCs face additional stressors linked to resettlement, including obstacles to education, increased segregation, as well as distrust, misunderstanding and failure to benefit fully from available protection systems. Those in transit face the risk of detention, which is a growing concern among children on the move, especially UMCs. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported on its global strategy to end detention that lack of data and information, misconceptions concerning detention and the use of detention as a deterrent for countries hinder any policy processes focused on providing alternatives to detention (UNHCR, 2014).

The limited research and data on this critical issue, especially within the case of Africa, illustrates a need to investigate the problem in different regions to map out migratory routes and document experiences of unaccompanied minors in order to identify policy relevant issues for regional economic communities (RECs) and nation States to address.

MOVEMENTS OF UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN WITHIN AFRICA: RISKS AND VULNERABILITY

There are four main migratory routes in Africa with different migration profiles. These are the northern, western, eastern and northern routes, which are comprised of different migrant groups including UMCs. The eastern route consist of movements from the Horn of Africa extending to Yemen and Saudi Arabia. The insecurity in Yemen due to the civil conflict in the country heightens the risks faced by all migrants in general, including children. The number of children on the move including UMCs are unknown in this route. Migrants from East and Horn of Africa also move north to Europe via Mediterranean Sea through and/or into the other parts of Africa to the west (UNICEF and IOM, 2017). In 2016, IOM reported 100,000 children on the move bound for Europe, with one third consisting of UMCs (ACERWC, 2018).

The southern route is dominated by migrants mostly from East and Horn of Africa bound for South Africa via the United Republic of Tanzania, Malawi and Mozambique by sea and land. This route is dominated by mostly Ethiopian and Somali migrants. Cases of UMCs have been identified in Zambia; however, the number of migrants moving to the south is less compared to those moving north. However, there is a need to further investigate this route to understand its nature, the populations on the move, as well as any protection issues among others that need to be addressed.

The northern and Sinai routes are also frequented by migrants from the East and Horn of Africa via the Sudan and Egypt bound for Israel. Since 2012, the movements through this route has reduced due to restrictive measures taken up at the Sinai–Israel border, as well as the risk of being kidnapped or trafficked along the route (ACERWC, 2018). Western and Central African routes for migrants bound for North Africa via the Niger use old trade routes from Ndjamena to Timbuktu. The population on the move have mixed migration profiles, both voluntary and involuntary. Data on this route shows an increasing number of UMCs on the move especially in the Niger from Burkina Faso, the Gambia, Nigeria, Mali, Guinea-Bissau and Côte d'Ivoire (ibid.).

Across these routes, the most vulnerable migrant groups are children under 5 (6%), pregnant and lactating women (4%) and the elderly (4%), with UMCs (3%) and persons with physical disability (2%) of the total population. Mixed migratory flows along these routes are witnessing an increase in the number of UMCs, with the total number of children migrating accounting for 31 per cent of migration in Africa. For example, a 2016 survey of women and child migrants in Libya reported 256,000 migrants – including 23,102 children – a third of whom were unaccompanied, even though the real figures are believed to be at least three times higher (UNICEF, 2017b).

Children and/or their families do not move in a hit-or-miss fashion (IOM, 2013). In cases other than forced displacement, their journey is usually backed by a period of planning and decision-making, either freely or wished-for and conveyed by the child's parents (ibid.). The choice of a specific route and destination are commonly influenced by their migration objectives, drivers and perception of opportunities in destination countries (ibid.; Sambo and Terenzio, 2013). Children oftentimes resort to dangerous routes and engage smugglers to help them cross borders, as they find very limited opportunities to move legally (UNICEF, 2017a).

There are several issues faced by both accompanied and unaccompanied migrant children as a voluntary and involuntary migrant. There are protection issues (ibid.) that children on the move face. They lack regular access to water, food and health services throughout their journey.

Furthermore, the movement is distressing, as migrants in general are at risk of being mugged, arrested, raped, kidnapped and/or killed (ibid.). This raises several security concerns provided for UMCs and their vulnerabilities, especially for undocumented young boys who could be treated as adults. In this case, they are detained and deprived of services and legal due process tailored for children.

A growing concern raised by non-governmental and civil society organizations is the detention of children. Cases of unaccompanied children are more common among those experiencing displacement. In the process of seeking asylum, children find themselves experiencing several risks as mentioned earlier including detention. Detention is harmful to children's health and well-being and can undermine their development, which makes alternatives to detention an important priority in the response to UMCs on the continent.

As a result, global, continental and regional actors have been discussing strategies and developing guiding principles for countries to adopt to address issues of children on the move, which also includes UMCs. These are guided by existing evidence across the globe on children on the move; however, it recognizes the importance of context and the realities in different regions and countries.

GLOBAL, CONTINENTAL AND REGIONAL FRAMEWORKS ON UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN

The issue of UMCs continues to be addressed at global, regional and inter-State consultation mechanisms on migration, through global and continental frameworks, regional migration dialogues and country-level action. At the international level, UMCs are protected by international migration law, specifically but not exclusively, through the CRC and ACRWC. These two instruments are complemented by the International Human Rights Law, International Refugee Law and International Humanitarian Law that have included clauses on the protection of UMCs.

All African countries are signatories to the CRC (United Nations, 1989), and 49 of the 55 African Union member States have ratified the ACRWC. Both CRC and ACRWC include provisions for the protection and assistance to unaccompanied and accompanied refugee and internally displaced persons (IDP) migrant children in the continent.¹ Furthermore, 46 African Union member States, under the African Commission on Human and People's Rights (ACHPR, n.d) have ratified OAU's Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (African Union, 2019) that sets obligations for the protection and assistance of all refugees and asylum seekers. The 2009 Convention on the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention), which was signed by 40 States and ratified by 31 as of March 2020 (African Union, 2020), also obliges State Parties to protect children from recruitment and provide special protection and assistance to separated and unaccompanied IDP children (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2017).

In addition to frameworks on refugees and IDPs, there are several continental and subregional frameworks in Africa that promote the adoption of international instruments and establishment of appropriate national legislations pertinent to tackling irregular migration among member States. These instruments, aside from promoting regional and subregional collaborative efforts to combat human

¹ Article 23 specifically call State parties to the charter "to take all appropriate measures to ensure that a child who is seeking refugee status or who is considered a refugee in accordance with applicable international or domestic law shall, whether unaccompanied or accompanied by parents, legal guardians or close relatives, receive appropriate protection and humanitarian assistance in the enjoyment of the rights set out in this Charter and other international human rights and humanitarian instruments to which the States are parties". The charter extends such protection to internally displaced children (see article 23 of OAU, 1990).

trafficking and migrant smuggling, encourage member States to safeguard and assist the needs of vulnerable groups, such as women and children. In the Migration Policy Framework for Africa and Plan of Action (2018–2030), one of the recommendations for States is to address the special needs of vulnerable categories of smuggled migrants, including pregnant women, women with children and unaccompanied minors. In terms of subregional instruments, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Migration Policy Framework recommends its member States to strengthen its national policies on migrant smuggling, as well as focus its attention on discouragement and eventual elimination of child smuggling. Moreover, there are joint African Union–European Union instruments such as the Joint Africa–European Union Declaration on Migration and Development, which encourages cooperation in all domains in the fight against illegal or irregular migration and enhancement of efforts to criminalize trafficking and smuggling in national legislation.

Moreover, the African Union's Ouagadougou Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings, Especially Women and Children (adopted by the Ministerial Conference on Migration and Development in Tripoli on 22–23 November 2006) requires African Union member States to adopt necessary legislative and policy frameworks to combat human trafficking in line with international standards, and provide victim protection and assistance mechanisms. The action plan is currently being revised based on feedback from member States regarding challenges in implementation and existing gaps.

On 19 September 2016, the United Nations General Assembly held a high-level meeting on addressing large movements of refugees and migrants, at which the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants was adopted. In the declaration, member States reaffirmed the need to protect the human rights of all refugees and migrants, regardless of their status, including women at risk and children, especially those who are unaccompanied or separated from their families (IOM, 2017).

Recently, the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration² promotes a child-sensitive approach based on “existing international legal obligations in relation to the rights of the child, and upholds the principle of the best interests of the child at all times, as a primary consideration in all situations concerning children in the context of international migration, including unaccompanied and separated children”. Moreover, the Global Compact on Refugees highlights the specific needs of children throughout the document (United Nations, 2018).

In terms of addressing children in detention, there have been a number of responses by international and local agencies in different countries in an effort to end child detention. The international and continental convention addressing detention of immigrant include the following:

- International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966;
- Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention), 1951;
- Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989;
- International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 1969;

² Adopted in Marrakech, Morocco, in 2018.

- Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 1984;
- International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (Migrant Workers Convention), 1990;
- Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture, 2002;
- African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, 1981; and
- Arab Charter on Human Rights (Revised), 2004.

IOM has also developed determinants of migrant vulnerability (DoV) model (Figure 2) as a new approach for analysing and responding to migrant vulnerabilities. It examines vulnerability factors at four levels: individual, household, community and structural (IOM, 2018). Each factor can create risk or protection. Vulnerability is seen as a scale, from very vulnerable to not vulnerable, based on the unique interactions of these risks and protective factors at the different levels (ibid.).

Figure 2. Models for determining vulnerability



Source: IOM, 2019.

The framework complements UNICEF's best interests determination (BID) process, whereby a decision maker is required to weigh and balance all the relevant factors of a particular case, giving appropriate weight to the rights and obligations recognized in CRC and other human rights instruments, so that a comprehensive decision can be made that best protects the rights of children. Institutionalizing the DoV model and BID process to ensure due process for UMCs in Africa will help States better understand the specific gaps in current protection services and policies.

As such, there have been several processes and procedures that have been put in place to address some of the vulnerabilities experienced by unaccompanied children. Therefore, it is evident that while there are comprehensive policies and legislative frameworks that exist internationally and on the continent, there is a need for countries to address the issues faced by UMCs through a cross-border lens with the goal of achieving a comprehensive programme that addresses the extreme vulnerabilities of UMCs.

REGIONAL MIGRATION DIALOGUES IN AFRICA ON UNACCOMPANIED MIGRANT CHILDREN

RECs³ across Africa have been instrumental in exploring ways to address migration as a thematic issue. Guided by international and continental frameworks, they have been taking stock of their regional migration realities and exploring strategies of addressing issues related to UMCs. In the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), member States adopted a set of common standards to better protect and care for children on the move. This promotes regional and cross-border case management and standardized services, including assistance, referral, BID and return. The Intergovernmental Authority for Development and East African Community are in the process of developing a regional framework.

Each REC has also established regional cooperation and coordination mechanisms that could be leveraged as a platform to address the needs of UMCs. These include dialogues and initiatives that focus on migration and address the issue of irregular and mixed migration. These are as follows:

- (a) Migration Dialogue for Central African States;
- (b) Migration Dialogue for Southern Africa (MIDSA);
- (c) Migration Dialogue for West Africa;
- (d) Migration Dialogue from the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa Member States; and
- (e) African Union-Horn of Africa Initiative on Human Trafficking and Smuggling of Migrants.

Due to the specific focus on migration, these dialogue platforms allow key stakeholders to take stock of the reality of migration issues, including approaches and strategies to addressing the concerns associated with UMCs. For instance, MIDSA in 2016 specifically discussed protection needs of UMCs where member States advocated of the development of a regional framework targeted at protecting vulnerable migrants with a special focus on UMCs. In addition, there is a need to continue dialoguing on the realities of UMCs especially in terms of establishing cooperation with other stakeholders including private sector.

³ IGAD, ECOWAS, SADC, COMESA, EAC, UMA, CEN-SAD and ECCAS.

COUNTRY-LEVEL RESPONSE AND PROGRAMMING RECOMMENDATIONS

Some African States, such as Djibouti, Lesotho and Uganda, have adopted national laws that prohibit the detention of refugees and asylum seekers including children. A partial presumption against detention also exists in Angola, Botswana, Malawi, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe (International Detention Coalition, 2018). Ethiopia and Uganda have legislation with articles covering all children on their territory and do not discriminate based on nationality, legal status (Republic of Uganda, 2016), age and gender.

The major challenge on the continent is the consistent application of these frameworks at the national and intercountry levels. The legislations and programmes intended to safeguard UMCs usually lack efficacy in enforcement and implementation, and many States prioritize migration issues from the standpoint of national and border security rather than the protection of human rights and UMCs.⁴ Regional and intercountry cooperation remains a challenge due to limited institutional capacity and resources and inadequate political commitment (Marchand et al., 2017; *ibid.*).

There are specific programmatic recommendations that member States can adopt to improve their responses to the needs of UMCs. These include the strengthening of migrant data systems, particularly in identifying and tracking the movements and needs of vulnerable populations including unaccompanied children. This would require building the capacity of States in data collection, management and analysis. As significant gaps in reporting on UMCs still exists, it would also be important to ensure that the collected data is publicized and made accessible to other countries. Regular research activities should be conducted with a focus on UMCs' issues in the continent that can be backed up by more reliable and consistent evidence and more rigorous analysis.

The results of the data and evidence can lead to the introduction of a holistic system that provides protection and assistance to UMCs along migration routes, and arrange more regular options for movement to reduce UMCs' reliance on smugglers and their risk of becoming victims of trafficking. The efforts to control and end smuggling and trafficking also necessitates improved border management and fighting corruption among officials. There should also be efforts to incorporate child-friendly immigration staff, such as social workers, guardians, educators, legal representatives and any other person who have been specifically trained to treat children and in the rights of the child. On this note, developing case management systems linked to DoV and BID approaches would be beneficial.

Furthermore, there should be an effective and efficient effort to change the adverse perceptions of migration, thereby ending the criminalization of migrants as the detention of UMCs is a serious human rights violation in accordance with article 37 of the CRC. Strengthening the capacities of key stakeholders through initiatives that can be made more effective, efficient and sustainable in dealing with migration management should be ensured. International and national organizations have

⁴ It is important to note that as per article 37 of CRC, the detention of UMCs is a serious human rights violation.

inaugurated to build capacity and support migrants of different types, including UMCs, either directly or indirectly. In this regard, the role of the international community should be emphasized.

These and other additional recommendations on improving services should be based on existing national and regional structures and mechanisms for child protection. There are a number of studies, including the African Union's ACERWC report (2018) on *Mapping Children on the Move within Africa*, that provides a framework and justification for the need to develop a protection sphere for UMCs and guide RECs and member States to strengthen their approaches in addressing the concerns associated with UMCs.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, UMCs moving voluntarily and involuntarily face several challenges that are still yet to be understood and documented sufficiently by region and at a country level. The realities experienced by UMCs are very pertinent and the significant lack of evidence and data available makes it difficult to formulate strategies to resolve these challenges and limitations. While a robust framework for dealing with UMCs exists on the continent, a lot more remains to be done to bridge the gap between commitments and implementation across the continent.

Moving forward to address these challenges faced by UMCs and fill the gaps in policy and practice, the key priorities should focus on supporting governments to adopt an all-inclusive approach to child protection regardless of nationality and status, harmonized data across the continent, and utilization of existing inter- and intraregional forums to advocate for African UMCs.

ANNEX

Article 23 of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child

Article 23 is the most relevant provision addressing the plights of refugee and internally displaced children in Africa. It provides for the obligation of State parties to the charter, which is to take all appropriate measures to protect children seeking refugee status (or who are considered refugees) and ensure that such children receive appropriate humanitarian assistance in the enjoyment of the rights set out in the charter and other international and humanitarian instruments that the concerned State is a party to. State Parties are expected to ensure that such children enjoy the rights provided in the charter whether unaccompanied or accompanied by parents, legal guardians or close relatives. The provision makes it clear that children who are seeking refugee status or who are considered refugees have equal rights with other children in the country to enjoy all the rights in the charter.

Furthermore, it is stipulated that State parties have an obligation to cooperate with existing international organizations that protect and assist refugees in their efforts to protect and assist such a child, as well as trace the parents or other close relatives of an unaccompanied refugee child to obtain information necessary for reunification with the family. In a situation where no parents, legal guardians or close relatives can be found, it is provided that the child should be accorded the same protection as any other child permanently or temporarily deprived of one's family environment for any reason.

A salient aspect of the provision is that it extends the protection afforded to asylum seeking and refugee children to internally displaced children, whether through natural disaster, internal armed conflicts, civil strife, breakdown of economic and social order or howsoever caused. This is owing to the high rate of internal displacement in Africa affecting children and to address their plights accordingly.

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“The way we perceive and project migration tangibly shapes and communicates our convictions about the contribution that migration as a global phenomenon can make towards Africa’s identity. In my artwork, I am trying to correlate the African migration paradigm within the migration culture of the bird. The bird is free to travel the world yet always remains drawn towards the sounds of the motherland.”

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16

MIGRATION FUTURES
FOR AFRICA

CHAPTER 16

MIGRATION FUTURES FOR AFRICA

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ABSTRACT

The drivers for future migration in Africa are examined in this chapter using future studies/scenario-building methodology to develop three explorative scenarios for the future of Africa by 2050. First, “empowered Africa” illustrates a future where Africa uses technology and networking to overcome barriers and create new opportunities. This scenario suggests that the Free Movement Protocol will drive economic growth, as improved mobility and opportunities will lessen the drive and desire to migrate outside the continent, and with policies to attract African foreign-born and foreign-trained talents to return. Second, “slowdown in the West” proposes that developed countries are fading and closing in on themselves, severely limiting prospects for Africa. In this scenario, migration of highly educated Africans will be to Asia, but insignificant compared to internal movements. The slowdown of the West is expected to lead to a large-scale return from the previous African diaspora. Third, “the African way” submits that African countries have chosen a uniquely African path that mixes cutting-edge technology with traditional African culture. In this scenario, Africa becomes a key migration destination with many Western migrants relocating to Africa either to access large growing markets and take advantage of low production cost, or elderly Westerners relocating for their golden years due to low living costs and improved quality of life. The authors conclude that the African way offers opportunity for Africa to become a migration and investment destination to the rest of the world.

INTRODUCTION

Migration is a response to development¹ contexts and prospects in any society; it moves from low to high development outlooks. It is a natural way of responding to economic and development dynamics in societies. The ageing population in most parts of the world as opposed to youthful demography in Africa is another driver of global migration. If well-harnessed, it can boost development as a source of investment (such as remittances), a driver of human capital formation (such as through exposure to skills unavailable in origin countries) and a major source

¹ This refers to economic, social, environmental and political aspects of development that drive movement of people both within and between countries.

of institutional change associated with diaspora externalities. If not effectively leveraged, however, it could be a drag on development, for instance as a cause of brain drain, a source of tension in host communities and an incitement to the violation of migrant rights. Migration is therefore a double-edged sword that requires thoughtful and collaborative efforts for it to lead to win-win development outcomes for both host and originating countries.

Accordingly, Africa's future development outlook will play a major role in shaping the migration of its people within and outside the continent. The key question is what will be Africa's development outlook in 2050? This chapter examines three possible future development pathways and the associated migration trends for Africa. To describe migration futures for Africa in this chapter, the United Nations' definition of migration and migrants, according to the 1998 revision of the definition of migrants, is used. This definition classifies migrants "as people who change their country of usual residence, irrespective of the reason for migration or legal status, for either temporary or permanent residence". This definition is particularly useful for this chapter since the scenarios do not carry the capacity to deeply explore the economic, political and social complexities of relocation, but instead apply the presented drivers as possible triggers for migration futures for Africa circa 2050.

The future of Africa and African migration will depend on several not-always predictable factors. Some are internal to Africa and mainly depend on developments within the continent, while others are external with Africa having little or no influence on migration. These megatrends driving African migration future are categorized into five broad categories: (a) knowledge growth; (b) economic growth; (c) empowerment; (d) globalization; and (e) anthropogenic change. The main elements and drivers of each megatrend are summarized in Annex 1 – detailing broad, pervasive, long-term trends that affect most of the world and almost all spheres of society – with suggestions on how each megatrend may affect African migration futures.

It is important to note that Africa is far from homogeneous, and different parts of Africa will likely find different paths towards 2050 in each of the individual scenarios. However, due to constraints of space, it is not possible to explore such differences in detail, and hence the scenarios reflect the most important common denominators for Africa in the portrayed futures.

SCENARIOS FOR AFRICAN MIGRATION

The future is not set in stone, so in discussing migration futures for Africa, several very different scenarios that illustrate a range of possible futures and can provide inspiration for leaders and decision makers are considered. Three such scenarios based on an analysis of the factors that drive migration and Africa's future overall are produced. In the scenarios, developments towards 2050 are looked at – far enough into the future to show substantial changes compared with today, yet close enough to the present to be relevant and recognizable.

It is believed that the way some broader developments (see megatrends table) play out and the degree to which they affect each other revolve around a range of critical uncertainties.

- (a) Will technology create increased prosperity for all or further divide nations and societies by increasing inequality and polarization?
- (b) Will automation ultimately benefit Africa due to increases in productivity, not outweighed by job losses associated with automation?
- (c) Will Africa miss out on the advantage of being a low-wage region because it is cheaper to automate production in the developed world or even within Africa?
- (d) Will the developed world remove trade barriers, allow market access, promote documented migration, eliminate illicit financial flows and reduce the debt burden on Africa?
- (e) Will Africa strive to become culturally more like the Western world or rather develop a future with a stronger, more local identity?
- (f) Will oil and gas resources remain an important economic factor by 2050, or will the transition to renewable energy be largely complete by then?

While such questions may not directly affect the future of migration, they may well impact migration indirectly, and hence can be considered explicitly or implicitly in the scenarios below.

Three balanced, neutral futures for Africa in the scenarios are chosen, but it should be noted that Africa must overcome significant challenges in order to flourish over the next three decades. A dark future scenario can be easily painted where Africa suffers from effects of climate change and overpopulation and fails to find the stability, unity and cooperation needed to address these issues. However, such grim scenarios are only useful as warnings and could run the risk of leading to fatalism, while more balanced scenarios may inspire and call for motivated action and collaboration. A business-as-usual scenario is also not provided, since it is highly unrealistic to imagine a business-as-usual case over a 30-year time frame.

The scenarios are created through the futurist method called “backcasting”, by which focused plausible future visions are first created for Africa and the paths that could lead to them are subsequently examined. In other words, rather than looking from the present towards the future, we look from the future back to the present. The scenarios explore the interplay of external factors and the policies that are adopted to address them.

It is important to stress once more that it is oversimplified to consider Africa as a homogeneous continent. Africa is a huge continent and home to many different nations and cultural traditions, economic strengths and weaknesses, and current levels and speeds of development. While the scenarios below illustrate the overall paths that Africa may take towards the middle of this century, individual countries and even regions will likely, for various reasons, follow different trajectories.

SCENARIO 1 – EMPOWERED AFRICA

Main drivers

By 2050, Africa has embraced the tradition of “leapfrogging”, thereby avoiding the bottlenecks and challenges associated with the first and second industrial revolutions and creating a comparative advantage against developed countries, where legacy infrastructure reduces the urgency and agility in introducing solutions based on new technology. This has been key to creating sustainable jobs for African youth (under 30) who have a population share of over 60 per cent. Personal electronic devices, Internet access and grass-roots networks are important aspects of this future, as is effective governance creating a strong framework for extensive local empowerment. Significant advances have been achieved in gender equality in many countries, allowing an increasing number of women to contribute more to the society and economic growth while also exercising greater control over family decisions. Most important, perhaps, is a general sense of optimism and hope due to concrete cross-African initiatives and collaboration.

Almost everyone has access to the global Internet through high-speed, wireless telephone connections, stratospheric Internet balloons (like Google’s Project Loon) (Project Loon, n.d.) and satellite networks (like SpaceX Starlink (Daniels, 2018)). This provides access to information and educational opportunities through automated interactive programs powered by artificial intelligence (AI), to virtual marketplaces and collaboration spaces, to news and culture, and to satellite data about weather, agricultural progress, wildlife, traffic and much more. Powerful real-time translation software removes language barriers, allowing access to information written or spoken in almost any language. This wealth of connectivity and information, in addition to the expanding physical infrastructure like roads, railways, ports (air and water) and utilities, is the backbone of “empowered Africa”.

Most homes or towns supply their own energy needs through solar panels, wind turbines, biogas units, watermills and other sustainable energy solutions from household size and up (Gordon, 2019). Remote farms and villages are increasing in self-sufficiency due to renewables and other decentralized technologies, while homes in more urbanized regions are connected in a smart grid (see for example, Smart Grid, n.d.), where excess power production is sold or stored for later use.

Modernized agricultural techniques, transformed rural communities and better access to education for rural Africans have enabled farming to become high-tech and low-impact, using connected sensors, drones and satellites to monitor fields and solar-powered robots to harvest, remove weeds and supply precise amounts of water, fertilizer or pesticide. The more expensive pieces of technology are co-owned by groups of farmers in a sharing-economy model. Less fertile areas are used for livestock supplying milk, meat, wool and leather, with methods like managed grazing ensuring optimal health of grasslands (Williamson, 2015). Non-proprietary genetically engineered crops and livestock are introduced if they can improve nutrition or reduce environmental impact. Fears of genetically modified organisms remain strong in Europe, but Africa should be carried away by the main objective of feeding its growing population; the safety of food matters too.

While products made in Africa are still mainly intended for the domestic market, which ensures a high degree of self-sufficiency for the continent, African production is increasingly integrated into the global market and achieving optimal production capacity. Production is highly automated, but there is still a need for many skilled engineers, designers and craftsmen. Internal trade barriers are largely removed, but many trade barriers (tariffs and technical barriers) to the Western world are still in place, limiting export to these countries.

Innovative communities around African universities collaborate on knowledge-intensive projects, including ways to improve farming, mitigating the effects of climate change and ensuring broad access to medical care. The focus on developing low-cost, decentralized solutions has reduced the need for extensive infrastructure development. Such solutions have become export successes to developing nations in Asia and South America and even to outlying regions of developed nations like Canada, Australia and the Russian Federation. An empowered Africa will need to: (a) stop exporting primary commodities by developing national and regional value chains; (b) deepen fiscal and policy spaces; (c) invest in youth to ensure the offering of sophisticated skills to the rest of the world; (d) advocate for a balanced approach to globalization – movement of technology, trade, finance and people; and (e) promote a balanced approach to development by ensuring rural and urban transformation simultaneously. A workforce of well-educated women is a core new resource for these innovation centres, and indeed, the creation of an educated female workforce has been one of the main disruptors driving the development of Africa over the last couple of decades towards 2050.

Migration within Empowered Africa

At the international level, in this scenario, migration is continuing to be foreseen as an important agenda for United Nations Member States. In 2050, it is expected that collaboration and cooperation on the global management of migration have further developed. By this time, global cooperation on migration will have added to the world's understanding and management of the issue as it relates to responding to situations of crisis, addressing root causes and taking preventive measures to ensure that migration is beneficial to all. Africa has historically been a leader in both creating home-grown initiatives and adapting to and implementing international instruments on the management of migration. Evidence-based migration policies, driven in part by the accumulation of data, will help to advance the benefits of migration for all. Technological advance will allow for more early predictions, giving enough time to respond to humanitarian disasters.

Regionally, in addition to the global process at its hand, Africa will continue to lead in managing migration through its regional protocols and regional process. Regional integration in the continent, in part driven by the implementation of the African Union's Agenda 2063 and global cooperation on migration, will have driven more interlinkages and made it easier for Africans to move more freely around the continent for work. The Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community Relating to Free Movement of Persons, Right of Residence and Right of Establishment will help to drive economic growth. More free movement and opportunities will have lessened the drive and desire to migration outside the continent. Although migration outside the continent will continue, Africa will have developed policies to attract its foreign-born and foreign-trained talents to return.

Nationally, cities in Africa will be better connected through collaboration on economic and migration policies. To compete for the best talent, cities will be forced to invest in education infrastructures to thrive in technology-advanced societies.

SCENARIO 2 – SLOWDOWN IN THE WEST

Main drivers

In the year 2050, the developed countries are fading from their hegemonic economic and political dominance. Economic growth is low in Europe and the United States because manufacturing and digital services, and with them, innovation, have largely moved to Asia and Africa. Most Western countries and the most developed Asian ones have ageing, elderly populations and struggle with low fertility rates. Populations are slowly shrinking due to xenophobic nationalism, limiting immigration to below the levels needed to offset low birth rates. Remaining production is highly automated, reducing the need for labour, and a growing proportion of people of working age are employed in health care and eldercare. But most Western countries failed to realize their economies are consumption based, which automation cannot address. It can only address labour shortage but do little to boost aggregate demand. Some countries have started to experience under-utilization of their educational systems. This strains the economy, and a lot of infrastructure is crumbling. A series of bursting bubbles in the economy has further subdued growth and led to high levels of inflation in the European Union and especially the United States. South America and the Russian Federation are not doing much better, plagued by low innovation, eroding infrastructure and high levels of corruption. Global economic growth is moderate, with Asia as the main engine; but China and Japan, once the powerhouses of Asian growth, are limited by ageing populations and a lack of young labour. Rather than making up for this deficit by importing labour from Africa, these high-tech nations have focused on developing robots and artificial intelligence to handle an increasing range of tasks.

The lack of opportunities in the West and the more developed parts of the East means that Africans are seeking fortunes inside Africa rather than outside. High inflation levels in Western countries have dramatically eased the burden of old foreign debt, which tended to be in Western currencies before China stepped into the game. There are fewer conflicts in the continent, although some nations continue to suffer ethnic, political or religious tensions; the peace accord in the Horn of Africa is a good example. Climate change has led to recurring issues of drought and flooding, but global food prices are low due to overproduction and reduced waste through technological means. Aid tends to reach affected areas before such problems can turn into humanitarian disasters. This has created a level of stability that makes long-term investment in Africa more attractive, both intraregional and from Asia, and opportunities have steadily been on the rise in Africa. Next to Asia, Africa is the region experiencing the highest level of growth.

Steady investments in improving infrastructure like roads, railways and power grids – among other infrastructure that will strengthen resilience against climate change – have created a class of regional migrant workers that move across the continent from one infrastructure project to the next. The rate of urbanization is high as many seek opportunities in cities, and while there are a lot of issues and challenges connected with rapid urban growth (such as growing slums, pollution

and insufficient sanitation infrastructure), the new African megacities have become crucibles driving economic growth, as seen in Asia in the first decades of the century.

While automation is an issue for employment levels, it has turned out that fears of mass unemployment were overblown. The efforts required to develop and construct the necessary hardware and software for full automation are quite high and requirements tend to change rapidly. As such, it is often faster to retrain employees than to reprogram or rebuild automated hardware. With a growing African workforce, finding labour is not a major issue. However, the economy is rather polarized, with low wages for low-skilled workers due to competition for jobs, while owners of factories, large-scale farms and infrastructure can get very rich – a phenomenon deepening and widening income inequality.

Africa is not quite a centre of innovation but what is present is enough to drive growth. However, the catch-up strategy is suboptimal in certain places, leading to destabilization in select African economies. The rapid pace of change for these advanced technologies challenges Africa's capacity to cope and adapt – and in actual sense, it is destabilizing.

Migration within slowdown in the West

Within Africa, there is significant migration to the growing cities, and by 2050, more than 60 per cent of the population is urban. Accelerated rural development programmes are required to enable rural–urban migration through localization of migration governance, to avoid overstressing government capacity. Lagos and Kinshasa are both nearing populations of 40 million, and a dozen other major African cities have surpassed 30 million. City-to-city networks have increasingly localized migration governance, and affected movement patterns and routes of migrants. Transport infrastructure between these megacities is steadily improving, making it easy for the urban population to move to cities with the best opportunities. Some of the largest cities struggle to absorb the influx of people and attempt to restrict migration but with little success, since it is difficult to control migration to the outlying slum districts that are also sources of the cheap labour that drives growth. This calls for triple development pathways: (a) a national development approach that promotes symbiotic relationships between rural and urban communities; (b) regional developmentalism that promotes growth of regional corridors and value chains; and (c) a full-fledged implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA).

Infrastructure projects around the continent attract many migrant workers who move on to the next project as soon as the current one is finished. With full implementation of free movement protocols, experienced workers have no problems finding jobs, and there are few restrictions on intra-African migration for adults willing to work, with near-free movement agreements among many African countries. There is some migration out of Africa, mainly of highly educated people to Asia, but this migration is insignificant compared to internal movements. And the Slowdown of the West has led to a large-scale return from the previous African diaspora.

Brain drain is much less of a concern, despite Africa not being on the cutting edge of technological and economic developments. Some well-educated Europeans and Asians emigrate to Africa, but due to the low-tech focus, opportunities are too few to drive major migration waves into Africa. Most Western countries and the most developed Asian economies have barely enough young people to supply their own labour needs, reducing the drive for their young people to migrate.

The shrinking Western population underutilizes educational infrastructure and facilities. Filling these facilities and generating incomes to run them open is an opportunity for additional skill development for African youths that could afford them. It could also promote strong exchange programmes between African universities and those of the rest of the world, especially the Western world.

SCENARIO 3 – THE AFRICAN WAY

Main drivers

Most of the world has experienced strong economic growth from 2020 to 2050, in part due to increased productivity from automation technologies and successful distributional policies, preventing extreme economic polarization. This includes policies to support democratization and wealth distribution, while curbing tax evasion, economic and political corruption, international money laundering and illicit financial flows, as well as illegal destruction of Africa's natural resources including deforestation and overfishing in oceans. Growing wealth drives a greater focus on climate change, advancing the transition to a sustainable global economy.

The focus in most African countries has been finding cooperation and unity, and by 2035, most violent unrest in Africa has ended. Looking forward, trendsetting countries have rejected copying Western culture and instead supporting measures to build a twenty-first-century African identity based on cutting-edge technology, combined with updating the best parts of local traditions and culture. As articulated in Agenda 2063, the goal is to choose a uniquely African way into the future rather than just playing catch-up with the old developed nations. Global brand stores are frowned upon, while local alternatives are actively supported. Pride in African heritage is strong but does not stand in the way of change. Architecture, fashion and popular culture find inspiration in tradition while using new technology to create a culture with a foot in the past and a head in the future. There is a desire to not let African cities look too much like modern cities all over the world, which tend to have the same global brand stores and styles of architecture. Why strive to be like everybody else when you can go your own way? Support of local culture and innovative architecture with roots in the past help achieve this goal. High-quality education and vocational training are widespread and key drivers.

There is a lot of focus on developing local technological capacities through the support of technical universities and companies in selected high-tech industries, mainly transport, energy and robotics, in part inspired by China's successful Made in China 2025 initiative (Institute for Security and Development Policy, 2018). Robots and AI play a large part in the development of sustainable infrastructure across Africa. Inspired by China's Belt and Road initiative (Chatzky and McBride, 2020), smart machines work 24/7 in collaboration with human workers to build highways, bridges, high-speed railways, ports and airports, all mainly for automated electric vehicles, thus slowly but surely connecting cities across the continent.

A major ongoing project is afforesting parts of the Sahara (such as the Green Great Wall) for carbon capture and as a source of food and lumber (see, for example, Sahara Forest Project, n.d.). One of the world's first commercial fusion plants has been built near Mombasa. In 2039, the National Space Research and Development Agency sent the first African woman into space with the *Anansi IV* spacecraft, launched from the Abuja spaceport; but since then, the Nigerian space agency has mainly focused on satellites and robotic probes, such as for asteroid mining.

Tourism has shifted significantly across the African continent. Technological progress increases global mobility and makes travel easier. The combination of stability, unique cultural offerings and heritage sites, and a warm climate with vast wildlife reserves makes Africa a very popular destination for tourists from outside as well as inside Africa, and urban tourism to Africa's great and unique cities has increased significantly. As a result, tourism is now responsible for roughly 10 per cent of GDP across Africa, triple what it was in 2019. The African Union's Agenda 2063 and AfCFTA have played a significant role in driving this increase in tourism across the continent. Meanwhile, historical items removed in the past by Western museums and collectors are slowly being returned to their rightful places in Africa and the success of the Grand Egyptian Museum built on the prowess of the age-long Egyptian pyramid, which opened in 2020, has led to the rise of similar prestige museums around Africa. Visitors to these museums flock from all regions of Africa, as well as from other parts of the world. African designer furniture, fabrics, food specialties and local wines (such as South African wine) are increasingly popular worldwide. The phenomenal growth of the creative economy like the Nollywood in Nigeria offers economic diversification with maximum youth engagement.

Family planning and improved education of women has reduced population growth to less than the United Nations' median forecast. The African population is 2.3 billion by 2050, with an expected peak at 3.8 billion by the end of the century, compared to the UN's earlier median 2100 projection of 4.5 billion. The proportion of people of working age is very high; this is generally an economic advantage, though a lot of people in the tourism sector may find it difficult to find work outside peak tourist season. However, with decent tourist-season wages and low costs of living, most people manage to get by as seasonal workers, and many choose to attend universities off-season, online or in person. Not everybody benefits equally from the developments, and economic polarization is an issue. Slums with poor sanitation and transport infrastructure are growing outside major cities, well away from centres of tourism, industry and finance.

Migration within the African way

Globally, migration is on the rise, fuelling a new class of global citizens with ties to various continents. Africa develops as a pivotal migration destination due to its flourishing industries and high-ranking universities. Global instruments for cooperation on migration will remain a valuable tool for African governments and United Nations Member States to benefit from migration. Implementation of the African Union's Agenda 2063 and the Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community Relating to Free Movement of Persons, Right of Residence and Right of Establishment will continue to help further link African countries. Increasing inter-linkages between African countries will make travel within the continent more affordable.

Among the well-educated, it is more common than not to study and work in several parts of the world, particularly when young. The flourishing African industries and top-notch technical universities attract migrants from abroad, both as students and academic staff, and many choose to remain in Africa rather than move back to their country of usual residence. It has become fashionable for young Africans to take a *wanderjahr* travelling around the continent to build their identities. Inexpensive youth travel passes, modelled after the European Interrail pass,² make this financially manageable for most youths. Quite a lot of these youths settle down in countries or regions other than the ones in which they were born.

With tourist seasons varying across Africa due to different climates, many people migrate with the seasons to service tourists wherever jobs can be found. In addition, strong population growth in Africa has resulted in many Western migrants relocating to Africa to access large, growing markets and taking advantage of low production cost. There is also steady migration to other parts of the world, and young, reasonably well-educated workers are generally welcome in an affluent world with ageing populations. In turn, increasing numbers of elderly Westerners move to Africa for their golden years due to low living costs, improving infrastructure and quality of life, a warm climate, rich cultural experiences and improved safety and security.

CONCLUSION

Migration is a strong barometer of development progress dynamics. It is therefore an important part of Africa's history, reality and future. To tap into its benefits, it will be up to Africa to plan for and respond to the future that awaits, including the ongoing transformation of the present. There are many global (Global Compact for Migration, United Nations 2030 Agenda) and home-grown (African Union's 2063 Agenda, Continental Free Trade Area and the African Union Free Movement of Persons Protocol) instruments that Africa has at its disposal. Migration has ascended to one of the top policy agendas of the United Nations and of leading nations globally. The premise of this chapter and the scenarios highlighted above has been to further drive discussions and spark much-needed debate.

Developing exploratory scenarios is a useful exercise for a variety of stakeholders and decision makers thinking about and strategizing around how to undertake long-term planning. Most importantly, assessment of migration futures must engage with the key critical uncertainties surrounding the economic, political and environmental factors driving migration. The drivers of migration in Africa will continue to evolve as the continent enters the middle of the twenty-first century.

A leapfrogging approach to migration may look apparently good. But its destabilizing impact on Africa makes it a suboptimal choice. The African way offers opportunity for Africa to become migration and investment destinations to the rest of the world – while at the same time becoming the feeders of overdeveloped and underutilized infrastructural facilities in regions experiencing ageing population.
















² See www.interrail.eu/en/interrail-passes/global-pass.

As the developed scenarios illustrate, it is not difficult to imagine realistic positive visions for Africa. However, it is important to remember that these futures do not just come into being by themselves; they are the results of actions taken by African leaders to address the very real problems confronting the continent. Events outside Africa may drive important factors that African leaders have little control over, underscoring the need to adopt resilient, versatile strategies for the future, and for Africa and her allies to collaborate to realize the best possible future scenario. Realizing a positive future for Africa will require the sustained commitment of Africa and its global partners to work jointly together to ensure that no one is left behind, and that migration continues to be positive, safe and beneficial to all.

Heavy investment in youth development including skills and entrepreneurial, political, social and leadership development remains critical. It also calls for rural revitalization, rural–urban linkages, megacities among African countries, regional corridor development and implementation of AfCFTA. All these are key to deepening intra-African migration for the continent’s transformation and development. This requires dedicated leadership, committed followership and long-range visioning and planning accompanied by responsive, transparent and accountable governance.

ANNEX

Megatrends driving African migration futures


| Knowledge growth | | |
|--|--|--|
|  <p>Automation Automation will improve productivity and reduce the need for low-skilled labour. Increased use of robots in developed countries risks undermining the traditional labour cost advantage of developing countries (Idowu, 2018). Operating robots in the United States will become cheaper than Kenyan wages in 2033 (Overseas Development Institute, 2018).</p> |  <p>Information explosion Advanced information and communication technologies, including satellite-based or stratospheric network access, will improve communications and provide ubiquitous access to global knowledge, education and markets. Smart sensors can gather detailed data about weather, traffic, farming, crime and more, which can be analysed for forecasts and aid resilience, reducing migration pressure.</p> |  <p>Improving health Better medical knowledge, improved nutrition and improved living conditions will reduce mortality for all age groups, leading to a less steep population pyramid with a greater fraction of the population at working age. New medical tools can be used to combat epidemics more effectively, reducing the pressure to migrate from affected regions.</p> |
| Economic growth | | |
|  <p>Growing national wealth Africa's overall GDP, measured in purchasing power parity, is forecast to triple towards 2050 (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2017). If benefits of growth are effectively distributed, this allows extreme poverty to be eradicated and infrastructure, including that of transport, to be massively improved.</p> |  <p>Polarization If current trends, including rapid urbanization, continue, a growing fraction of wealth will become concentrated in fewer hands, with the wealth of the richest growing far faster than that of the poorest.</p> |  <p>Immaterialization As basic material needs are satisfied, there will be a growing focus on immaterial goods and needs. Markets will grow for culture, entertainment, personal health and personal development, with associated job creations and labour needs.</p> |
| Empowerment | | |
|  <p>Decentralization Improved civil liberties and access to assets and opportunities are formerly restricted to the elite. This allows more bottom-up innovation. Decentralized energy production, including renewable energy, makes local communities self-sufficient.</p> |  <p>Individualization There is greater freedom to choose one's own lifestyle and identity, and less persecution of heterogeneous lifestyles, religious beliefs and sexual identities. This will reduce forced migration due to persecution.</p> |  <p>Erosion of boundaries This means erosion of distinctions like class, nationality and religious affiliation in select locations and regions. Work and leisure blend together and services are increasingly becoming available 24/7.</p> |
| Globalization | | |
|  <p>Market globalization More multinational corporations will operate in and out of Africa. If globalization is genuinely practiced, African companies will get easier access to foreign markets and improved infrastructure, and trade in and out of Africa will grow. All of this will benefit the African economy and likely create jobs.</p> |  <p>Increasing migration The overall trend is for more global migration of students, workers and retirees, but more migration due to war, poverty and climate change – both within and outside Africa – are likely to be seen. Migration across national borders will likely be far easier.</p> |  <p>Rising global consciousness There is a growing realization that global problems like climate change, tax evasion, war, terrorism and pollution require coordinated international action. It is likely that Africa will not be alone in handling these major issues, reducing migration pressure out of affected regions if the challenges are alleviated.</p> |
| Anthropogenic change | | |
|  <p>Climate change Warmer climate, rising sea levels and more extreme weather as a result of human activity are expected. Local farming will suffer, leading to migration due to famine unless rural transformation and climate change adaptation are prioritized. According to the World Bank, up to 143 million people could be displaced due to climate change by 2050, just from sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia and Latin America.</p> |  <p>Agglomeration United Nations forecasts that 58 per cent of Africans will live in cities by 2050, compared to 40 per cent in 2016. Almost the entire net population growth in Africa will be in urban areas, with 1.4 billion urban Africans by 2050, compared to 0.5 billion today. This migration to major cities especially will likely result in the formation of massive slums.</p> |  <p>Growing resource needs Africa's population is projected to grow to 1.6 billion by 2030 and 2.5 billion by 2050 (UN DESA, 2017). With growing population and growing wealth comes a growing need for food, water, energy and raw materials. Value-added extraction and transportation of resources will create jobs and attract labour, but extraction may also create environmental issues that drive local population away.</p> |

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